Alliance with England to Solve the Population Problem

3. Acquire new territory for the increasing population

The principle of acquiring new territory, on which the surplus population could be settled, has many advantages to recommend it, especially if we take the future as well as the present into account.

In the first place, too much importance cannot be placed on the necessity for adopting a policy which will make it possible to maintain a healthy peasant class as the basis of the national community. Many of our present evils have their origin exclusively in the disproportion between the urban and rural portions of the population.

A solid stock of small and medium farmers has at all times been the best protection which a nation could have against the social diseases that are prevalent to-day. Moreover, that is the only solution which guarantees the daily bread of a nation within the framework of its domestic national economy.

4. Reorganize industry and commerce to secure an increase in the exports

This will support our people by the increased purchasing power accruing from the profits made on foreign markets.

This is less attractive than acquiring new territory.

In this way, industry and commerce would no longer be the basis of the national subsistence, but would be auxiliary institutions.

Such a territorial policy, however, cannot find its fulfilment in the Cameroons but almost exclusively here in Europe.

One must calmly and squarely face the truth that it certainly cannot be part of the dispensation of Divine Providence to give a 50 times larger share of the soil of this world to one nation than to another.

We must not allow existing political frontiers to distract attention from what should exist on principles of strict justice. If this earth has sufficient room for all, then we should have that share which is absolutely necessary for our existence.

Of course people will not voluntarily make that accommodation.

At this point, our right of self-preservation comes into effect. We must take by force what was refused to the open hand of friendship.

We owe the two Eastern Marks (Note 8) of the Empire to the natural determination of our forefathers in their struggle for existence. Thus it is to the same determined policy that we owe the inner strength which is based on the extent of our political and racial territories and which alone has made it possible for us to exist up to now.

Many contemporary European States are like pyramids standing on their apexes. The European territory which these States possess is ridiculously small when compared with the enormous overhead weight of their colonies, foreign trade, etc.

The apex is in Europe and the base of the pyramid is all over the world.

It is quite different from the USA, which has its base on the American Continent and is in contact with the rest of the world only through its apex.

Out of that situation arises the incomparable inner strength of the U.S.A. and the contrary situation is responsible for the weakness of most of the colonial European Powers.

England cannot be suggested as an argument against this assertion, though in glancing casually over the map of the British Empire one is inclined easily to overlook the existence of a whole Anglo-Saxon world.

England’s position cannot be compared with that of any other State in Europe, since it forms a vast community of language and culture together with the U.S.A.

Therefore, Germany’s only sound territorial policy is to acquire new territory in Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose as long as they are not suited for European settlement on a large scale.

In the 19th century it was no longer possible to acquire such colonies by peaceful means.

Therefore any attempt at such a colonial expansion would have meant an enormous military struggle. Consequently it would have been more practical to undertake that military struggle for new territory in Europe rather than to wage war for land abroad.

Such a goal could have been reached only by war, and the prospect of war should have been faced with calm and collected determination.

The whole system of alliances should have been envisaged and valued from that standpoint.

If new territory were to be acquired in Europe it must mainly be at Russia’s cost. Once again, the new German Empire should march along the same road as formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to acquire soil for the German plough.

Alliance with England

For such a policy, however, there was only one possible ally in Europe. That was England.

Only by alliance with England was it possible to safeguard the rear of the new German crusade. The justification for undertaking such an expedition was stronger than the justification which our forefathers had for setting out on theirs.

No sacrifice should have been considered too great if it was a necessary means of gaining England’s friendship.

Colonial and naval ambitions should have been abandoned and attempts should not have been made to compete against British industries.

Only a clear and definite policy could lead to such an achievement.

Such a policy would have demanded a renunciation of the endeavour to conquer the world’s markets, also a renunciation of colonial intentions and naval power. All the means of power at the disposal of the State should have been concentrated in the military forces on land.

This policy would have involved a period of temporary self-denial, for the sake of a great and powerful future.

There was a time when England might have entered into negotiations with us, on the grounds of that proposal.

For England would have well understood that the problems arising from the steady increase in population were forcing Germany to look for a solution either in Europe with the help of England or, without England, in some other part of the world.

This outlook was probably the chief reason why London tried to draw nearer to Germany about the turn of the century.

For the first time in Germany an attitude was then manifested which afterwards displayed itself in a most tragic way.

People then gave expression to an unpleasant feeling that we might thus find ourselves obliged to pull England’s chestnuts out of the fire.

As if an alliance could be based on anything else than mutual give-and-take! And England would have become a party to such a mutual bargain.

British diplomats were still wise enough to know that an equivalent must be forthcoming as a consideration for any services rendered.