The Measures Of Allegiance

Allegiance For Protection And Security

Some political writers thought of a promise, or original contract, as the source of our allegiance to government.

They intended to establish a perfectly just and reasonable principle. But the reasoning which established it was fallacious and sophistical.

They would prove that:

• our submission to government admits of exceptions, and
• a shocking tyranny is enough to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance.

They say that since men enter into society and submit themselves to government by their free and voluntary consent, they must have certain advantages in view.

They propose to reap from those advantages.

They are contented to resign their native liberty for them.

Therefore, there is something mutual engaged on the magistrate’s part: protection and security.

Only through the hopes of these advantages can he ever persuade men to submit to him.

But when instead of protection and security, they meet with tyranny and oppression, they:

• are freed from their promises (as in all conditional contracts), and
• return to that state of liberty which preceded the institution of government.

Men would never be so foolish to enter engagements that would turn entirely to the advantage of others, without any view of bettering their own condition.

Whoever proposes to profit from our submission must make us reap some advantage from his authority.

We will never continue obeying without the performance of his part.

This conclusion is just. But the principles are erroneous.

I flatter myself that I can establish the same conclusion on more reasonable principles.

I shall not assert that:

• men perceive the advantages of government, men institute government with a view to those advantages, this institution requires a promise of obedience which imposes a conditional moral obligation. This obligation ceases to be binding whenever the other contracting party does not perform his part.

A promise itself:

• arises entirely from human conventions, and
• is invented with a view to a certain interest.

Therefore, I seek an interest that:

• is more immediately connected with government, and
• may at once be:
  • the original motive to its institution, and
  • the source of our obedience to it.

I find this interest to consist in the security and protection which we:

• enjoy in political society, and
• can never attain if we were perfectly free and independent.

Interest is the immediate sanction of government.

The one exists as long as the other exists.

Whenever the civil magistrate oppresses so far as to render his authority intolerable, we are no longer bound to submit to it.

• The cause ceases.
• The effect must cease also.

Allegiance For The Public Interest

The conclusion on our natural obligation towards allegiance is immediate and direct.
But in moral obligation, when the cause ceases, the effect does not cease.
    Because it is a principle of human nature that men:
        are mightily addicted to general rules, and
        often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induced us to establish them.
When cases are similar in many circumstances, we tend to put them on the same footing without considering that:
    they differ in the most material circumstances, and
    the resemblance is more apparent than real.
In the case of allegiance, our moral obligation of duty will not cease even if the natural obligation of interest, which caused it, has ceased.
    Men may be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical government against:
        their own interest, and
        the public interest.
General rules commonly extend beyond the principles they are founded on.
    We seldom make any exception to them, unless that exception:
        has the qualities of a general rule, and
        is founded on very numerous and common instances.
This is entirely the present case.
    Men submit to the authority of others to secure themselves against the wickedness and injustice of men, who are carried by their:
        unruly passions, and
        present and immediate interest.
    But this imperfection is inherent in human nature.
        Our rulers do not immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind because of their superior power and authority.
        What we expect from them does not depend on a change in their nature but of their situation.
            In this change, they acquire a more immediate interest to preserve order and execute justice.
            This interest is only more immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects.
        From the irregularity of human nature, we expect that they will:
            neglect even this immediate interest, and
            be transported by their passions into the excesses of cruelty and ambition.
All the following induce us to:
    open the door to exceptions, and
    make us conclude that we may resist the violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice:
        our general knowledge of human nature
        our observation of history, and
        our experience of present times.

This is mankind's general practice and principle.
A nation that could find a remedy, never:
    suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, nor
    was blamed for their resistance.
Those who took up arms against Dionysius, Nero, or Philip II, are favoured by the readers of their history.
    Only the most violent perversion of common sense can make us condemn them.
In all our notions of morals, we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience.
    Instead, we make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression.
Mankind's general opinion has some authority in all cases.
    But the general opinion in morals is perfectly infallible.
    Men cannot distinctly explain the foundation of moral principles.
        But this does not make general moral opinion less infallible.
        Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning.

Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society.
    When tyranny removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience.
The moral obligation is founded on the natural obligation.
    It therefore must cease when that ceases, especially when the subject makes us foresee very many occasions when the natural obligation:
        may cease, and
        cause us to form a general rule to regulate our conduct.

This train of reasoning is too subtle for the vulgar.
    But all men:
        have an implicit notion of it, and
        are sensible that they owe obedience to government merely because of the public interest.
    At the same time, human nature is so subject to frailties and passions which may easily:
        pervert this institution, and
        change their governors into tyrants and public enemies.
If the sense of common interest were not our original motive to obedience, what other principle is there in human nature, capable of:
    subduing the natural ambition of men, and
    forcing them to such a submission?
Imitation and custom are not sufficient.
    The question still recurs, what motive first produces:
        those instances of submission which we imitate, and
        that train of actions which produces the custom?
There is no other principle than public interest.
    If interest first produces obedience to government then the obligation to obedience must cease whenever the interest ceases.