The Importance of the Bicameral system

The lower sort of people and small proprietors can properly judge their peers who are close in rank or residence.

They will probably choose the best representative in their parochial meetings.

But they are totally unfit for:

• county-meetings
• electing into the higher offices of the republic

Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

10,000 people is large enough for any free government even though they were not annually elected. There are more than 10,000 nobles in Poland that oppress their people. But as power always continues there in the same persons and families, this makes them a different nation from the people.

All free governments must consist of 2 chambers:

• a lesser senate
• a greater people

Harrington observes that:

• without the senate, the people lack wisdom,
• without the people, the senate would lack honesty,

A large assembly of 1,000 representatives would would fall into disorder if allowed to debate. But if not allowed to debate, the senate would have a negative on them.

The negative before resolution is the worst kind of negative.

The solution is to divide the people into many separate bodies so that they may debate with safety.

Cardinal de Retz says, that all numerous assemblies are:

• a mere mob, and
• swayed in their debates by the least motive.

When an absurdity strikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and so on, till the whole be infected.

Separate this great body.

This will remove influence and example so that good sense will always get the better of bad among a number of people. Even though every member is only of middling sense, it is improbable for anything else but reason to prevail over the whole.

Every senate must guard against its own combination and division.

Its combination is the most dangerous but can be solved by:

• annual democratic elections the great dependence of the senators on the people by . This is not dependence on a rabble by the English electors, but by men of fortune and education.
• allowing them only a small power
  • They have few offices, almost all of which are given by the magistrates in the counties.
• the Council of Opposition made up of their rivals
  • They are next to the senators in interest and are uneasy in their present situation
  • They will certainly take all advantages against the senators

This division is prevented by:

• the smallness of their number
  • Faction supposes a combination in a separate interest and is prevented by the senate’s dependence on the people.
• their power of expelling any factious member
  • The county representatives have no power of expelling such members as such factions a symptom of some ill conduct in public affairs.

Senate Resolutions

In a senate regularly chosen by the people, almost anyone can be fit for any civil office. The senate should form some general resolutions regarding the disposing of offices among the members. Such resolutions should not limit the senate in critical times when any senator shows either extraordinary skill or stupidity.

Instead, the resolutions would prevent intrigue and faction by making the disposal of the offices procedural. Sample resolutions are:

• No one shall enjoy any office until he has sat four years in the senate.
• No man shall be in office two years following, except ambassadors.
• No one shall attain the higher offices but through the lower
• No man shall be protector twice
• etc

The senate of Venice govern themselves by such resolutions.

In foreign politics, the interest of the senate cannot be separated from that of the people. Therefore the senate can have absolute powers with regard to foreign politics. Otherwise, there could be no secrecy or refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance can be executed.

The senate is still sufficiently dependent as the legislative power is always superior to the executive. The magistrates or representatives may interpose whenever they think proper.

This plan does all the good without any of the harm. The Council of the Opposition has no power to control the senate. They have only the power of accusing, and appealing to the people.

It is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in the 1,000 magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation of places and interests. But if that is not enough, their dependence on the 10,000 representatives for their elections, serves the same purpose. The 10,000 may resume the power whenever they please, whenever any 5% of them please. This will happen on the very first suspicion of a separate interest.

The 10,000 representatives are too many to unite or divide, except when:

• meet in one place, and
• have ambitious leaders.
• have their annual election by the people

A small commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within itself, because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers. But it may be subdued by great external force. This scheme seems to have all the advantages of large and small commonwealths.

Every county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another county because that shows an opposition of interest. No part should decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the whole, which will best determine what agrees with general interest.

No free government will ever have security or stability without:

• the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrates, and
• a militia

Salaries

In many governments, the rewards of inferior magistrates arise only from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of the French judges amount not to the interest of what they pay for their offices. The Dutch burgo-masters have a little more immediate profit than the English justices of peace, or the members of the house of commons formerly.

People should not fear their negligence in administration because of mankind’s natural ambition. But if they do, then the magistrates should have competent salaries. There is little attendance required of the representatives.

The senators have access to so many honourable and lucrative offices. Their attendance needs not be bought. This plan of government is practicable as proven by the commonwealth of the United Provinces, which is a wise and renowned government.

This plsn has many advantages over the government system of the United Provinces:

• the representation is more equal
  • The unlimited power of the burgo-masters in the towns leads to a perfect aristocracy in the Dutch commonwealth. It is corrected by a well-tempered democracy which gives to the people the annual election of the county representatives.
• it removes the negative from selected provinces
  • Every province and town has the negative on the Dutch republic regarding alliances, peace and war, and the imposition of taxes.
• the counties are not so independent of each other
  • In my plan, they do not form separate bodies so much as the seven provinces. Their government was frequently disturbed by the jealousy of the smaller provinces against the greater, particularly Holland and Amsterdam.
• larger powers, though of the safest kind, are entrusted to the senate instead of the States-General.
  • This lets the senate become more expeditious and secret in their resolutions, than the States-General.

Changes to the British government

The chief support of the British government is the opposition of interests. But it breeds endless factions even if it is mainly serviceable. It can be reformed by restoring the plan of Cromwell’s parliament by:

• making the representation equal, and
• allowing only those who have property of 200 pounds value to vote in the county elections

This would lead to a house of Commons that would be too weighty for a frail house of Lords, like the present.

Therefore:

• the Bishops and Scotch Peers should be removed
• the number of the upper house should be raised to 300-400
• their seats should not hereditary but only for a lifetime
• they should have the election of their own members
• no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat that was offered him

In this way, the house of Lords would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, abilities, and interest. Every turbulent leader in the house of Commons might be removed and connected by interest with the house of Peers.

Such an aristocracy would be an excellent barrier and support to the monarchy. At present, the balance of our government depends on the sovereign’s abilities and behaviour which are variable and uncertain.

This plan of limited monarchy is still liable to three great inconveniencies.

1. It softens the parties of court and country but does not remove it entirely
2. The king’s personal character still has a great influence on the government
3. The sword is in the hands of a single person, who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a pretence for keeping up a standing army.

Rural Republics vs Urban Commonwealths

They say that a large state, such as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth and that such a form of government can only happen in a city or small territory.

The contrary seems probable. It is more difficult to create a republican government in a large country than in a city. But after it is formed, it can be preserved more steadily and uniformly without tumult and faction.

It is not easy, for the distant parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government. But they easily conspire in the esteem and reverence for one person who might seize the power through this popular favour. He would force the more obstinate to submit and might establish a monarchical government.

On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same notions of government. The natural equality of property favours liberty. The nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually to assist each other.

Even under absolute princes, the subordinate government of cities is commonly republican, while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which create commonwealths in cities, render their constitution more frail and uncertain.

Democracies vs Aristocracies

Democracies are turbulent. People may be separated into small parties, either in their votes or elections. But their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible.

Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order. This is why they were most admired by ancient writers. But they are jealous and oppressive.

In a large government modelled with masterly skill, there is room to refine the democracy.

The lower people may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth to the higher magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.

Should such a government be immortal?

Plagues might leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We do know not how men may neglect all order and public good. When the difference of interest is removed, whimsical and unaccountable factions often arise, from personal favour or enmity. Rust might grow to the springs of the most accurate political machine and disorder its motions.

Lastly, extensive conquests ruins every free government. It ruins more perfect governments sooner than the imperfect ones because of the very advantages of the perfect governments. Even if such a state establishes a fundamental law against conquests, republics have ambition just as people have ambition. Their present interest makes men forgetful of their posterity.

It is sufficient motivation that such a government would flourish for many ages. It would not be immortal, just as the Almighty has not made any its creations immortal.