Germany's Policy In Eastern Europe

Two considerations induce me to make a special analysis of Germany’s position in regard to Russia:

1. This may prove to be the most decisive point in determining Germany’s foreign policy.

2. The problem which has to be solved in this connection is also a touchstone to test the political capacity of the young National Socialist Movement for clear thinking and acting along the right lines.

The second consideration has often been a source of great anxiety to me.

The members of our movement are extremists.

Their understanding of foreign politics naturally suffers from the prejudice and ignorance.

This is true not merely of the men who come to us from the Left.

Our members who have received subversive teachings which have been counterbalanced by the instinct of self-preservation.

But it is much more difficult to impress definite political ideas to the partisans of the Left.

They have sacrificed their natural instincts to worship some abstract and entirely objective theory.

It is particularly difficult to induce them to take a realistic and logical view of their own interests and the interests of their nation in its relations with foreign countries.

We have to fight a hard battle with them.

These arrogant snobs pretend to know better than other people. They are wholly incapable of:

• calmly analysing a problem
• weighing its pros and cons

These are the necessary preliminaries of any decision or action in the field of foreign politics.

Our foreign policy is to secure the existence of our race which is incorporated in this State.

This must be done by establishing a healthy and natural balance between:

• the number and growth of the population
• the extent and resources of their territory

A HEALTHY proportion guarantees the support of a people by the resources of its own soil and sub-soil.

Any situation which falls short of this condition is nonetheless unhealthy even though it may endure for centuries or even a thousand years. Sooner or later, this lack of proportion must lead to the decline or even annihilation of the people concerned.

Only a sufficiently large space on this earth can assure the independent existence of a people.

The extent of the territorial expansion that may be necessary for the settlement of the national population must not be estimated by present exigencies nor even by the magnitude of its agricultural productivity in relation to the number of the population.

In volume 1 of this book, under the heading “Germany’s Policy of Alliances before the War,” I have already explained that the geometrical dimensions of a State are of importance not only as the source of the nation’s foodstuffs and raw materials, but also from the political and military standpoints.

Once a people is assured of being able to maintain itself from the resources of the national territory, it must think of how this national territory can be defended. National security depends on the political strength of a State, and this strength, in its turn, depends on the military possibilities inherent in the geographical situation.

Thus the German nation could assure its own future only by being a World Power.

For nearly 2,000 years, the defence of our national interests was a matter of world history.

For example, our gigantic struggle from 1914 to 1918 was known in history as the World War.*

When Germany entered this struggle, it was presumed that she was a World Power. I say PRESUMED, because in reality she was no such thing.

In 1914, if there had been a different proportion between the German population and its territorial area, Germany would have been really a World Power and, if we leave other factors out of count, the War would have ended in our favour.

Germany is not at all a World Power today.