The Origin of Government

The Short-Sightedness Of Humans

Men are most certainly governed by interest in a great measure.
    Even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, it is not to any great distance.
    It is not usual for them to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance.
It is impossible for men to consult their interest in so effective a manner as by a universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice.
    Through these rules alone, can they:
        preserve society, and
        keep themselves from falling into that savage condition called 'the state of nature'.
The interest of all men in upholding society and observing the rules of justice is:
    great, and
    so palpable and evident, even to the most rude and uncultivated humans.
        It is almost impossible for anyone who has experienced society, to be wrong in this.
How can any disorder ever arise in society if:
    men are so sincerely attached to their interest?
    their interest is so much concerned in the observance of justice?
    this interest is so certain and avowed?
What principle in human nature is:
    so powerful to overcome so strong a passion, or
    so violent to obscure such a clear knowledge?

Regarding passions, men:
    are mightily governed by the imagination, and
    proportion their affections more to how any object appears to them, than to its real and intrinsic value.
What strikes with a strong and lively idea commonly prevails over what lies in a more obscure light.
    Only a great superiority of value can compensate this advantage.
Everything contiguous to us in space or time strikes us with an idea that:
    has a proportional effect on the will and passions, and
    commonly operates with more force than any object that lies in a more distant and obscure light.
We can be convinced that a distant object excels the contiguous object.
    But we cannot regulate our actions by this judgment.
    We yield to the solicitations of our passions which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous.

This is why men:
    so often act contrary to their known interest, and
    prefer any present trivial advantage to maintain the order in society.
The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote.
    They are not able to counter-balance any immediate advantage that may be reaped from it.
However, they are nevertheless real for being remote.
    All men are subject to the same weakness.
It necessarily happens that:
    the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and
    the commerce of men is rendered very dangerous and uncertain by those violations.
You have the same propension, that I have, in favour of what is contiguous above what is remote.
    Therefore, you are naturally carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me.
    Your example:
        pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and
        gives me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me that I would be a fool if I alone restrained myself amidst the licentiousness of others.

The Government As The Solution

This quality of human nature is very dangerous to society.
It also seems incapable of any remedy.
    The remedy can only come from the consent of men.
    If men are incapable themselves to prefer the remote to the contiguous, they will never consent to anything which would:
        oblige them to such a choice, and
        sensibly contradict their natural principles and propensities.
Whoever chooses the means, also chooses the end.
    If it is impossible for us to prefer what is remote.
    It is equally impossible for us to submit to any necessity which would oblige us to such a method of acting.

This infirmity of human nature becomes a remedy to itself.
    We provide against our negligence about remote objects, merely because we are naturally inclined to that negligence.
When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute distinctions vanish.
    We always prefer whatever is preferable in itself, without considering its situation and circumstances.
    This gives rise to 'reason' in an improper sense.
        It is a principle that is often contradictory to those propensities that display themselves on the object's approach.
In reflecting on any action I am to perform next year, I always prefer the greater good, whether it will be more contiguous or remote at that time.
    Any difference in that does not make a difference in my present intentions and resolutions.
    My distance from the final determination makes all those minute differences vanish.
    I am only affected by the general and more discernible qualities of good and evil.
But on my nearer approach, those circumstances which I initially overlooked, begin to appear and influence my conduct and affections.
    A new inclination to the present good springs up.
    This makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first purpose and resolution.
I may very much regret this natural infirmity.
    I may endeavour to free my self from it.
    I may have recourse to:
        study and reflection within myself,
        the advice of friends,
        frequent meditation, and
        repeated resolution.
Having experienced how ineffective all these are, I may embrace with pleasure any other expedient which:
    restrains myself, and
    guards against this weakness.

The only difficulty, therefore, is to find out this expedient to:
    cure our natural weakness, and
    lay ourselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity, despite their violent propension to prefer the contiguous to the remote.
Such a remedy can never be effective without correcting this propensity.
    It is impossible to change or correct anything material in our nature.
    The utmost we can do is to:
        change our circumstances and situation, and
        render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote.
But this is impractical with respect to all mankind.
    It can only take place with a few who are interested in the execution of justice.
Civil magistrates, kings, ministers, governors, and rulers are indifferent persons to most of the state.
    They have no interest or but a remote one, in any act of injustice.
    They have an immediate interest in every execution of justice as they are satisfied with their:
        present condition, and
        part in society.
Here then is the origin of civil government and society.
    Men are not able radically to cure that narrowness of soul in themselves or others.
        This narrowness makes them prefer the present to the remote.
    They cannot change their natures.
    All they can do is to:
        change their situation, and
        render the:
            observance of justice the immediate interest of some persons, and
            violation of justice their more remote interest.
These persons, then, are induced to:
    observe those rules in their own conduct,
    constrain others to a like regularity, and
    enforce the dictates of equity throughout the society.
If needed, they may also:
    interest others more immediately in the execution of justice if it is necessary, and
    create civil and military officers to assist them in their government.

The Advantages Of Government

This execution of justice is the principal advantage of government.
    But it is not the only one.
Violent passions hinder men from distinctly seeing the interest they have in an equitable behaviour towards others.
    It hinders them from seeing that equity itself.
    It gives them a remarkable partiality in their own favours.
This inconvenience is corrected in the same manner as that above-mentioned.
    Those who execute the laws of justice will also decide all controversies concerning them.
    They will decide them more equitably than everyone would in his own case, as they are indifferent to most of the society.

Through these two advantages in the execution and decision of justice, men acquire a security against the weaknesses and passions of each other and of their own.
    Under the shelter of their governors, they taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual assistance.
But government extends farther its beneficial influence.
    It is not contented to protect men in those conventions they make for their mutual interest.
    It often:
        obliges them to make such conventions, and
        forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose.
The quality in human nature which causes the most fatal errors in our conduct is the quality which:
    leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and
    makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow they jointly own.
    Because it is easy for them to know each other's mind.
    Each must see that the failure to do his part would cause the whole project to be abandoned.
But it is impossible that 1,000 persons should agree in any such action.
    It is difficult for them to concert so complicated a design.
    It is still more difficult for them to execute it while each seeks to:
        free himself of the trouble and expence, and
        lay the whole burden on others.
Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences.
Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects.
    They consult only themselves to form any scheme to promote that interest.
    The failure of any one piece in the execution is connected with the failure of the whole, though not immediately.
    They prevent that failure because they find no immediate nor remote interest in it.
Thus, bridges are built, harbours opened, ramparts raised, canals formed, fleets equipped, and armies disciplined everywhere by the care of government.
    Government is composed of men subject to all human infirmities.
    But it becomes by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable.
        It is a composition exempted from all these infirmities.