More Precise Characterization of the Relationship between Philosophy and the Other Manifestations of Spirit
Table of Contents
What is the difference between philosophy and the sciences, art, mythology, religion, politics, etc.
I answer this by:
- Delimiting the concept of philosophy
- Selecting out the moments which thus become important
- Applying them to the history of philosophy
In so doing, I separate off and exclude what does not belong to the history of philosophy.
In the history of philosophy, only philosophy itself is to be considered.
Everything else, such as religion, etc., is to be left to the side.
But what is philosophy?
We leave religion to one side.
In history, however, religion and philosophy have frequently been connected and in conflict with each other.
I look first at the sciences, at scientific culture.
Then I must look at the relationship between philosophy and religion.
This relationship must be looked at openly, directly, and honestly.
We must not give the impression of wanting to leave religion untouched.
- Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Culture as Such
The empirical sciences are based on observation, experiment, and reasoning.
They have “thinking” in common with philosophy.
They belong within the framework of experience, but they are also characterized by thinking, since they strive to discover the universal in experience.
Scientific culture, then, shares its formal aspect with philosophy.
Religion, on the other hand, shares with philosophy its other aspect, the substantial, God, the Spirit, the Absolute.
To know the essence of this world, of truth, of the absolute Idea, is common ground for both philosophy and religion.
Scientific principles have been established.
This involves practical requirements (Gebote, Pflichten).
On the other hand we recognize laws, forces, natural classes, causes.
Matter, then, corresponds to:
- forces and causes in the external world
- the substantial, the motivating, the enduring in the spiritual world of morality
A content such as this demands, as does philosophy, thinking.
Whatever has been thought from this point of view has been called philosophy.
Thus, in the history of philosophy we first meet the 7 wise men of Greece.
They, too, are called philosophers, principally because they enunciated a number of moral sayings and principles concerning general moral obligations and essential relationships.
Then, in more recent times we see that man began to turn his gaze to things of nature.
That was the case particularly in the period subsequent to that of scholastic philosophy.
A priori reasoning about the things of nature based on religion or metaphysics was given up.
Nature itself was investigated. It was observed, and an attempt was made to know its laws and forces.
By the same token, research was instituted into moral relationships, civil law, etc.
This was also called philosophy.
It was customary, for example, to speak of Newtonian philosophy, even though it concerned itself principally only with things of nature.
In general, then, the form which characterizes philosophy is one according to which, from experience regarding nature, the state, justice, religion, etc., general principles are derived and are enunciated as formal, quite universal principles.
Philosophy, it is said, investigates universal causes, the ultimate grounds of things.
Thus, wherever in the sciences universal causes, essential grounds, and principles are enunciated, the sciences have this universality in common with philosophy, and, to be more precise, such principles and grounds are derived from experience and from reflection on it (innere Empfindung).
No matter how foreign to the principle of philosophy this last may seem to be, it is nevertheless true with regard to any philosophy that I have received it through my senses and through reflection on what they present to me (meine innere Empfindung) – i.e., through experience – and that on the basis of this experience alone I consider it true. This form of knowing, of taking into oneself, has appeared not only in opposition to religion but also in a negative relation to other philosophies; and this, too, was called philosophy, because it was opposed to whatever is merely positive. Newtonian philosophy comprises only what we now call philosophy of nature – a science based on experience and perception, containing knowledge of laws, forces, and universal properties of nature.
It was a great period in history which saw the emergence of this principle of experience, when man began to see for himself, to feel, to taste, to look on nature as worthwhile, to rely significantly on the testimony of his senses, to hold for true only what was known through the senses. This conviction of the immediate certitude afforded by the senses was the foundation for this so-called philosophy; it was from this testimony of the senses, after all, that the sciences of nature took their impetus. This reliance on the senses was opposed to previous ways of looking at nature; formerly the point of departure had been metaphysical principles. Because men now based their procedures on sensible representations they came into conflict with religion and the state. It was, however, not merely the testimony of the senses which they had set up against a metaphysics of the understanding; still another testimony was highly regarded – namely, that the true could count as true only to the extent that it was to be found in both the heart and the understanding of man. Through this kind of understanding, this thinking and feeling for himself, there resulted an even greater opposition to what was merely positive in religion and contemporary government. Man learned now to do his own observing and thinking, to form his own representations, opposing them to the fixed truths and dogmas of the Church and to then – accepted civil law – or at least he sought new principles to support the old civil law, in order to justify it in the light of these principles. In the precise context in which religion is positive had been found the validation of those principles according to which subjects owed obedience to the authority of the princes; it was the divine authority which gave validity to these principles, because rulers were appointed by God. The basis for this was found in the Jewish laws according to which kings were the anointed of the Lord. (The Mosaic laws had a special validity even with regard to marriage.) Against this whole positive position, against whatever had been imposed by authority, man’s own proper understanding and free thinking rebelled. Among those who thought this way can be counted Hugo Grotius who formulated a law of nations based on what was accepted as law by all peoples, i.e., the consensus gentium. According to this law the purpose of the state was posited as something proper to the state itself, as something immanent in man, rather than based on a divine command. What was accepted as law was derived from what is the ground for man’s being recognized as man, whereas previously everything had been regulated by authoritarian legislation (nach dem Positiven). Positing in this way a ground other than that of authority was called philosophizing, and for this reason philosophy was also called world-wisdom. Because this kind of philosophizing had as its object external nature and the rights of human nature, and because a content such as this owed its origin to the activity of man’s mundane understanding and reason, it was correct to call this world-wisdom. There is no question that philosophy does not limit itself to internal objects; it extends its interest to everything in the surrounding world and, thus, is occupied with mundane, finite things. On the other hand, however, it does not confine itself to the mundane; it has the same goal as religion; and the mundane which it has as its object is nonetheless a determinateness of the divine Idea. In recent times Schlegel has warmed over again the term world-wisdom as a name for philosophy. He intended it, however, ironically; what he meant was that philosophy must give way, when there is question of higher things – for example, of religion. In this he has had a number of followers.