Spinoza's Philosophy -- The Soul's Immateriality

Every philosophical system has contradictions regarding:

• external physical objects
• the ideas of those objects

These contradictions are so clear and determinate in our imagination.

There are naturally bigger contradictions in every hypothesis regarding:

• our internal perceptions, and
• the nature of the mind.

We imagine that these are so much more obscure and uncertain.

The intellectual world is involved in infinite obscurities.

• It does not perplex itself with such contradictions.
• What is known is known.
• What is unknown, we must leave unknown.

Spinoza

Some philosophers promise to reduce our ignorance, at the risk of creating contradictions.

• Some reason on the material substances which they suppose are inherent to our perceptions.
• Others reason on the immaterial substances which are also inherent.
• To stop these endless objections on both sides, I ask these philosophers: What do they mean by ‘substance’ and ‘inherent’?

This question:

• is impossible to answer from the material perspective
• is very difficult to answer from the mental perspective

Every idea is derived from a precedent impression.

• If our minds are a substance, then we must also have an impression of it.
• This is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceived.

An impression can represent a substance only by resembling it. But an impression cannot resemble a substance, since, according to this philosophy, this makes it not a substance.

Those philosophers reply that the substance is not physical or material, but is an idea perceived by our minds.

But:

• what is the impression that produces it that idea?*
• how does that impression operate?
• where does it come from?
  • Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection?
  • Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent?
  • Does it attend us always, or does it only return at intervals?
    • If at intervals:
      • when does it return and
      • how is it produced?

Philosophers evade these questions by saying that the idea of a substance exists by itself and is sufficient. Such an idea:

• involves everything that can possibly be conceived, and
• will distinguish:
  • substance from accident, or
  • the soul from its perceptions.

But my reasoning is:

• whatever is clearly conceived may exist.

• everything, which is different, is distinguishable and separable by the mind.
• therefore, all our perceptions are different from each other.

This means that our perceptions:

• are also distinct and separable from everything else in the universe and
• can exist separately by themselves.

Perceptions therefore are substances.

• Substances define substances.*

We cannot arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance through:

• a idea and
• the first origin of ideas.

This is a sufficient reason for abandoning that dispute on the soul’s materiality and immateriality.

• It makes me absolutely condemn the question itself.

Our ideas only come from perceptions.*

• A ‘substance’ is not a perception.
• Therefore, we have no idea of a ‘substance’.