Application of these Notions (Bestimmungen) to the History of Philosophy

a. The first conclusion we can draw from the foregoing is that in the history of philosophy we are not dealing with opinions.

In everyday life, of course, we have to do with opinions, i.e., thoughts about external things; one has one opinion, another has another.

But in the business of the world’s Spirit there is a completely different seriousness; it is there that universality is.

There it is a question of the universal determination of the Spirit, nor do we speak of this or that one’s opinion. The universal Spirit develops in itself according to its own necessity; its opinion is simply the truth.

b. The second conclusion is the answer to the question: What is the situation in regard to diverse philosophies, about which we hear it said that they are a proof against philosophy itself, i.e., against truth? First of all we must say, there is only one philosophy.

This, of course, has a formal sense, since each philosophy is at least philosophy to the extent that it really is philosophy – frequently what is called philosophy is simply chatter, arbitrary caprice, etc). just as different kinds of fruit are all fruit, so are we to look on the relation of various philosophies to the one philosophy.

A more precise sense in which we can speak of many philosophies is to say that they are the necessary stages in the development of reason coming to consciousness of itself, a reason which is one in the way we previously understood it. The manner in which they succeed each other, then, is necessary.

No philosophy, therefore, can make its appearance sooner than it does. It is true, of course, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ancient philosophies were resurrected – this was necessary to the progress of Christian culture.

Nevertheless, when past philosophies return again they are like mummies of earlier thoughts. The World-Spirit has progressed, and a past philosophy is not its proper garment, the form in which it finds expressed what it in fact is.

With regard to the refutation of one philosophy by another, a more precise characterization (Bestimmung) is required, one which will be made manifest in the history of philosophy itself, one which shows in what relation philosophies stand to each other and to what extent the position (Stellung) of their principle has changed.

Refutation, as we have seen, involves a negation, namely that what had been believed regarding a system of philosophy no longer holds. Now, such a negation is of two types.

In one form, when some philosophy or another is compared with an earlier one and the principle of the later one is affirmed, then the subsequent system shows the untenability of the earlier. In itself every principle of the understanding is one-sided , and such a one-sidedness is brought out by the fact that another principle is contrasted with it. This other principle, however is equally one-sided.

In this situation there is present no totality as the unity in which they are reconciled; it exists only as completeness in the process of development.

In this way, for example, Epicureanism stands in opposition to Stoicism, or the Spinozistic substance of absolute unity is opposed to that of the Leibnizian monad, in its concrete individuality.

Thus, the self-developing Spirit integrates the one-sidedness of the one principle by making the other appear.

The second, more profound form of negation consists in the unification of diverse philosophies into one whole in such a way that no one of them remains independent, but all appear as parts of the one.

Their principles are united by being reduced to elements of the one idea; or they consist merely in moments, determinations, aspects of the one idea.

This, then, is the concrete which unites the others in itself and constitutes the true unity of these diverse forms.

The concrete of which we speak is to be distinguished from the eclectic procedure, i.e., from a mere combining of diverse principles and opinions, like combining different pieces of cloth in one garment. The concrete is the absolute and complete identity of those differences, not an external combining of them – just as the human soul is the concrete in relation to souls in general, since the vegetable soul is contained in the animal and the latter in the human.

Convergences (Knoten) such as these, where certain particularities, certain philosophies, are united in one, we shall become acquainted with in the history of philosophy. One such, for example, is the Platonic philosophy.

If we pick up Plato’s dialogues we find that some are Eleatic, others Pythagorean, and still others Heraclitean in character; yet Plato’s philosophy has united in itself these earlier philosophies and in so doing has transformed their inadequacies.

This is no eclectic philosophy but rather an absolute, true penetration into the unification of these philosophies. Another example is Alexandrian philosophy, which has also been called Neoplatonic, Neopythagorean, and Neoaristotelian – it unified in itself precisely these opposites.

c. A third conclusion to be drawn from what has been said up to this point is that we are not dealing with what is past but rather with actual thinking, with our own spirit.

Properly speaking, then, this is not a history, since the thoughts, the principles, the ideas with which we are concerned belong to the present; they are ‘determinations within our own spirit. The historical, i.e., the past as such, is no longer, it is dead. The tendency to be abstractly historical, to be occupied with lifeless objects, has in recent times gained ground.

But the heart must be dead which finds satisfaction with dead bodies. The spirit of truth and life lives only in what is. The living spirit speaks: “Let the dead bury their dead;. follow me!” If I know thoughts, truths, cognitions, only, historically, they remain outside my spirit, i.e., for me they are dead; neither my thinking nor my spirit is present in them; what is most interior to me, my thought, is absent.

The possession of merely historical knowledge is like the legal ownership of things which I do not know what to do, with. If we simply stop at the knowledge of what this or that philosophy has thought, of what has been handed down (uberliefert), then we surrender (uberliefert) ourselves, and we forgo what makes man to be man, we forgo thinking.

We are, thus, occupied merely with the thinking and the spirit of others, we investigate only what has been truth for others. Now, we must think for ourselves.

If our interest in theology is merely historical – if, for example, we learn only what Church councils, or heretics and non-heretics, have known about God’s nature – we can, of course, have had edifying thoughts, but we do not have the spirit properly speaking.

To have this there is no need of theological erudition. When the historical tendency has taken over a given age, it can be taken for granted that the spirit has fallen into despair, has died, has given up the attempt to satisfy itself – otherwise it would not be concerned with the sort of objects which for it are dead.

In the authentic history (Geschichte) of thought it is thought with which we are concerned; there we have to consider how the spirit enters into its own depths in order to arrive at consciousness of itself, as man renders to himself an account of his spirit’s consciousness.

In order to do this, man must be present to his own spirit. Here, however, I speak only against the merely historical (geschichtliche) attitude.

In no way should this make the study of history as such something to be despised. We ourselves, in fact, want to take up the history of philosophy.

Still, when an age treats everything historically (historisch), thus being constantly occupied solely with the world which no longer is and so wanders around in mausoleums, then has the spirit given up its own life which consists in its thinking itself.

Connected with the purely historical (historischen) manner of treating philosophy is the demand that one who teaches the history of philosophy be uninvolved (unparteiisch).

This insistence on non-involvement means for the most part simply that the one who teaches history of philosophy shall act like a dead man in presenting philosophies, that he should treat them as something separated from his own spirit, something external, that he should himself be without thought in treating them.

Tennemann, for example, conveys this impression of non-involvement.

He is completely caught up in the Kantian philosophy, whose main contention is that the true is not to be known.

In that case, however, the history of philosophy is a sorry affair, where one knows ahead of time that one must put up with unsuccessful efforts.

Tennemann praises the most diverse philosophers for their erudition, their genius, etc.

But he finds fault with them for not having adopted the Kantian point of view or, simply, for having philosophized.

One should not, if one follows this view, be on the side of thinking spirit.

Still, if one wants to study the history of philosophy properly, then non-involvement consists in not opting for the opinions, thoughts, concepts of individuals.

But, one must be involved in philosophy and not be satisfied with limiting oneself merely to the knowledge of what others have thought.

Truth will be known (erkannt) only when with his spirit one is in it; mere knowledge about (Kenntnis) it does not show that one is in it.

To all this I should like to add a few remarks regarding the manner of treating the history of philosophy.