Section 11: The Laws of Nations

Nations as Persons

A new set of duties arises among neighbouring states, suitable to the nature of their commerce with each other after:
    civil government has been established over most of mankind, and
    different societies have been formed contiguous to each other.
Political writers tell us that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is like one person.
    Different nations and private persons require mutual assistance.
    At the same time, their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord.
In this case, nations resemble individuals.
    Yet they are very different in other respects.
    No wonder they:
        regulate themselves by different maxims, and
        give rise to a new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations.
            Under these are:
                the sacredness of the ambassadors,
                the declaration of war, and
                the abstaining from poisoned arms with other duties of that kind.
            These are created for the commerce between different societies.

These rules are super-added to, but do not entirely abolish, the laws of nature.
    The three fundamental rules of justice are duties of princes and of subjects:
        the stability of possession,
        its transference by consent, and
        the performance of promises.
The same interest produces the same effect in both cases.
    There must be perpetual war if possession has no stability.
    There can be no commerce if property is not transferred by consent.
    There can be no leagues nor alliances if promises are not observed.
Therefore, the advantages of peace, commerce, and mutual succour, which take place among individuals, make us extend the same notions of justice to different kingdoms.

Different Moral Systems

The system of morals calculated for princes is much more free than the system of morals governing private persons.
    This maxim is very current in the world.
    Few politicians are willing to avow this.
    Though it has been authorized by the practice of all ages.
This does not affect public duties and obligations.
    The most solemn treaties still has force among princes.
    Princes do actually form treaties among themselves.
        They must propose some advantage from their execution.
        The prospect of such future advantage must:
            engage them to perform their part, and
            establish that law of nature.
This political maxim means that the morality of princes has the same reach.
    But it does not have the same force as the morality of private persons.
    It may lawfully be transgressed from a more trivial motive.
However shocking such a proposition may appear to certain philosophers, it will be easy to defend it on those principles of the origin of justice and equity.

Men quickly restrain their actions and impose an obligation to observe the laws of justice when they have found that it is impossible to:
    subsist without society, and
    maintain society while they give free course to their appetites.
This obligation of interest does not rest here.
    By the necessary course of the passions and sentiments, it creates the moral obligation of duty while we:
        approve of actions that maintain the peace of society, and
        disapprove of actions that disturb it.
The same natural obligation of interest:
    takes place among independent kingdoms, and
    gives rise to the same morality.
No one so corrupt morals will approve of a prince who voluntarily:
    breaks his word, or
    violates any treaty.
The intercourse of different states is advantageous and even necessary sometimes.
    But it is not so necessary nor advantageous as the intercourse among individuals.
    Without this, it is impossible for human nature to ever subsist.
The natural obligation to justice among different states is not so strong as among individuals.
    The moral obligation arising from this natural obligation must share its weakness.
    We must give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister who deceives another, than to a private gentleman who breaks his word.

What proportion do these two species of morality bear to each other?
    We can never precisely answer this question.
    It is impossible to reduce to numbers the proportion between them.
        This proportion is not studied by men.
The practice of the world is better at teaching us our duty, than the most subtle philosophy.
    This may serve as a convincing proof that everyone:
        has an implicit notion of the foundation of those moral rules on natural and civil justice, and
        is sensible that they arise merely from:
            human conventions, and
            our interest in preserving peace and order.
Otherwise, the reduction of the interest would never:
    relax the morality, and
    reconcile us more easily to any transgression of justice among princes and republics, than in the private commerce of one subject with another.