The Probability of Chances

Chance is the Negation of Cause

Many arguments from causation exceed probability.

It would be ridiculous to say that:

• the sun will probably rise tomorrow, or
• that all men will probably die.

Experience assures us of these.

Evidence has 3 origins:

1. From knowledge

Knowledge is the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.

2. From proofs

Proofs are arguments derived from cause and effect. These are entirely free from doubt.

3. From probabilities

Evidence from probabilities are still uncertain.

Probability is reasoning from conjecture. It has 2 kinds:

1. Probability from chance
2. Probability from causes

The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience.

Experience presents us with objects constantly conjoined with each other.

• If we imagine them conjoined otherwise, we get resistance.

On the other hand, chance is:

• not real in itself
• merely the negation of a cause*

Its influence on the mind is contrary to the influence of causation.

Chance is essential to the mind.

It leaves the imagination perfectly indifferent to consider the existence or non-existence of that object it regards as contingent.

A cause traces the way to our thought.

It forces us to survey such certain objects, in such certain relations.

Chance can only:

• destroys this determination of the thought, and
• leave the mind in its native situation of indifference; in which it is instantly re-instated on the absence of a cause.

A perfect and total indifference is essential to chance.

We can only say that Chance A is superior to Chance B if Chance A has had more chance in the past.

By doing so, we:

• allow of a cause, and
• destroy our indifference to chance.

One total indifference can never in itself be superior or inferior to another.

This truth is acknowledged by every system that forms calculations on chances.

Chance and causation are directly contrary.

It is remarkable that it is impossible for us to conceive this combination of chances needed to render one hazard superior to another, without supposing:

• a mixture of causes among the chances, and
• a conjunction of necessity in some particulars, with a total indifference in others.

Where nothing limits the chances, every imagined idea is on a footing of equality.

There cannot be any circumstance to give one the advantage above another.

We cannot calculate the laws of hazard unless we allow that there are some causes to make the dice:

• fall and preserve their form in their fall, and
• lie on some one of their sides.

It is easy to arrive at a notion of a superior combination of chances, supposing:

• these causes to operate, and
• all the other causes are indifferent and to be determined by chance.