Zeno of Citium: Founder of Stoicism

^32-33 The Stoics divide philosophy into 3:

1. natural philosophy
2. ethics
3. logic

Zeno was the first to make this division in his treatise on Reason.

He was followed in it by:

• Chrysippus in book 1 of his treatise on Reason and book 1 of his treatise on Natural Philosophy
• Apollodorus
• Syllus in book 1 of his Introduction to the Doctrines of the Stoics
• Eudromus in his Ethical Elements
• Diogenes, the Babylonian
• Posidonius

These divisions are called:

• topics by Apollodorus
• species by Chrysippus and Eudromus
• genera by all the rest.

They compare philosophy to an animal:

• logic is the bones and sinews
• natural philosophy is the fleshy parts
• ethical philosophy is the soul

They compare it to an egg:

• logic is the shell
• ethics is the white
• natural philosophy is the yolk

Also to a fertile field:

• logic is the fence around it
• ethics are the fruit
• natural philosophy the soil or the fruit-trees

They compare it to a city fortified by walls, and regulated by reason.

No one part is preferred to another. They are all combined and united inseparably.

So they treat of them all in combination.

Zeno orders them in his treatise on Reason:

1. logic
2. natural philosophy
3. ethics

This is followed by Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Eudromus.

But Diogenes of Ptolemais puts ethics 1st.

Apollodorus places ethics second

Panætius and Posidonius begin with natural philosophy, as Phanias, the friend of Posidonius asserts, in the first book of his treatise on the School of Posidonius.

Cleanthes says that there are 6 divisions of reason according to philosophy:

1. dialectics
2. rhetoric
3. ethics
4. politics
5. physics
6. theology

But others assert that these are not divisions of reason, but of philosophy itself; and this is the opinion advanced by Zeno, of Tarsus, among others.

XXXIV. Some say that the logical division is properly subdivided into 2 sciences:

1. rhetoric
2. dialectics

Some divide it also into definitive species, which is conversant with rules and tests.

Others deny the propriety of this last division altogether, and argue that the object of rules and tests is the discovery of the truth; for it is in this division that they explain the differences of representations.

They also argue that, on the other side, the science of definitions has equally for its object the discovery of truth, since we only know things by the intervention of ideas.

They also call rhetoric a science conversant about speaking well concerning matters which admit of a detailed narrative; and dialectics they call the science of arguing correctly in discussions which can be carried on by question and answer; on which account they define it thus: a knowledge of what is true, and false, and neither one thing nor the other.

Rhetoric itself they divide into three kinds; for one description they say is concerning about giving advice, another is forensic, and the third encomiastic.

It is also divided into several parts, one relating to the discovery of arguments, one to style, one to the arrangement of arguments, and the other to the delivery of the speech. And a rhetorical oration they divide into the exordium, the narration, the reply to the statements of the adverse party, and the peroration.

XXXV. Dialectics, they say, is divided into two parts; one of which has reference to the things signified, the other to the expression.

That which has reference to the things signified or spoken of, they divide again into the topic of things conceived in the fancy, and into those of axioms, of perfect determinations, of predicaments, of things alike, whether upright or prostrate, of tropes, of syllogisms, and of sophisms, which are derived either from the voice or from the things. And these sophisms are of various kinds; there is the false one, the one which states facts, the negative, the sorites, and others like these; the imperfect one, the inexplicable one, the conclusive one, the veiled one, the horned one, the nobody, and the mower.

In the second part of dialectics, that which has for its object the expression, they treat of written language, of the different parts of a discourse, of solecism and barbarism, of poetical forms of expression, of ambiguity, of a melodious voice, of music; and some even add definitions, divisions, and diction.

They say that the most useful of these parts is the consideration of syllogisms; for that they show us what are the things which are capable of demonstration, and that contributes much to the formation of our judgment, and their arrangement and memory give a scientific character to our knowledge. They define reasoning to be a system composed of assumptions and conclusions: and syllogism is a syllogistic argument proceeding on them. Demonstration they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; and perception they divide into comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, and which is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object; Incomprehensible, which has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation.

Dialectics itself they pronounce to be a necessary science, and a virtue which comprehends several other virtues under its species. And the disposition not to take up one side of an argument hastily, they defined to be a knowledge by which we are taught when we ought to agree to a statement, and when we ought to withhold our agreement. Discretion they consider to be a powerful reason, having reference to what is becoming, so as to prevent our yielding to an irrelevant argument. Irrefutability they define to be a power in an argument, which prevents one from being drawn from it to its opposite. Freedom from vanity, according to them, is a habit which refers the perceptions back to right reason.

Again, they define knowledge itself as an assertion or safe comprehension, or habit, which, in the perception of what is seen, never deviates from the truth. And they say further, that without dialectic speculation, the wise man cannot be free from all error in his reasoning. For that that is what distinguishes what is true from what is false, and which easily detects those arguments which are only plausible, and those which depend upon an ambiguity of language. And without dialectics they say it is not possible to ask or answer questions correctly. They also add, that precipitation in denials extends to those things which are done, so that those[277] who have not properly exercised their perceptions fall into irregularity and thoughtlessness. Again, without dialectics, the wise man cannot be acute, and ingenious, and wary, and altogether dangerous as an arguer. For that it belongs to the same man to speak correctly and to reason correctly, and to discuss properly those subjects which are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him, all which qualities belong to a man who is skilful in dialectics. This then is a brief summary of their opinions on logic.