The Idea of Existence and External Existence

The Idea of Existence Automatically Arises With Every Conception

The ideas of existence and external existence have their difficulties just as with the ideas of space and time.

By explaining existence, we shall be more prepared to examine knowledge and probability. All the impressions or ideas that we have any awareness or memory of, are existent.

The most perfect idea and assurance of being is derived from this awareness. From this, we can create the most clear and conclusive dilemma: We never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it.

Therefore, the idea of existence must be:

• derived from a distinct impression, conjoined with every perception or object of our thought, or
• the same with the idea of the perception or object.

This dilemma is a consequence of the principle that every idea arises from a similar impression.

I do not think that there are any two distinct impressions which are inseparably conjoined.

Certain sensations might be united at one time.

But we quickly find that they:

• allow a separation, and
• can be presented apart.

Every impression and idea that we remember is existent.

But that idea of existence is not derived from any impression.

Therfore, the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of whatever we conceive to exist.

Simply reflecting on anything, and reflecting on it as existing, is the same. The idea of existence, when conjoined with the idea of any object, does not add to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to exist. Any idea we form is the idea of a being. The idea of a being is any idea we form.

Whoever opposes this, must:

• point out that distinct impression from which the idea of entity is derived, and
• prove that this impression is inseparable from every perception that we believe to exist.

This is impossible.

Our reasoning in Part 1, Section 7 about the distinction of ideas without any real difference does not apply here.

That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may have to other ideas. Every object that is presented, must necessarily exist.

Therefore no object can be presented to resemble the existence of an object, but different from the existence of other objects.

A similar reasoning will account for the idea of external existence.

Nothing is ever really present with the mind, but its perceptions or impressions and ideas. External objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, love, think, feel, see, are all nothing but to perceive. It is impossible for us to conceive or create an idea of anything different from ideas and impressions since: nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves.

Let us chase our imagination to the limits of the universe.

We never really:

• advance a step beyond ourselves, and
• can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass.

This is the universe of the imagination.

We do not have any idea but what is produced in our imagination.

When specifically different from our perceptions, our farthest conception of external objects is to create their relative idea without comprehending the related objects.

Generally, we do not suppose them specifically different.

We only attribute different relations, connections and durations to them.

More of this in Part 4, Section 2.