How to Understand Questions

If we perfectly understand a question, it must be abstracted from all superfluous concepts, reduced to its simplest form, and divided into the smallest parts with enumeration.

In this, we imitate the Dialecticians in one respect, that just as they assume the terms or the matter to be known for handing down the forms of syllogisms, so also here we require the question to be perfectly understood.

However, unlike them, we do not distinguish two extremes and a middle; rather, we consider the whole matter in this way:

1. In every question there must necessarily be something unknown, otherwise it would be in vain to seek it;
2. that same thing must be designated in some way, otherwise we would not be determined to investigate it rather than anything else
3. it cannot be designated except through some other known thing.

All these are also found in imperfect questions: for example, if we inquire about the nature of the magnet, what we understand to be signified by these two terms, magnet and nature, is known, by which we are determined to inquire about this rather than anything else, etc.

But furthermore, for a question to be perfect, we want it to be fully determined, so that nothing more is sought than what can be deduced from the given: for example, if someone asks me what can be inferred about the nature of the magnet precisely from those experiments which Gilbert asserts he has conducted, whether true or false; likewise, if one asks what judgment can be made precisely about the nature of sound from the fact that three strings A, B, C produce equal sound, among which B, by supposition, is twice as thick as A but not longer, and is stretched by a weight twice as heavy; and C, although not thicker than A, is only twice as long, yet is stretched by a weight four times heavier, etc.

From which it is easily understood how all imperfect questions can be reduced to perfect ones, as will be explained more fully in its place; and it also appears how this rule can be observed, by abstracting from all superfluous concepts to understand the difficulty well, and by reducing it so that we no longer think about being involved with this or that subject, but only in general about certain magnitudes compared among themselves: for example, after we have determined to observe certain experiments about the magnet, there is no difficulty remaining in our thinking that needs to be removed from all other subjects.

Furthermore, it is added that the difficulty should be reduced to its simplest form, namely according to Rules V and VI, and divided according to Rule 7: so if I examine the magnet from several experiments, I will go through them one by one separately; likewise, if, as mentioned, I compare the strings A and B separately, then A and C etc., so that afterwards I cover everything together with sufficient enumeration. And only these three things occur about the terms of any proposition to be kept from pure understanding before we undertake its final solution, if it needs the use of the next eleven rules; which will be more clearly explained in the third part of this Treatise. Moreover, we understand through questions, those where true or false is found in them; the different kinds of which are to be enumerated to determine what we can accomplish about each one.

Already we have said that, in the mere view of things, whether simple or composite, falsehood cannot be; nor in this sense are questions called, but they acquire the name immediately, as soon as we deliberate on some judgment about them. We do not count among questions only those requests made by others; but the very ignorance itself, or rather the doubt of Socrates, was a question, when he first turned to it and began to inquire whether it was true that he doubted about everything, and asserted this himself.

But we seek either things from words, or causes from effects, or effects from causes, or the whole from its parts, or other parts, or finally several things together from these.

We say that things are sought from words whenever the difficulty lies in the obscurity of the speech; and hither we refer not only all enigmas, such as that of the Sphinx concerning the animal which at first is four-footed, then two-footed, and finally becomes three-footed; also that of the fishermen who, standing on the shore, equipped with hooks and reeds for catching fish, said they no longer had those they had caught, but that on the contrary they had those they had not yet caught, etc.;

But also in the greatest part of those about which the learned dispute, almost always the question is about the name. Nor is it right to think so badly of the greater minds, that we should judge them to conceive things badly, whenever they do not sufficiently explain them with suitable words: if sometimes, for example, they call the surface of the body surrounding place, they conceive nothing false, but only misuse the name of place, which from common usage signifies that simple nature and by itself known, by reason of which something is said to be here or there; which consists wholly in a certain relation of the thing, which is said to be in place, to the parts of the outer space, and which some, seeing the name of place occupied by the surrounding surface, have improperly said where intrinsic, and so on. And these questions about the name occur so often that, if agreement among philosophers about the signification of words were always present, almost all their disputes would be removed.

