The Soul's Substance

I have condemned the question of the soul’s substance as utterly unintelligible.

The doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism.

It will justify all those feelings that Spinoza is so universally infamous for.

I hope at least to reap one advantage.

My adversaries will not render my present doctrine odious because they will see that they can be so easily retorted on them.

The fundamental principle of Spinoza’s atheism is the doctrine of the:

• universe’s simplicity
• unity of that substance which is inherent in thought and matter.
• He says that there is only one substance in the world.

That substance is:

• perfectly simple,
• indivisible, and
• exists everywhere, without any local presence.

All are modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being:

• Whatever we discover externally by sensation.
• Whatever we feel internally by reflection.

That being does not have any separate existence.

Every passion of the soul, every configuration of matter, however different and various:

• are inherent in the same substance, and
• preserve in themselves their characters of distinction, without communicating them to that subject.

The same substratum supports the most different modifications, without any difference in itself.

That substratum varies them, without any variation.

Time, place, and all nature’s diversity cannot produce any composition or change in its perfect simplicity and identity.

Spinoza is a famous atheist.

• His principles enter into gloomy and obscure regions.
• His hypothesis is hideous.

It is almost the same with that of the soul’s immateriality which has become so popular.

Every idea is derived from a preceding perception (Part 2, Section 6).

It is impossible that our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence, can ever be different from each other. Whatever difference between them is still incomprehensible to us.

We are obliged to:

• conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative, or
• make it the very same with a perception or impression.

The consequence I draw from this may appear as a mere sophism.

But it will be found solid and satisfactory on the smallest examination.

We can never conceive a specific deference between an object and impression.

Any conclusion we form on the connection and repugnance of impressions will not be applicable to objects.

On the other hand, whatever conclusions of this kind that we create on objects, will be applicable to impressions.

An object is supposed to be different from an impression.

We cannot be sure that the circumstance of our reasoning is common to both, if we create the reasoning on the impression.

It is still possible that the object may differ from the impression.

But when we first create our reasoning on the object, that same reasoning must be applied to the impression, because the quality of the object on which the argument is founded, must at least be conceived by the mind.

It could not be conceived unless it were common to an impression, since our ideas come from impressions.

Thus we may establish a maxim that we can only discover a connection or repugnance, between objects not extending to impressions, from an irregular principle of reasoning from experience (like that of Section 2, from the coherence of our perceptions).

But the inverse proposition might not be equally true, that all the discoverable relations of impressions are common to objects. I apply the inherent substance to two different systems of being: the physical and nonphysical.

The universe of objects which has the sun, moon, stars, earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, and houses. Spinoza tells me that these are only modifications.

The subject inherent to all of them, is simple, uncompounded, and indivisible.

The universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas, observing another sun, moon, stars, earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, and houses.

Theologians tell me that these are also modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible substance. Theologians:

• detest the first hypothesis, and
• venerate the second hypothesis.

I examine these hypotheses to see the cause of so great a partiality.

I find that they are:

• both unintelligible, and
• so much alike.

It is impossible to discover any absurdity in one, not common to both.

We have no idea of any quality in an object which does not agree to, and may not represent a quality in an impression because all our ideas are derived from our impressions.

Therefore, we can never find any repugnance between a physical object as a modification, and a simple uncompounded essence, as its substance, unless that repugnance takes place equally between:

• the perception or impression of that physical object, and
• the same uncompounded essence.

Every idea of a quality in an object passes through an impression.

Therefore, every perceivable relation, whether of connection or repugnance, must be common to both objects and impressions.