The Relation of Perceptions

An apple is one end of the table and a lemon at the other.

• The apple and lemon have a taste and color, which are complex ideas.

We conjoin these qualities.

The sweet taste of the apple and the sour taste of the lemon exist in the bodies of the apple and lemon.

• These bodies are separated by the length of the table.

This is so notable and so natural an illusion.

A physical object in space cannot be conjoined with a quality that does not exist in space.

• Yet they have many other relations.

The taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of colour and texture.

Whichever is the cause or effect, they are always co-existent.

• They are also co-temporary in their appearance in the mind.

We perceive the physical body’s taste and smell when we sense them.

The sequence of the causation and contiguity, between a physical object in space and a quality that does not exist in space have an effect on the mind.

When one appears, the mind immediately thinks of the other.

• We also try to give them a new conjunction in place, so that we make the transition easier.
• This is a common quality of human nature.

When objects are related in any way, we have a strong propensity to add a new relation to them, in order to complete the union.

When we arrange bodies, we always place things that:

• are resembling,
• in contiguity to each other, or
• at least in correspondent points of view.

This is because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities.

The effects this propensity have been already observed (towards the end of Section 2) in that resemblance.

We readily suppose this resemblance between particular impressions and their external causes.

But we find the most obvious effect of it in the present instance.

From the causation and contiguity in time between two objects, we likewise feign a conjunction in place, to strengthen the connection.

An object in space, such as an apple, can have a union in space with a quality that does not have a location, such as taste.

But this union is altogether unintelligible and contradictory.

• Is the taste of the apple in its entire body?
• If this is true, then the taste would have a shape. Or is it in one part or some parts of the apple only?

This cannot be true because the whole apple has a taste.

We are then influenced by two principles directly contrary to each other:

• the inclination of our fancy which makes us incorporate the taste with the physical object, and
• our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such a union.

We are divided between these opposite principles, so we renounce neither one nor the other.

We suppose that the apple’s taste exists within the apple’s body, but in a way that it:

• fills the whole without space, and
• exists in every part without separation.

In short, we use the principle that says a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there.

When crudely proposed, this appears so shocking.

All this absurdity comes from us trying to give a location on something that is utterly incapable of it.

This endeavour arises from our inclination to complete a union founded on a causation and contiguity of time, by attributing a conjunction to the objects in space.

But if reason must prevail if it has enough force to overcome prejudice.

Our reason can only choose either:

• Opinion 1: That some perceptions exist without any location
• Opinion 2: That some perceptions have a shape and size
• Opinion 3: That when perceptions are in physical objects, their entire being is in the whole object and its every part.

The absurdity of Opinions 2 and 3 proves the accuracy of Opinion 1.

There is no Opinion 4 because the supposition of mathematical points resolves itself into Opinion 2. Opinion 2 supposes that:

• several passions have a circular shape, and
• a number of smells conjoined with a number of sounds, may make a body of 12 cubic inches.

In this view, we condemn the materialists.

• They conjoin all thought with space.

We also equally blame their antagonists who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance.

The most vulgar philosophy informs us that no external object can make itself known to the mind:

• immediately, and
• without the interposition of an image or perception.

That table which appears to me, is only a perception.

All its qualities are qualities of a perception.

The most obvious of its qualities is space.

The perception consists of parts.

These parts are situated to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity, length, width, and thickness.

The end of length, width, and thickness is a ‘shape’.

This shape is moveable, separable, and divisible.

Mobility and separability are the distinguishing properties of physical objects.

To cut short all disputes, the very idea of space comes from an impression.

Consequently, space must perfectly agree to its impression.

If an object occupies a space then the space agrees to its object.

The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn.

After finding that impressions and ideas occupy space, he may ask his antagonists how can they incorporate a simple and indivisible substance with an object that has space?

All the arguments of Theologians may here be retorted on them.

Is the indivisible or immaterial substance on the left or on the right hand of the perception?

Is it:

• in this particular part, or in that other part?
• in every part without being extended?
• entire in any one part without deserting the rest?

The only answer to these questions:

• is absurd in itself, and
• will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with a physical object.