Causes are sought from effects whenever we investigate whether a thing exists or what it is…

However, since when a question is proposed to us for solution we often do not immediately perceive of what kind it exists, nor whether things are sought from words, or causes from effects, etc.; therefore, to say more about these particulars seems to me superfluous. For it will be briefer and more convenient if we pursue all that is to be done in order for the solution of any difficulty in order; and therefore, with any given question, we must first endeavor to understand distinctly what is sought.

For frequently some, in investigating propositions, are so hasty that they apply a vague mind to their solution before they perceive by what signs the sought thing, if it should happen, can be distinguished: no less unfit than a boy sent by his master, who would be so eager to obey that he would hasten to run without having received orders, not knowing whither he should go.

But indeed in every question, although something must be unknown, otherwise it would be in vain to seek it, yet this same thing must be designated by certain conditions so that we may be determined to investigate one thing rather than another. And these are the conditions to be examined, which we immediately declare to be incumbent from the beginning: which will be done, if we turn the mind’s eye to each one distinctly, inquiring diligently how much that unknown thing we seek is limited by each one; for here human ingenuity is liable to be deceived in two ways, either indeed by assuming something more than is given to determine the question, or on the contrary by omitting something.

We must beware lest we suppose more and stricter conditions than are given: especially in enigmas and other artfully invented requests to circumvent minds, but sometimes also in other questions, when something seems to be assumed as certain for their solution, which no certain reason has persuaded us, but an inveterate opinion.

For example, in the riddle of the Sphinx, it should not be thought that the name of foot signifies only true feet of animals, but it must also be seen whether it can be transferred to other things, as happens, namely, to the hands of an infant, and to the staff of an old man, because both use them as if feet for walking.

Also, in that of the fishermen, care must be taken lest the thought of fish so occupy our mind that it turns it away from the thought of those animals which poor people often carry around with them reluctantly, and reject what is caught.

Likewise, if it is asked how a vessel, such as we have seen sometimes, was constructed, in whose middle stood a column on which was placed a statue of Tantalus appearing to be eager to drink.

However, water was best contained in the vessel until it was high enough for Tantalus’ mouth to enter; but as soon as it reached his unfortunate lips, it all immediately flowed out: at first glance, it seems that the whole artifice was in constructing this statue of Tantalus, which, however, in no way determines the question, but only accompanies it; for the whole difficulty lies in this alone, that we ask how the vessel should be constructed so that the water in it flows entirely as soon as it reaches a certain height, but not before.

Finally, if all those observations we have about the stars are asked, what we can assert about their motions, it is not assumed gratuitously that the earth is immovable and located in the middle of things, as the Ancients did, because it has seemed so to us from infancy; but this very thing should be called into doubt, so that we may examine later what certainty can be judged about this matter. And so on for the rest.

But we commit an omission whenever some condition required for the determination of the question is expressed or understood, to which we do not reflect: if, for example, perpetual motion is asked, not natural, such as that of the stars or springs, but made by human industry, and someone (as some believed could happen, thinking the earth could be moved perpetually in a circle around its axis, and all the properties of the earth were preserved) thought he would find perpetual motion if he adjusted this stone to move in a circle, or at least communicated its motion with its other powers; although this were to happen, nevertheless he would not make perpetual motion by art, but would use only that which is natural, just as if he applied a wheel to the flow

of a river, so that it always moved; therefore, he would omit the condition required for determining the question, etc.

With the question sufficiently understood, it must be precisely seen in what its difficulty consists, so that this may be more easily solved by abstracting from all other difficulties.

It is not always enough to understand the question to know in what its difficulty consists; but moreover it must be considered in its particulars that are required in it, so that if anything easy should be found by us, we omit it, and with these omitted from the proposition, only that remains which we are ignorant of.

Just as in that question about the vessel described a little while ago, we easily perceive indeed how the vessel should be made: the column must be placed in its middle, the bird painted, etc.; by which all things having been rejected, as not concerning the matter, it is clear that the naked difficulty in this, that the water, after being contained in the vessel, as soon as it reached a certain height, all flowed out; why this happens, is to be sought.

Therefore, we say that it is only worth the effort to scan all those things which are given in a proposition, rejecting those which clearly do not affect the matter, retaining those which are necessary, and referring doubtful ones to a more careful examination.