Moral Sentiments

The General Principles of Morals

What are the general principles of morals? How far do REASON or SENTIMENT enter into moral judgments?

One of the foundations of moral praise is the usefulness of a quality or action. Therefore, reason decides morality since only reason can=

• instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions
• point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor.

But=

• doubts may arise
• opposite interests may occur
• preference must be given to one side, from very nice views, and a small overbalance of utility.

This is remarkable in questions with regard to justice as springing from morals*.

*See Appendix 2

A single instances of justice might be pernicious in their first and immediate tendency. The advantage to society results only from=

• the observance of the general rule
• the concurrence and combination of several persons in the same equitable conduct.

The case here becomes more intricate and involved.

The following are doubtful and subject to great inquiry=

• The various circumstances of society
• the various consequences of any practice
• the various interests which may be proposed

The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions with regard to justice= the debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are all directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate REASON or JUDGEMENT is often requisite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities.

Reason instructs us in the good or bad tendency of qualities and actions. But it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation.

Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means.

A feeling for the happiness of mankind and a resentment of their misery is needed to prefer the good from the bad tendencies. Here therefore, REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.

This partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment, in all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding hypothesis. But I shall suppose that hypothesis false= it will then be requisite to look out for some other theory that may be satisfactory;

None such will ever be found, so long as we suppose reason to be the sole source of morals. To prove this, it will be proper t o weigh the five following considerations.

I.

It is easy for a false hypothesis to seem as truth when it deals with=

• general cases
• undefined terms
• employs comparisons instead of instances.

Philosophy ascribes the discernment of all moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of sentiment.

It is impossible for this hypothesis to be made intelligible, whatever specious figure it may make in general declamations and discourses.

For example, the crime of ingratitude happens wherever we observe good-will returned with ill-will or indifference.

Reason judges either:

• of MATTER OF FACT or
• of RELATIONS.

Enquire first: where is that matter of fact of the crime?

• Determine the time of its existence
• Describe its essence or nature
• Explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself.

That feeling should reside in the mind of the ungrateful person.

• But he feels nothing.

But such a feeling of nothing, of themselves and always, is crime.

This lack of feeling is only a crime when it is directed towards persons who have before expressed good-will towards us.

Consequently, the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual FACT. Instead, it arises from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the spectator, excites the SENTIMENT of blame, by the particular structure and fabric of his mind.

This representation, you say, is false.

Crime consists not in a particular FACT, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it consists in certain MORAL RELATIONS, discovered by reason, in the same manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra.

But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other.

Between these, there is a relation of CONTRARIETY. Does the crime consist in that relation?

But suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good offices. Here is the same relation of CONTRARIETY; and yet my conduct is often highly laudable. Twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never rest the morality on relation; but must have recourse to the decisions of sentiment.

When it is affirmed that two and three are equal to the half of ten, this relation of equality I understand perfectly.

I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the other; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as many units as that compound number.

But when you draw thence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a loss to understand you. A moral action, a crime, such as ingratitude, is a complicated object. Does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other? How? After what manner?

Specify the relation= be more particular and explicit in your propositions, and you will easily see their falsehood.

No, say you, the morality consists in the relation of actions to the rule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or disagree with it. What then is this rule of right? In what does it consist? How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined by the comparison of action to a rule. And that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reasoning?

All this is metaphysics, you cry.

I reply that it is metaphysics that is all on your side. who advance an abstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular instance or illustration. The hypothesis which we embrace is plain.

It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be WHATEVER MENTAL ACTION OR QUALITY GIVES TO A SPECTATOR THE PLEASING SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION; and vice the contrary.