The Fourth Source Of Authority: Right of Succession

The right of succession naturally prevails after the founding sovereign dies when long possession, present possession, or conquest do not take place.
Men are commonly induced to:
    place the son of their late monarch on the throne, and
    suppose him to inherit his father's authority.
Men are led to prefer the son of their late monarch to any other person because of:
    the presumed consent of the father,
    the imitation of the succession to private families, and
    the state's interest in choosing the most powerful person with the most followers.24

Footnote 23:

I do not assert that present possession or conquest are enough to give a title against long possession and positive laws.
I only assert that they:
    have some force,
    will be able to call the balance when the titles are unequal, and
    will even sometimes sanctify the weaker title.
It is difficult to determine what degree of force they have.
I believe that they have great force in all disputes on the rights of princes.

Footnote 24:

To prevent mistakes, this case of succession is not the same with the case of hereditary monarchies, where custom has fixed the right of succession.
These depend on the principle of long possession explained above.


These reasons have some weight.
    To one who considers this impartially, it will appear that there concur some principles of the imagination, along with those views of interest.
Through the natural transition of the thought, the royal authority seems connected with the young prince:
    even in his father's lifetime, and
    still more after his death.
This union is completed most naturally:
    by a new relation, and
    by giving him what seems naturally to belong to him.

To confirm this, we may weigh the following curious phenomena.
    In elective monarchies, the right of succession has no place in the laws and settled custom.
    Yet its influence is so natural.
        It is impossible to:
            entirely exclude it from the imagination, and
            render the subjects indifferent to the son of their deceased monarch.
    Hence in some elective monarchies, the choice commonly falls on one of the royal family.
        In some governments, they are all excluded.
Those contrary phenomena proceed from the same principle.
    When the royal family is excluded, a refinement in politics makes people:
        sensible of their propensity to choose a sovereign in that family, and
        jealous of that family's liberty, lest their new monarch, aided by this propensity:
            establishes his family, and
            destroys the freedom of future elections.

The history of Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus offer some reflections on this.
Cyrus pretended a right to the throne above his elder brother, because he was born after his father's accession.
    I do not pretend that this reason was valid.
    I only infer that he would never have used that pretext, were it not for the qualities of the imagination above-mentioned.
        We are naturally inclined by those qualities to unite, by a new relation, whatever objects we already find united.
    Artaxerxes had an advantage over his brother, as being the eldest son and the first in succession.
        But Cyrus was more closely related to the royal authority, as being begot after his father was invested with it.

Should convenience be the source of all the right of succession?
Should men gladly take advantage of any rule which lets them:
    fix the successor of their late sovereign, and
    prevent that anarchy and confusion, which attends all new elections?
This motive may contribute something to the effect.
    But without another principle, it is impossible such a motive would take place.
A nation's interest requires that the succession to the crown be fixed one way or other.
    So that if the relation of blood did not affect the public interest, it would never have been regarded without a positive law.
    It would have been impossible that so many positive laws of different nations could ever have concurred precisely in the same views and intentions.

The Fifth Source of Authority: Positive Laws

When the legislature establishes a certain form of government and succession of princes, at first sight this must resolve into some of the preceding titles of authority.
The legislative power is the origin of this positive law.
    It must be established by:
        original contract,
        long possession,
        present possession,
        conquest, or
        succession.
Consequently, the positive law must derive its force from some of those principles.
    A positive law can only derive its force from these principles.
    But it does not acquire all the force of the principle from whence it is derived.
    It considerably loses the force in the transition.
Suppose that a government is established for many centuries on a certain system of laws, forms, and methods of succession.
    If its legislative power suddenly changes the whole system of government and introduces a new constitution, I think that few people will think themselves bound to comply with this change, unless it had an evident tendency to the public good.
    But men think themselves still free to return to the ancient government.
Hence the notion of fundamental laws which are supposed to be unalterable by the sovereign's will.
    The Salic law in France is of this nature.
    How far these fundamental laws extend is not determined in any government.
    It is not possible that it ever should.
There is such an indefensible gradation from the most material laws to the most trivial.
    From the most ancient laws to the most modem, it will be impossible to:
        set bounds to the legislative power, and
        determine how far it may innovate in the principles of government.
    That is the work more of imagination and passion than of reason.

People will soon learn to treat all disputes on the rights of princes very lightly if they consider:
    the history of several nations,
    their revolutions, conquests, increase, and reduction,
    how their governments are established, and
    the successive right transmitted from one person to another.
They will be convinced that the following virtues hold less reason than bigotry and superstition:
    a strict adherence to any general rules, and
    the rigid loyalty to important persons and families.
In this, the study of history confirms the reasonings of true philosophy.
    It shows us the original qualities of human nature.
    It teaches us to regard political controversies as:
        incapable of any decision in most cases, and
        entirely subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty.
Where the public good does not demand a change, the concurrence of the following titles forms the strongest title to sovereignty:
    original contract
    long possession
    present possession
    succession
    positive laws.
        This concurrence is justly regarded as sacred and inviolable.
But when these titles are mingled and opposed in different degrees, they often occasion perplexity.
    They are less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery.
Roman Emperor Tiberius had an only son, Drusus, and an adopted son Germanicus.
    If Tiberius died without naming a successor, which of his two sons should have been named emperor?
    Should the right of adoption be equivalent to the right of blood in a nation where it had:
        the same effect in private families, and
        in two instances, already taken place in the public?
    Should Germanicus be esteemed the eldest son because he was born before Drufus?
        Or should he be the younger, because he was adopted after Drusus' birth?
    Should the elder's right be regarded in a nation where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession to private families?
    Should the Roman empire at that time be esteemed hereditary, because of two examples?
        Or should it be regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present possessor, as being founded on a recent usurpation?
We shall never be able to satisfy an impartial inquirer who:
    adopts no party in political controversies, and
    will be satisfied only with sound reason and philosophy.