The Influence Of The Imagination On The Passions

It is remarkable that:

• the imagination and affections have close union together
• nothing, which affects the imagination can be entirely indifferent to the affections.

Whenever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions: ◦ become more violent ◦ keep pace with the imagination in all its variations. • I shall not determine whether this proceeds from the above principle, that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant one. ◦ It is sufficient that we have many instances to confirm this influence of the imagination on the passions.

Any pleasure we are acquainted with, affects us more than any other superior pleasure but of whose nature we are wholly ignorant. ◦ We can form a particular and determinate idea of the pleasure we know. ◦ We conceive the unknown pleasure under the general notion of pleasure.

The more general and universal any of our ideas are, the less influence they have on the imagination. • A general idea is nothing but a particular one considered in a certain view. ◦ It is commonly more obscure because no particular idea, which we use to represent a general one, is ever fixed or determinate. ▪ It may easily be changed for other particular ones serving equally in the representation.

Themistocles told the Athenians that he had formed a design, which would be highly useful to the public. ◦ But it was impossible for him to communicate to them without ruining the execution, since its success depended entirely on its secrecy.

The Athenians, instead of granting him full power to act as he thought fitting, ordered him to communicate his design to Aristides. ◦ They had entire confidence in Aristides’ prudence. ◦ They would blindly to submit to his opinion. • Themistocles’ plan was to secretly set fire to all Greek fleets assembled in a neighbouring port. ◦ This would destroy the rivals of the Athenians at sea. ◦ Aristides returned to the assembly and told them, that Themistocles’ plan was most advantageous but most unjust. ▪ The people unanimously rejected the project.

• Charles Rollin [Ancient History (Paris, 1730–38)] admires this most unique passage of ancient history.

• He says:
    ◦ “The philosophers establish the finest maxims and most sublime rules of morality easily in their schools.
    ◦ Here, they do not decide that interest should never prevail above justice.
    ◦ It is the people who are interested in this proposal.
        ▪ They consider it important to the public good.
        ▪ They reject it unanimously and without hesitation, merely because it is contrary to justice.”

• I see nothing extraordinary in this proceeding of the Athenians.
    ◦ The same reasons, which render it so easy for philosophers to establish these sublime maxims, tend to reduce the merit of such a conduct in that people.
• Philosophers never balance between profit and honesty.
    ◦ Because their decisions are general, and neither their passions nor imaginations are interested in the objects.
• In the present case the advantage was immediate to the Athenians as a general advantage.
    ◦ It was not conceived by any particular idea.
    ◦ It must have:
        ▪ had a less considerable influence on their imaginations
        ▪ been a less violent temptation, than if they had been acquainted with all its circumstances.
• Otherwise it is difficult to conceive that everyone should so unanimously have adhered to justice, and rejected any considerable advantage,since men are commonly unjust and violent.

• Any fresh and recent satisfaction operates on the will with more violence than a distant satisfaction with traces decayed and almost obliterated.
• From whence does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions?
• The image of the past pleasure is strong and violent.
    ◦ It bestows these qualities on the idea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it by the relation of resemblance.

• A pleasure suitable to our life excites our desires and appetites more than a pleasure which is foreign to life.
    ◦ This phenomenon may be explained from the same principle.

• Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than eloquence.
    ◦ It represents objects in their strongest and most lively colours.
• We may acknowledge that such an object is valuable and another is odious.
    ◦ But until an orator excites the imagination and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence on the will or the affections.

• But eloquence is not always necessary.
• The bare opinion of another, especially when enforced with passion, will cause an idea of good or evil to influence us, which would otherwise have been entirely neglected.
    ◦ This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication.
        ▪ Sympathy is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the imagination’s force.

• It is remarkable that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination.
• In this respect, the passion’s force depends as much on the temper of the person, as the object;s nature or situation.

• I have already observed, that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression.
    ◦ This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent.
    ◦ The fiction of the imagination has no considerable influence on either of them.
        ▪ It is too weak to:
            • take hold of the mind or
            • be attended with emotion.