Analogy as a Kind of Probability and Origin of Chance
Table of Contents
3. Analogy as a Kind of Probability and Origin of Chance
This differs from the two in some material circumstances.
According to the above hypothesis, all kinds of reasoning from causes or effects are founded on:
- the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and
- the resemblance of a present object to any one of them.
These 2 invigorate the present object and enlivens the imagination.
The resemblance, along with the constant union, conveys this force and vivacity to the related idea that we believe.
If you weaken the union or resemblance, you weaken:
- the transition, and
- consequently, the belief arising from it.
The vivacity of the first impression cannot be fully conveyed to the related idea:
- if the conjunction of their objects is not constant, or
- if the present impression does not perfectly resemble any of those, whose union we are used to.
In those probabilities of chance and causes above-explained, the constancy of the union is reduced.
In the probability derived from analogy, only the resemblance is affected.
Without some degree of resemblance and union, there can be no reasoning.
But this resemblance admits of many different degrees.
The reasoning becomes proportionally firm and certain.
An experiment loses its force when transferred to instances which are not exactly resembling.
Though it may still retain as much as may be the foundation of probability, as long as there is any resemblance remaining.