The rules of justice are established merely by interest

2. The rules of justice are established merely by interest, but their connection with interest is singular and different each time.

A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest.

If it stood alone without being followed by other acts, it might be very prejudicial to society.

When a man of merit restores a great fortune to a miser or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably.

• But the public is a real sufferer.

Every separate act of justice is not more conducive to private than to public interest.

A man may impoverish himself by a single instance of integrity.

He might wish the laws of justice to be suspended for a moment with regard to that single act.

But however single acts of justice may be contrary to public or private interest, the whole scheme is absolutely requisite to:

• the support of society, and
• the well-being of every individual.

It is impossible to separate the good from the bad.

Property must be:

• stable, and
• fixed by general rules.

Even if the public becomes a sufferer in one instance, it is amply compensated by:

• the steady prosecution of the rule, and
• the peace and order it establishes.

Every person would find himself a gainer on balancing the account, since without justice:

• society must immediately dissolve, and
• everyone must fall into a savage and solitary condition infinitely worse than the worst situation that can happen in society.

Justice and property soon take place after people experience that the system of actions agreed to by society is infinitely advantageous to the whole.

Every member of society is sensible of this interest.

Everyone expresses this sense to his fellows, along with his resolution of squaring his actions by it, provided that others will do the same.

They do not need to be induced to perform an act of justice.

The first act of justice becomes an example to others.

Thus, justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest common to all.

Every act is done expecting that others will do the same.

Without such a convention, no one would ever: have dreamed that there was such a virtue as justice, or have been induced to conform his actions to it. My actions might be pernicious. I can only be induced to embrace justice on the supposition that others will imitate my example. Only this combination can: render justice advantageous, or afford me any motives to conform myself to its rules.

Why do we annex the idea of virtue to justice and vice to injustice? This will be explained briefly here and in detail in Part 3.

Interest or the natural obligation to justice has been fully explained. The natural virtues must be examined before we can give a full account of moral obligation. People are naturally induced to restrain their selfishness, in order to render their commerce safer after they find: that acting at their liberty totally incapacitates them for society, and that society is necessary to satisfy those very passions. People are initially induced only by interest to impose and observe these rules. This motive is sufficiently strong in the first formation of society. But this interest becomes more remote after society has increased into a tribe or a nation. People do not readily see that disorder follows the breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society. In our own actions, we may frequently: lose sight of that interest in maintaining order, and may follow a lesser and more present interest. The prejudice from the injustice of others is always blinded by passion, or biased by a contrary temptation.

Injustice still displeases us even when it is so distant from us as to not affect our interest. Because we consider it as: prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to everyone. We share their uneasiness by sympathy. Everything which gives uneasiness in human actions is called Vice. Whatever produces satisfaction is called Virtue. This is why the sense of moral good and evil follows on justice and injustice. This sense is derived only from contemplating the actions of others. But we do not fail to extend it even to our own actions. The general rule goes beyond the instances it arose from. At the same time, we naturally sympathize with others in their sentiments for us. Thus, self-interest is the original motive to establish justice. But a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends justice.

The Esteem For Justice

This progress of the sentiments is natural and even necessary. It is here advanced by the artifice of politicians. They have created an esteem for justice and an abhorrence of injustice in order to: govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human society. However, this has been carried too far by certain writers on morals. They seem to have given their utmost efforts to destroy all sense of virtue. The artifice of politicians can assist nature in producing the sentiments she suggests to us. It may even produce an approbation or esteem for any particular action alone. But it can never be the sole cause of our distinction between vice and virtue. Because if nature did not aid us in making distinctions, it would be in vain for politicians to talk of ‘honourable’ or ‘dishonourable’, ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘blameable’. These words would be unintelligible, as if they were from an unknown language. The most politicians can do is to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds. But still nature must: furnish the materials, and give us some notion of moral distinctions.

Our esteem for justice is increased by:
    public praise and blame, and
    private education and instruction.
Parents easily observe:
    that a man is more useful to himself and others the more probity and honour he has, and
    that probity and honour have greater force when custom and education assist interest and reflection.
This is why parents are induced to:
    inculcate the principles of probity on their children, and
    teach them to regard the observance of the rules which maintain society as worthy and honourable and their violation as base and infamous.
Through this, the sentiments of honour may:
    take root in their tender minds,
    acquire such firmness and solidity so that they may not fall short of those principles which are:
        essential to our natures, and
        most deeply rooted in our internal constitution.

The interest of our reputation further contributes to increase their solidity.
    This comes after the opinion that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice.
Nothing touches us more nearly than our reputation.
    Our reputation depends most on our conduct, with relation to the property of others.
This is why a person must never violate those principles essential to probity and honour if he:
    has any regard to his character, or
    intends to live on good terms with mankind.

There is neither justice nor injustice in the imaginary state which preceded society.
    But it does not mean that it was allowable to violate the property of others in such a state.
    I only maintain that there was no such thing as property.
    Consequently, there could be no such thing as justice or injustice.
I shall make a similar reflection regarding promises.
    I hope this reflection will remove all odium from the foregoing opinions on justice and injustice.