A Feeling or Perception Cannot Be Bound By Dimensions

Philosophers say that the soul is immaterial because it exists in divisible physical space.

But a thought, feeling, or perception is an inseparable and indivisible being.

• It is impossible for anything divisible, such as a space, can be conjoined to something indivisible, such as a feeling.

If space were conjoined to a feeling, would the feeling exist on the left or the right of the space?

• If the indivisible feeling exists within the divisible space, it must either:
  • exist in one part of the space, or
    • That space would then be indivisble and separate from the rest of the space.
  • exist in all parts of the space.
    • It would make the indivisible feeling divisible as the space.

These are all absurd and contradictory.* No one can think of a feeling that has:

• a length of 1 kilometer,
• a width of 1 meter, and
• a thickness of 1 centimeter.

Thought and space are totally incompatible.

• They can never be put together in one subject.

This argument does not affect the question on the soul’s substance directly.

• But it affects the question on the soul’s matter-like properties.

Therefore, we may consider what objects have properties like those of matter.

Space

The first notion of space is derived solely from the senses of sight and feeling.

Only what is coloured or tangible can convey that idea.

We reduce or increase our desire in a different way from how we reduce or increase the size of visible objects.

When several sounds strike our hearing at once, we create ideas of the distance of their physical sources through habit and reflection alone.

The location of that sound must either be:

• a mathematical point without parts, or
• in a space.

Whatever is in a space must have a shape, as square, round, triangular, etc.

None of these will agree to:

• a desire, or
• any impression or idea, except to sight and feeling.

A desire is indivisible.

• But it is not a mathematical point.

Otherwise, desires could be added into 2, 3, or 4 desires.

They would be disposed in a way as to have a determinate length, width, and thickness, which is absurd.

Most Perceptions of Qualities Have No Easily-Perceivable Location

I deliver a maxim that an object may exist and yet be nowhere.

Most beings actually exist this way.

This maxim is:

• condemned by several metaphysicians, and
• contrary to the most certain principles of reason.

An object may be nowhere when:

• its parts cannot create any shape or quantity, and
• its whole cannot create any shape or quantity with respect to other bodies.

This is the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling.

A moral reflection cannot be placed on the right or on the left hand of a passion

• Smell or sound cannot have a circular or square shape*.
• These perceptions are absolutely incompatible with location.
  • Even the imagination cannot ascribe it to them.

If the passions and feelings appear to the perception to have a location, the idea of space might be derived from them as well as from the sight and touch.

But this is contrary to what we have already established.

If they appear not to have any particular place, they may exist in the same way, since whatever we conceive is possible.

We do not need to prove that those simple perceptions that exist nowhere cannot be in a matter or body in a space, since it is impossible to find a relation on quality that is common to all simple perceptions and all bodies in space.

This question occurs in:

• metaphysical disputes on the soul’s nature, and
• our common life, if we think about it.