Transportation Security Administration (tsa)

The TSA model is costly and unwisely makes TSA both the regulator and the regulated organization responsible for screening operations. As part of an effort to shrink federal bureaucracies and bring private-sector know-how to govern- ment programs, TSA is ripe for reform. The U.S. should look to the Canadian and European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately.

TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors.

Contractors would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any oper- ating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government. The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service to travelers should also improve.

MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT)

The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much over- lap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component bud- gets need to roll up into all-department budgets.

The Directorate requires intense reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature. Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force (RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization, etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2). One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with any subject matter and in any location.

Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement

Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15

Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented. To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging.

Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out- side of the executive branch.

OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY)

Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights.

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A)

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should be eliminated both because it has not added value and because it has been weaponized for domestic politi- cal purposes.

The Intelligence Community (IC) already provides raw intelligence to DHS components. In addition, the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, and other agencies where necessary already provide holistic threat assessment products to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector entities at both the classified and unclassified levels where appropriate. I&A’s work as an interlocuter between the IC and DHS components’ individual intelligence operations on the one hand and government and the private sector on the other, as well as between the IC and the components, is at best duplicative. At worst, it is used and discussed in the media as a political tool, resulting in more harm than good to the U.S. government and IC writ large.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is not a member of the IC, should create cyber intelligence products in a collaborative fashion with the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Such efforts would lead to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders that exceed the quality and capability of I&A’s efforts. This same principle applies to other

PLCY should likewise do a complete inventory, analysis, and evaluation of any of the department’s work, in coordination with social media outlets, to censor or otherwise change or affect Americans’ speech. PLCY should comprehensively report on and publish this history in full so that the American people can know the facts. The department should remove all personnel who participated in any of this activity.

The department has significant authority and budget to provide grants for var- ious purposes. This effort is diffused across components and lacks central policy thought and coordination. PLCY should set a departmentwide policy that estab- lishes how granting choices are to be made and is consistent with the President’s priorities. PLCY should clear all granting decisions to ensure that they are con- sistent with the new policy.

PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY should work with Congress to streamline the department’s reporting requirements. Because there has not been a departmen- tal reauthorization bill and these requirements have been added piecemeal over two decades, they significantly overlap and even conflict—wasting resources and distracting from the department’s mission. PLCY should seek the elimination of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Issue-Area Reforms. PLCY should bolster its Immigration Statistics program and make it the one-stop shop for the timely production of all department immi- gration statistics and analysis.

components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments. The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coor- dination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)

Needed Reforms

OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations, policies, and programs.

Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters Gen- eral Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equiv- alent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head. The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS.

OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making. OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressio- nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.

OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses.

The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the department that can pull responsive communications quickly.