Our civil duties

Without our civil duties:

• no government could subsist, nor
• no peace or order could be maintained in large societies where there are:
  • so many possessions on the one hand, and
  • so many real or imaginary wants on the other.

Our civil duties, therefore, must soon:

• detach themselves from our promises, and
• acquire a separate force and influence.

The interest in civil duties and promises is of the very same kind.

It is general, avowed, and prevails in all times and places.

There is, then, no reason to found one on the other, while each of them has a foundation peculiar to itself.

We might as well resolve the obligation to abstain from the possessions of others, into the obligation of a promise, as that of allegiance.

The interests are not more distinct in the one case than the other.

A regard to property is not more necessary to a savage society, than obedience is to a civil society.

The savage society is not more necessary to mankind’s survival, than civil society is to mankind’s happiness.

In short, if the performance of promises is advantageous, then so is obedience to government.

• If the former interest be general, so is the latter.
• If the one interest be obvious and avowed, so is the other.

These two rules are founded on like obligations of interest.

• Each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other.

In promises and allegiances, the two following are distinct:

• the natural obligations of interest, and
• the moral obligations of honour and conscience.

The merit or demerit of the one does not depend on the merit or demerit of the other.

We shall find this conclusion unavoidable if we consider the close connection between the natural and moral obligations.

Our interest is always engaged on the side of obedience to magistracy.

Only a great present advantage can lead us to rebellion, by making us overlook our remote interest in society’s peace and order.

A present interest may blind us with regard to our own actions.

But it does not take place with regard to the actions of others.

It does not hinder them from appearing in their true colours, as highly prejudicial to:

• public interest, and
• our own interest in particular.

This naturally gives us an uneasiness in considering such seditious and disloyal actions.

It makes us attach the idea of vice and moral deformity to them.

The same principle causes us to disapprove:

• all kinds of private injustice, and
• particularly the breach of promises.

We blame all treachery and breach of faith.

Because we consider that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on promises.

We blame all disloyalty to magistrates.

Because we perceive that without submission to government, it is impossible to:

• execute justice,
• stabilize possessions,
• transfer possessions by consent, and
• perform promises.

Here, the two interests are entirely distinct.

They must give rise to two moral obligations, equally separate and independent.

There was no such thing as a promise in the world.

But government would still be necessary in all large and civilized societies.

If promises had only their own proper obligation, without the separate sanction of government, they would have little efficacy in such societies.

This separates the boundaries of our public and private duties.

• It shows that the private duties are more dependent on public duties, than the public on the private.

Education, and the artifice of politicians, concur to:

• bestow a further morality on loyalty, and
• brand all rebellion with more guilt and infamy.

Politicians are very industrious in inculcating such notions, where their interest is so particularly concerned.

The obligation of submission to government is not derived from any promise of the subjects.

I have tried to establish my system on pure reason.

I have scarce ever cited the judgment of philosophers or historians on any article. I now appeal to popular authority and oppose the sentiments of the rabble to any philosophical reasoning.

Because men’s opinions:

• carry with them a peculiar authority, and
• are infallible.