Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. lNorth Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. lIran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next — 123 —  l decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. 1. Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft. 2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM. 3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370. Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade.  l l Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. 1. Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned. 2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis. 3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. l Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons. — 124 —Department of Defense 1. Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential both for modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile. 2. Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development. 3. Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises. l Correctly orient arms control. The U.S. should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interests of the U.S. and its allies. 1. Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence. 2. Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S. and its allies rather than as an end in itself.

MISSILE DEFENSE

This can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of missiles as tools of coercion. It also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails.41 Adversaries are relying increasingly on missiles to achieve their aims.

China and Russia, in addition to their vast and growing ballistic missile inventories, are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. North Korea has pursued an aggressive missile testing program and is becoming increasingly belligerent toward South Korea and Japan. Iran continues to maintain a missile arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the Middle East and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is developing the ability to build ICBMs.

3. Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail.

Missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. In light of these growing threats, the incoming Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority.

Needed Reforms

Champion the benefits of missile defense. Despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second- strike capabilities.

Reject claims made by the Left that missile defense is destabilizing while acknowledging that Russia and China are developing their own advanced missile defense systems.

2. Commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.42

Strengthen homeland ballistic missile defense. The United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea, but as North Korea improves its missile program, this system is at risk of falling behind the threat.43

Buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is more advanced than the GBI, for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptors.44 The Biden Administration currently plans to buy only 20.

2. Consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as a layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast.

Increase the development of regional missile defense. As the Ukraine conflict amply demonstrates, U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited. The United States has been unable to supply our partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and types of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. The U.S. should prioritize procurement of more regional defense systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot missiles.

Change U.S. missile defense policy. Historically, the U.S. has chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic missile threat to the homeland and to use homeland missile defense only against rogue nations.

1. Abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland against Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles and focus on how to improve defense as the Russian and Chinese missile threats increase at an unprecedented rate.45
2. Invest in future advanced missile defense technologies like directed energy or space-based missile defense that could defend against more numerous missile threats.

Invest in new track-and-intercept capabilities. The advent of hypersonic missiles and increased numbers of cruise missile arsenals by threat actors poses new challenges to our missile defense capabilities.

1. Invest in cruise missile defense of the homeland.46

2. Accelerate the program to deploy space-based sensors that can detect and track missiles flying on nonballistic trajectories.47

3. Accelerate the Glide Phase Interceptor, which is intended to counter hypersonic weapons.