Reality is a system made up of current perceptions and ideas and those from memory

My principles apply to beliefs.

Besides cause and effect, resemblance and contiguity convey the mind from one idea to another.

If cause and effect, resemblance, and contiguity make the mind move from idea to idea, then it means a belief is just a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea.

It follows that that action of the mind may not only be derived from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance.

There is some error in that reasoning which leads us into such difficulties because we find by experience that:

• belief arises only from causation, and
• we can draw no inference from one object to another, except those connected by this relation.

My solution to this objection is that whatever is presented to the memory that:

• strikes the mind with vivacity, and
• resembles an immediate impression must:
• become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind, and
• easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination.

We create ‘Reality’ as a system that is made up of:

• perceptions or ideas from memory
• current perceptions

But the mind does not stop not here.

The mind finds that its reality is connected by habit or by cause and effect to another system of perceptions.

The mind then considers the ideas of this other system.

It feels determined to view these ideas.

It creates them into a new system since the habit or relation that determines it does not allow change.

It likewise calls them as ‘realities’.

• The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses.
• The second is of the judgment.

Judgment:

• peoples the world, and
• makes us acquainted with existences beyond the reach of the senses and memory, as they are removed in time and place.

Through judgment, I:

• paint the universe in my imagination, and
• fix my attention on any part of it I please.

I form an idea of Rome, which I do not see nor remember.

But this idea is connected with such impressions which I remember from the books of travelers and historians.

I place this idea of Rome in a certain situation on the idea of the globe.

I join to it the conception of a government, religion, and manners.

I look back and consider its first foundation, revolutions, successes, and misfortunes.

All this which I believe, are nothing but ideas.

Their force and settled order arises from habit and cause & effect.

These distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination.

Contiguity and resemblance will assist cause and effect if the contiguous and resembling object is comprehended in this system of realities.

I assert that even where the related object is feigned, the relation will:

• enliven the idea, and
• increase its influence.

A poet can form a stronger description of the Elysian fields if he views a beautiful meadow or garden.

In other times, he can imagine himself in these fabulous regions, so that he may enliven his imagination by the feigned contiguity.

I cannot exclude the relations of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the fancy in this way.

But when single, their influence is very feeble and uncertain.

The relation of cause and effect is needed to persuade us of any real existence.

This persuasion is also needed to give force to these other relations.

There is only a small effect on the mind when, upon the appearance of an impression, we:

• feign another object arbitrarily, and
• give it a relation to the impression by our mere goodwill and pleasure.

There no reason why, on the return of the same impression, we should place the same object in the same relation to it.

The mind does not need to feign any resembling and contiguous objects.

If it does, there little need for it to always confine itself to the objects without any variation.

Such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure caprice can determine the mind to form it.

That principle is fluctuating and uncertain.

Thus, it is impossible that it can ever operate with any degree of force and constancy.

The mind foresees and anticipates the change.

It feels:

• the looseness of its actions from the very first instant, and
• its weak hold of its objects.

This imperfection is very sensible in every instance.

It further increases by experience and observation, when we:

• compare the several instances we may remember, and
• form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feigned resemblance and contiguity.