Clarifications On The Self

I had hoped that no matter how deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions and absurdities in every explanation of the material world. But on a stricter review of the section on personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth. I confess I do not know how to correct my former opinions and render them consistent.

If this is not a good general reason for skepticism, it is at least a sufficient one for me to entertain a modesty in all my decisions.

I shall propose the arguments on both sides.

I begin with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self.

When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annexed to these terms. Otherwise they are altogether unintelligible.

Every idea is derived from preceding impressions. We have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We therefore have idea of them in that sense.

Whatever is distinct is distinguishable. Whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination.

All perceptions are distinct.

Therefore, they:

• are distinguishable and separable,
• may be conceived as separately existent, and
• may exist separately without any contradiction or absurdity.

When I view this table and that chimney, only the particular perceptions are present to me, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers.

But this table and the chimney may exist separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar. It implies no contradiction.

Therefore, there is no contradiction in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions.

In general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All ideas are borrowed from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore, are derived from that source.

Consequently, no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But it is intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. Therefore, this proposition can never be absurd with regard to perceptions.

When I reflect on myself, I can never perceive this self without some perceptions. I can only perceive the perceptions. Therefore, the composition of these forms the self. We can conceive a thinking being to have many or few perceptions.

Suppose the mind is reduced below the life of an oyster. Suppose it has only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Do you conceive anything but that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.

Some people suppose death to be followed by the complete annihilation of this self. Death is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions: love and hatred, pain and pleasure, and thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self, since the one cannot survive the other.

Is the self the same with substance? If it is, how can that question have place concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they are distinct, what is the difference between them?

I have a notion of neither, when conceived distinct from particular perceptions.

Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions.

So far I seem to have sufficient evidence.

I explain the principle of connection which:

• binds our perceptions together, and
• makes us attribute a real simplicity and identity to them.

I know:

• that my account is very defective, and
• that only the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it.

If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding.

We only feel a connection or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. Therefore, it follows that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind The ideas of them: are felt to be connected together, and are naturally introduce each other.

This conclusion may seem extraordinary. But it should not surprise us.

Most philosophers think that: personal identity arises from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception.

The present philosophy, therefore, has a promising aspect so far. But all my hopes vanish when I explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which satisfies me on this.

In short, there are two inconsistent principles:

All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences

The mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. I cannot renounce either of them.

There would be no difficulty if: our perceptions inhered in something simple and individual, or the mind perceived some real connection among our perceptions.

I must:

• plead the privilege of a skeptic, and
• confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.

I do not pretend to pronounce it absolutely impossible to overcome. On more mature reflections, others or myself, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions.

I also confess two other smaller errors: In Vol. 1, page 106, I said that the distance between two bodies is known by the angles which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other. These angles are not known to the mind. They consequently can never discover the distance. In Vol. 1, page 144 where I said that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity.

I believe there are other differences among ideas which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. I would have been nearer the truth if I had said that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling.