Being One and the Other

^'125' Identity constitutes the essential character of the thing. It is now so defined that the thing becomes different from others.

This identity is an absolute one if there is nothing else.

• Its connection with others would emphasize its identity and cease its absoluteness.

^'126' The necessity of the experience which consciousness has to go through in finding that the thing is destroyed just by the very characteristic which constitutes its essential nature and its distinctive existence on its own account, may, as regards the bare principle it implies, be shortly stated thus.

Identity sets up the thing to have a being of its own.

• This being is an absolute negation of all otherness.

• Hence it is an absolute negation relating itself to itself.

^'127' The identification of the object contains nothing else.

It aims at having an essential property – identity.

^'128' With this the last qualifying “in-so-far”, which separated self-existence and existence for another, drops away altogether.

The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself-for itself “so far as” it is for another, and for another “so far as” it is for itself.

It is for itself, reflected into self, one; but all this is asserted along with its opposite, with its being for another, and for that reason is asserted merely to be superseded.

In other words, this existence for itself is as much unessential as that which alone was meant to be unessential, viz. the relation to another.

^'129' By this process the object in its pure characteristics, in those features which were to constitute its essential nature, is superseded, just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became transcended.

From being sensible it passed into being a universal; but this universal, because derived from sense, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is, in general, not a genuine self-identical universality, but one affected with an opposition.

This is why this universality breaks up into the extremes of singleness and universality, of the one of the properties and the “also” of the free constituents or matters.

These pure determinations appear to express the essential nature itself; but they are merely a self-existence which is fettered at the same time with existence for an other.

Since, however, both essentially exist in a single unity, we have before us now unconditioned absolute universality; and it is here that consciousness first truly passes into the sphere of Understanding, of Intelligence.

^'130' Sensible singleness thus disappears in the dialectic process of immediate certainty. It becomes universality, but merely sensuous universality.

The stage of “meaning” has vanished. Perceiving takes the object as it inherently is in itself generally as a universal.

Singleness, therefore, makes its appearance there as true singleness, as the inherent nature of the “one”, or as reflectedness into self.

However, this is still a conditioned self-existence alongside which appears another self-existence, the universality opposed to singleness and conditioned by it.

But these two contradictory extremes are not merely alongside one another, but within one unity; or, what is the same thing, the common element of both, self-existence, is entirely fettered to its opposite, i.e. is, at the same time, not an existence-for-self.

The sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction. It tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between “aspects” by using terms like “also” and “so far as”. It seeks to lay hold on the truth by distinguishing the unessential element from an essential nature opposed thereto.

But these expedients, instead of keeping away deception from the process of apprehension, prove to be useless.

The real truth, which should be got at through the logic of the perceptual process, proves to be in one and the same “aspect” the opposite (of what those expedients imply), and consequently to have as its essential content undifferentiated and indeterminate universality.

^'131' The following are the powers the interplay of which constitutes

Perceptual understanding or “sound common sense” (Menschenverstand) is made up of the interplay of: . these empty abstractions of “singleness” and antithetic “univerisality”

• “essence” that is attended with a “non-essential” element, an element which is all the same “necessary”

This “healthy common sense”` is merely the sport of these abstractions.

• It is always poorest where it means to be richest.

It is tossed about by these unreal entities, bandied from one to the other. By its sophistry, it tries to affirm and hold fast alternately now one, then the exact opposite, it sets itself against the truth.

It imagines philosophy has merely to do with “things of the intellect” (Gedankendinge), merely manipulates “ideas”.

Philosophy does have to do with them, too, and knows them to be the pure essential entities, the absolute powers and ultimate elements.

But in doing so, philosophy knows them at the same time in their determinate and specific constitution, and is, therefore, master over them; while that perceptual understanding takes them for the real truth, and is led by them from one mistake to another.

It does not get the length of being, aware that there are such simple essentialities operating within it and dominating its activity; it thinks it has always to do with quite solid material and content; just as sense-certainty is unaware that its essence is the empty abstraction of pure being.

But it is these essential elements in virtue of which perceptual understanding makes its way hither and thither through every kind of material and content.

They are its principle of coherence and control over its varied material. They alone are what constitutes for consciousness the essence of sensuous things, what determines their relations to consciousness.

They are that in the medium of which the process of perceiving, with the truth it contains, runs its course.

This process is a perpetual alternate determining of the truth and superseding of this determination. It constitutes the constant everyday life and activity of perceptual intelligence, of the consciousness that thinks it lives and moves in the truth.

In that process it advances, without halt or stay, till the final result is reached, when these essential ultimate elements or determinations are all alike superseded; but in each particular moment it is merely conscious of one given characteristic as the truth, and then, again, of the opposite.

It suspects their unessentiality.

To save them from the impending danger, it takes to the sophistry of now asserting to be true what it had itself just affirmed to be not true.

What the nature of these untrue entities really wants to force this understanding to do – viz. to bring together and thereby cancel and transcend the ideas about that “universality” and “singleness”, about that “essentiality” which is necessarily connected with an “unessentiality” and about an “unessential” that is yet “necessary” – understanding strives to resist by leaning for support on the so qualifying terms “in-so-far”, “a difference of aspect”, or by making itself answerable for one idea in order to keep the other separate and preserve it as the true one.

But the very nature of these abstractions brings them together as they are and of their own accord.

“Sound common sense” is the prey of these abstractions; they carry understanding round in their whirling circle.

When understanding tries to give them truth by at one time taking their untruth upon itself, while at another it calls their deceptiveness a mere appearance due to the uncertainty and unreliability of things, and separates the essential from an element which is necessary to them, and yet is to be unessential, holding the former to be their truth as against the latter: – when understanding takes this line, it does not secure them their truth, but convicts itself of untruth.