Superphysics Superphysics
Chapter 2f

Opposition

by Hegel Icon
8 minutes  • 1499 words

(c) Opposition

§ 908

In opposition, the determinate rejection, difference, finds its completion.

It is the unity of identity and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites.

§ 909

Identity and difference are the moments of difference held within itself.

They are reflected moments of its unity.

But likeness and unlikeness are the self-alienated reflection. Their self-identity is not merely the indifference of each towards the other distinguished from it, but towards being-in-and-for-self as such, an identity-with-self over against the identity that is reflected into itself.

It is therefore the immediacy that is not reflected into itself. The positedness of the sides of the external reflection is accordingly a being, just as their non-positedness is a non-being.

§ 910

Closer consideration shows the moments of opposition to be positedness reflected into itself or determination in general.

Positedness is likeness and unlikeness; these two reflected into themselves constitute the determinations of opposition. Their reflection-into-self consists in this, that each is in its own self the unity of likeness and unlikeness.

Likeness is only in the reflection that compares on the basis of unlikeness, and therefore is mediated by its other, indifferent moment; similarly, unlikeness is only in the same reflective relationship in which likeness is. Therefore each of these moments is, in its determinateness, the whole. It is the whole in so far as it also contains its other moment; but this its other is an indifferent, simple affirmative moment; thus each contains reference to its non-being, and is only reflection-into-self or the whole, as essentially connected with its non-being.

§ 911

This self-likeness reflected into itself that contains within itself the reference to unlikeness, is the positive; and the unlikeness that contains within itself the reference to its non-being, to likeness, is the negative. Or, both are a positedness; now in so far as the differentiated determinateness is taken as a differentiated determinate self-reference of positedness, the opposition is, on the one hand, positedness reflected into its likeness to itself and on the other hand, positedness reflected into its unlikeness to itself — the positive and the negative. The positive is positedness as reflected into self-likeness; but what is reflected is positedness, that is, the negation as negation, and so this reflection-into-self has reference-to-other for its determination. The negative is positedness as reflected into unlikeness; but the positedness is unlikeness itself, and this reflection is therefore the identity of unlikeness with itself and absolute self-reference. Each is the whole; the positedness reflected into likeness-to-self contains unlikeness, and the positedness reflected into unlikeness-to-self also contains likeness.

§ 912

The positive and the negative are thus the sides of the opposition that have become self-subsistent. They are self-subsistent in that they are the reflection of the whole into themselves, and they belong to the opposition in so far as this is the determinateness which, as a whole, is reflected into itself. On account of their selfsubsistence, they constitute the implicitly determined opposition. Each is itself and its other; consequently, each has its determinateness not in an other, but in its own self. Each is self-referred, and the reference to its other is only a self-reference. This has a twofold aspect: each is a reference to its non-being as a sublating of this otherness within it; thus its non-being is only a moment in it. But on the other hand positedness here has become a being, an indifferent subsistence; consequently, the other of itself which each contains is also the non-being of that in which it is supposed to be contained only as a moment. Each therefore is, only in so far as its non-being is, and is in an identical relationship with it.

§ 913

The determinations which constitute the positive and negative consist, therefore, in the fact that the positive and negative are, in the first place, absolute moments of the opposition; their subsistence is inseparably one reflection; it is a single mediation in which each is through the non-being of its other, and so is through its other or its own non-being. Thus they are simply opposites; in other words, each is only the opposite of the other, the one is not as yet positive, and the other is not as yet negative, but both are negative to one another. In the first place, then, each is, only in so far as the other is; it is what it is, through the other, through its own non-being; it is only a positedness; secondly, it is, in so far as the other is not; it is what it is, through the non-being of the other; it is reflection-into-self. But these two are the one mediation of the opposition as such, in which they are simply only posited moments

§ 914

Further, however, this mere positedness is simply reflected into itself; in accordance with this moment of external reflection the positive and negative are indifferent to that first identity in which they are only moments; in other words, since that first reflection is the positive’s and negative’s own reflection into themselves, each is in its own self its positedness, so each is indifferent to this its reflection into its non-being, to its own positedness. The two sides are thus merely different, and in so far as their being determined as positive and negative constitutes their positedness in relation to one another, each is not in its own self so determined but is only determinateness in general. Therefore, although one of the determinatenesses of positive and negative belongs to each side, they can be changed round, and each side is of such a kind that it can be taken equally well as positive as negative.

§ 915

But thirdly, the positive and negative are not only something posited, not merely an indifferent something, but their positedness, or the reference-to-other in a unity which they are not themselves, is taken back into each. Each is in its own self positive and negative; the positive and negative are the determination of reflection in and for itself; it is only in this reflection of opposites into themselves that they are positive and negative. The positive has within itself the reference-to-other in which the determinateness of the positive is; similarly, the negative is not a negative as contrasted with an other, but likewise possesses within itself the determinateness whereby it is negative.

§ 916

Thus each [the positive as well as the negative] is a self-subsistent, independent unity-with-self. The positive is, indeed, a positedness, but in such wise that for it the positedness is only positedness as sublated. It is the not-opposite, the sublated opposition, but as a side of the opposition itself. As positive, something is, of course, determined with reference to an otherness, but in such a manner that its nature is to be not something posited; it is the reflection-into-self that negates the otherness. But the other of itself, the negative, is itself no longer a positedness or moment, but a self-subsistent being; thus the negating reflection of the positive is immanently determined as excluding from itself this its non-being.

§ 917

The negative, as such absolute reflection, is not the immediate negative but the negative as a sublated positedness, the negative in and for itself, which is based positively on itself. As reflection-into-self it negates its relationship to other; its other is the positive, a self-subsistent being; consequently, its negative relation to it is to exclude it. The negative is the independently existing opposite contrasted with the positive, which is the determination of the sublated opposition-the self-based whole opposition opposed to the self-identical positedness.

§ 918

The positive and negative are therefore not merely implicitly [an sich] positive and negative, but explicitly and actually so [an undfiir sich].

They are implicitly positive and negative in so far as one makes abstraction from their exclusive relation to other and only takes them in accordance with their determination. Something is in itself positive or negative when it is supposed to be so determined not merely relatively to an other. But when the positive and negative are taken, not as positedness, and therefore not as opposites, then each is the immediate, being and non-being.

But the positive and negative are moments of opposition; their in-itself constitutes merely the form of their reflectedness-intoself.

Something is in itself positive, apart from the relation to the negative; and something is in itse@ negative, apart from the relation to the positive;’ in this determination, one clings merely to the abstract moment of this reflectedness.

But the positive or negative in itse@ essentially implies that to be an opposite is not merely a moment, does not stem from comparison, but is a determination belonging to the sides of the opposition themselves.

They are therefore not positive or negative in themselves apart from the relation to other; on the contrary, this relation-an exclusive relation-constitutes their determination or in-itself; in it, therefore, they are at the same time explicitly and actually [an undfiir sichl positive or negative.

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