The Objects Of Allegiance

Submission To Government

Sometimes it may be justifiable to resist supreme power in sound politics and morality. But ordinarily, nothing can be more pernicious and criminal. Such revolutions always cause: convulsions, the subversion of all government, and a universal anarchy and confusion among mankind. Big and civilized societies cannot subsist without government. Government is entirely useless without an exact obedience. We should always weigh the advantages we reap from authority against the disadvantages. Through this, we shall become more scrupulous of practicing the doctrine of resistance. The common rule requires submission. The exception can only happen in cases of grievous tyranny and oppression.

A blind submission is commonly due to magistracy.
    Who should our lawful magistrates be?
    To answer this, let us recollect what we have already established on the origin of government and political society.
Men experience the impossibility of preserving any order in society while everyone:
    is his own master,
    violates the laws of society, or
    observes those laws according to his present interest or pleasure.
Men naturally invent government.
    Government puts men out of their own power to transgress the laws of society, as far as possible.
    Government, therefore, arises from the same voluntary conversation of men.
    The same convention which establishes government will:
        also determine the persons who are to govern, and
        remove all doubt and ambiguity in this.
    The voluntary consent of men must here have the greater efficacy.
The authority of the magistrate initially stands on the foundation of a promise of the subjects.
    This promise binds themselves to obedience, as in every other contract or engagement.
Therefore, the same promise which binds them to obedience:
    ties them down to a particular person, and
    makes him the object of their allegiance.

But the case is entirely altered:
    after government has been established on this footing for some time, and
    after our separate interest in submission has produced a separate moral sentiment.
A promise is no longer able to determine the particular magistrate.
    Since it is no longer considered as the foundation of government.
We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission.
    We imagine that such persons have a right to command, as we are bound to obey.
    These notions of right and obligation are derived from nothing but the advantage we reap from government.
        This gives us a repugnance to practise resistance ourselves.
        This makes us displeased with any resistance in others.
The original sanction of government is interest.
    But in this new state of affairs, it is remarkable that interest does not decide our leaders, as the original sanction did initially when affairs were based on a promise.
    If men were to regulate their conduct by the view of a public or private interest, they would:
        involve themselves in endless confusion, and
        render all government ineffective.
Everyone's private interest is different.
    The public interest in itself is always one and the same.
    But it becomes the source of great dissentions, because of people's different opinions.
Therefore, the same interest which causes us to submit to magistracy:
    makes us renounce itself in the choice of our magistrates, and
    binds us down to:
        a form of government, and
        particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to the perfection in either.
The case is here the same as in that law of nature on the stability of possession.
    It is highly advantageous and even absolutely necessary to society for possession to be stable.
    This leads us to the establishment of such a rule.
But if we follow the same advantage in assigning particular possessions to particular persons, we would perpetuate the confusion which that rule intends to prevent.
    We must, therefore:
        proceed by general rules, and
        regulate ourselves by general interests in modifying the law of nature on the stability of possession.
We do not need to fear that our attachment to this law will diminish because of the frivolousness of those interests.
The mind's impulse is derived from a very strong interest.
    Those other more minute interests only direct the motion, without:
        adding anything to it, or
        reducing from it.
    It is the same case with government.
Nothing is more advantageous to society than a government.
    This interest is sufficient to make us embrace it with ardour and alacrity.
    Though we are obliged afterwards to:
        regulate and direct our devotion to government by several considerations which are not of the same importance, and
        choose our magistrates without having in view any particular advantage.