Contrary Events

All our reasonings on the probability of causes are founded on the transferring of past to future.

The transferring of any past experiment to the future is enough to give us a view of the object whether:

• that experiment is single or combined with others of the same kind, and
• it is entire or is opposed by others of a contrary kind.

Suppose it acquires both these qualities of combination and opposition.

It does not lose its former power of presenting a view of the object.

It only concurs with, and opposes other experiments, that have a like influence.

A question may arise on the manner of the concurrence and opposition.

Concurrence is based on 2 hypotheses:

1. The view of the object, created by the transference of each past experiment preserves itself entirely and only multiplies the number of views.

This hypothesis is erroneous from experience.

Experience tells us that the belief attending any reasoning, consists in one conclusion, not in many similar ones.

Having many conclusions would only distract the mind.

Our finite capacity cannot comprehend too many conclusions.

The view of the object runs into the other similar and correspondent views, and gives them a superior force and vivacity.

This is how past experiments concur when they are transferred to any future event.

The contrary views are incompatible with each other.

It is impossible that the object can at once exist conformable to both of them.

Thus, their influence becomes mutually destructive.

The mind is determined to the superior only with that force remaining after subtracting the inferior force.

To the general readers, this reasoning is abstruse.

They are not accustomed to such profound reflections on the intellectual faculties of the mind.

They will reject as chimerical whatever does not strike with the:

• common received notions, and
• easiest and most obvious principles of philosophy.

Some pains are required to enter into these arguments.

Perhaps very little pains are necessary to perceive the imperfection of:

• every vulgar hypothesis on this subject, and
• the little light, which philosophy can afford us in such sublime and such curious speculations.

Let men be fully persuaded of these two principles:

There is nothing in any object, considered in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference on any object beyond those of which we have had experience. These will throw men so loose from all common systems, that they will more easily receive any extraordinary system.

These principles are sufficiently convincing, even with regard to our most certain reasonings from causation. With regard to these conjectural or probable reasonings, they acquire further a new degree of evidence. It is not the object presented to us which makes us draw a conclusion on any other object, because this latter object is supposed as uncertain. The uncertainty is derived from a concealed contrariety of causes in the first presented object.

If any of the causes were placed in the known qualities of that object:

• the causes would no longer be concealed, or
• our conclusion would no longer be uncertain.

But it is equally obvious that if the transference of the past to the future were founded merely on a conclusion of the understanding, it could never bring any belief or assurance.

When we transfer contrary experiments to the future, we can only repeat these contrary experiments with their particular proportions.

Those proportions could not produce assurance in any single event, unless the fancy:

• melted together all those images that concur
• extracted from them a single idea or image which is intense and lively in proportion to:
  • the number of experiments from which it is derived, and
  • their superiority above their antagonists.

Our past experience presents no determinate object.

Our belief, however faint, fixes itself on a determinate object.

The belief arises not merely from the transference of past to future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoined with it.

This may lead us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into all our reasonings.

I shall conclude with 2 reflections:

1. When the mind forms a reasoning on any matter of fact which is only probable, it views its past experience and transfers it to the future.

The mind is presented with so many contrary views of its object.

The views of the same kind unite and run into one act of the mind, to fortify and inliven it.

But if this multitude of views comes from voluntary imagination and not experience, this effect does not follow.

If it follows, it does not follow in the same degree.

2. Custom and education produce belief by a repetition not derived from experience.

Yet this requires a long time and a very frequent and undesigned repetition.

In general, a person who voluntarily repeats any idea in his mind, supported only by one past experience, would not be more inclined to believe the object’s existence, than if he was contented with just one survey of it.

Each act of the mind is separate and independent.

It has a separate influence.

It does not join its force with the force of its fellows.

Each act is not united by any common object.

They have no relation to each other.

Consequently they make no transition or union of forces.

We shall understand this phenomenon better afterwards.

Reflection 2 is founded on:

• those large probabilities which the mind can judge of, and
• the minute differences it can observe between them.

When the chances or experiments amount to 10,000 on one side and 10,001 on the other, the judgment prefers the latter because of that superiority.

Though it is plainly impossible for the mind to:

• run over every particular view, and
• distinguish the superior vivacity of 10,001, when its difference from 10,000 is so small.

We have a parallel instance in the affections.

According to the above-mentioned principles, when an object produces any passion in us which varies with the different quantities of the object, the passion is not a simple emotion.

It instead is a compounded emotion made up of many weaker passions derived from a view of the object’s parts.

Otherwise it would be impossible for the passion to increase by the increase of these parts.

Thus a man, who desires £1,000, in reality has 1,000 or more desires which seem to make only one united passion.

This union betrays itself on every change of the quantity, by his preference for the larger number, even by just 1.

So small a difference would not be discernible in the passions.

It could not render them distinguishable from each other.

Therefore, the difference of our conduct in preferring the greater number, does not depend on our passions.

It depends on custom and general rules.

The adding of numbers adds to the passion if the numbers are precise and the difference is sensible.

From its immediate feeling, the mind can perceive that three guinea coins produce a greater passion than two guinea coins.

• It transfers this to larger numbers, because of the resemblance.

By a general rule, the mind assigns a stronger passion to 1,000 guineas than to 999 guineas.

We shall explain these general rules.

Those 2 kinds of probability are derived from:

• an imperfect experience, and
• contrary causes.