International Organizations

Defending and protecting the American people and advancing their interests requires the United States to engage in a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral relationships, including participating in international organizations. Working with other governments through international organizations like the United Nations (U.N.) can be tremendously useful—but membership in these organizations must always be understood as a means to attain defined goals rather than an end in itself.

Engagement with international organizations is one relatively easy way for the U.S. to defend its interests and to seek to address problems in concert with other nations, but it is not the only option—and American diplomats should be clear- eyed about international organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. When such institutions act against U.S. interests, the United States must be prepared to take appropriate steps in response, up to and including withdrawal. The manifest failure and corruption of the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the danger that international organizations pose to U.S. citizens and interests.

The next Administration must end blind support for international organi- zations. If an international organization is effective and advances American interests, the United States should support it. If an international organization is ineffective or does not support American interests, the United States should not support it. Those that are effective will still require constant pressure from U.S. officials to ensure that they remain effective. Serious consideration should also be given to withdrawal from organizations that no longer have value, quietly undermine U.S. interests or goals, or disproportionately rely on U.S. financial con- tributions to survive.

The Trump Administration’s “tough love” approach to international organiza- tions served American interests. For example, the Trump Administration withdrew from, or terminated funding for, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and the WHO. The results were redeployment of taxpayer dollars to better uses—and other organizations “getting the message” that the United States will not allow itself and its money to be used to undermine its own interests.

The Biden Administration reversed many of these decisions. Currently, U.S. funding for international organizations is more than $16 billion in fiscal year 2021—a sharp increase from $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2015.19 Millions of American taxpayer dollars go to support policies and initiatives that hurt the United States and American citizens.

The next Administration should direct the Secretary of State to initiate a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in all international organizations. This review should take into account long-standing provisions in federal law that prohibit the use of taxpayer dollars to promote abortion, popu- lation control, and terrorist activities, as well as other applicable restrictions on funding for international organizations and agencies with a view to withholding U.S. funds in cases of abuses.

International organizations should not be used to promote radical social pol- icies as if they were human rights priorities. Doing so undermines actual human rights and weakens U.S. credibility abroad. The next Administration should use its voice, influence, votes, and funding in international organizations to pro- mote authentic human rights and respect for sovereignty based on the binding

international obligations contained in treaties that have been constitutionally ratified by the U.S. government. It must promote a strict text-based interpreta- tion of treaty obligations that does not consider human rights treaties as “living instruments” both within the State Department and within international organi- zations that receive U.S. funding, including by making respect for sovereignty and authentic human rights a litmus test of personnel decisions and elections processes within international organizations.

The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights focused on the primacy of civil and political rights in its inaugural report, which remains an important guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights. The com- mission’s report is a roadmap for revamping and reenergizing U.S. human rights policy and should be the basis for both structural and policy changes throughout the State Department.20 All U.S. multilateral engagements must be reevaluated in light of the work of the commission, and initiatives that promote controversial policies must be halted and rolled back.

It is paramount to create a healthy culture of respect for life, the family, sover- eignty, and authentic human rights in international organizations and agencies. To support this goal, the U.S. led an effort during the Trump Administration to forge a consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health, support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national sovereignty. The result was the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and Protection of the Family.21 All U.S. foreign policy engagements that were pro- duced and expanded under the Obama and Biden Administrations must be aligned with the Geneva Consensus Declaration and the work of the U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights.

The U.S. government should not and cannot promote or fund abortion in inter- national programs or multilateral organizations. Technically, the United States can prevent its international funding from going toward abortions, but the U.S. will have a greater impact by including like-minded nations and building on the coali- tion launched through the Geneva Consensus Declaration, with a view to shaping the work of international agencies by functioning as a united front. The COVID-19 pandemic made it painfully clear that both international organi- zations—and some countries—are only too willing to trample human rights in the name of public health. For example, the WHO was, and remains, willing to support the suppression of basic human rights, partially because of its close relationship with human rights abusers like the PRC.

The next Administration should unequivocally embrace the premise that humanity and the international community can simultaneously tackle pandem- ics and other emergent health threats without impeding the rights of people. It must also become a vocal surrogate for people in countries where rights are being suppressed in the name of health. This will likely require greater restrictions on the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies.

The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations.

SHAPING THE FUTURE

Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures

Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies.

The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining.

Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority.

Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices.

The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities.

Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately, U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years. The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as a tool to communicate directly with the people of Europe during World War 2.

During the next half-century, America’s international broadcasting efforts both expanded and increased in sophistication as the United States shifted out of its “hot” war in Europe and into the Cold War with the Soviet Union. U.S. international broadcasting prowess, and the confident willingness to communicate the correctness of American ideals in the face of global resistance, arguably hit its peak near the conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Soviet and Eastern Bloc Communism, factors including the false appeal of a so-called peace dividend triggered a slide in the U.S. ability to communicate a pro-freedom message to the rest of the world and in its commitment to do so. Ironically, this slide accompanied the rise of the Internet and mobile phone technologies, which arguably facilitated the most significant revolution in human communication since the invention of the printing press.

Engage in cyber diplomacy. Cyberspace has become an arena for competition between the U.S. and nations that seek and export digital authoritarianism. Cyberspace protection is critical to national security and deserving of commensurate diplomatic resources. Defined as “the use of diplomatic tools to address issues arising in and through cyberspace,” cyber diplomacy is a key part of the U.S. government’s toolkit for preventing and addressing cyber threats.24

The model for cyberspace that the U.S. espouses is based on democracy and freedom of information. It is “an open, interoperable, secure, reliable, market-drive, domain that reflects democratic values and protects privacy.”25 Russia and China, meanwhile, are authoritarian regimes that use the Internet to limit public opposition and control information. They have created technological tools to enforce dominance over their peoples, and at the U.N. and international organizations dealing with cyberspace, they strive to push standards that assist their totalitarian efforts and undermine Western nations.

The United States must reassert its public diplomacy obligations by restoring its international broadcasting infrastructure as part of the broader U.S. foreign policy framework, consolidating broadcasting resources and recommitting to people-focused and pro-freedom messaging and content. Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware.

In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26

The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation’s role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective.

In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.

The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century.