Office Of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, And Emergency Response (ceser)
Table of Contents
Mission/Overview
CESER’s mission is to “enhance the security and resilience of U.S. critical energy infrastructure to all hazards,” to “mitigate the impacts of disruptive events and risk to the sector overall through preparedness and innovation,” and to “respond to and facilitate recovery from energy disruptions in collaboration with other Federal agencies, the private sector, and State, local, tribal, and territory governments.”18
Needed Reforms
The threats to U.S. energy infrastructure are real and persistent, and CESER’s role—working to support national security by working with the private sector to ensure energy security—is a proper one for government. Though CESER is properly focused on the threat to the grid from inverter-based resources like wind and solar, it needs to focus on the entire energy system, including the interdependence between natural gas and electric generation and cybersecurity. A good first step would be to reinstate an iteration of the Trump Administration’s Executive Order 13920, “Secur- ing the United States Bulk-Power System.”19 The Biden Administration also placed the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) and DOE’s Federal Power Act 202(c) author- ity20 under the CESER office, which should continue in the next Administration.
New Policies
Budget
CESER received $177 million for FY 2022 under the Energy and Water Develop- ment and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022,21 and $550 million through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.22 The FY 2023 budget request is for $202 million.23 In addition, the White House has sent a letter to Congress request- ing additional appropriations of $500 million to modernize the SPR.24
OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY (OE)
Mission/Overview
OE was created after the 2003 blackouts to improve grid reliability and energy assurance.25 OE works to defend and promote the reliability and resiliency of the electric grid through power grid modeling and analytics, cyber resilience programs, and coordination with private-sector electricity providers. It also works to identify Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure.
Needed Reforms
Focus more intently on grid reliability. There are significant cyber, physical, and reliability threats to the electric grid, and it is important
CESER should be refocused to prioritize the cybersecurity, physical security, and resilience of critical infrastructure. Through research and development, tech- nical assistance to states and industry, and emergency exercises, CESER can make a difference in our energy security posture. that a government agency with access to national security information develops data and plans to address threats to the grid and assist the private sector in securing it. Although OE does not stand out as a problematic office, additional focus and priority could be given to its original mission of working on grid reliability and resilience. OE could be combined with CESER (as well as what is left of the Grid Deployment Office if it is eliminated).
Eliminate applied programs. OE administers grant programs for things like energy storage and the testing of grid-enhancing technologies (GETs). These programs should be eliminated. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate all DOE applied energy programs including OE (except perhaps those related to basic science for new energy technology).
New Policies
Prioritize grid security
OE (along with CESER if they are combined) should focus on the security of critical infrastructure equipment used in the bulk power system as envisioned in President Trump’s May 2020 Executive Order 13920 and a related December 2020 Prohibition Order,26 which was revoked in April 2021 by President Biden.27 In addition, CESER/OE should:
- Focus on the interdependence of and threats to electric generation and natural gas pipelines.
- Continue to focus on Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure.
- Work with FERC and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to ensure that there is sufficient dispatchable on-demand generation available to generate the electricity the grid needs when intermittent generation like wind and solar is not available. l End funding of programs for commercial technology and deployment. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate nonessential funding of commercial technology and deployment. These activities can be conducted by the private sector.
Budget
OE’s FY 2021 enacted budget was $211,720,000, and DOE has requested $297,386,000 for FY 2023.28
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE)
Mission/Overview
The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31
Needed Reforms
Substantially limit NE’s size and scope.
Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry.
New Policies
NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should:
Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects
NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector.
Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste.
Budget
The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities.