U.s. Space Force

Needed Reforms

Reverse the Biden Administration’s defensive posture. The Biden Administration has eliminated almost all offensive deterrence capabilities and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of disaggregation, maneuver, and reconstitution—the most costly, the slowest, and ultimately the most fragile architecture selection.

U.S. space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air, land, and sea effectiveness, lethality, and superiority by providing secure broad- band global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy); attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of operations both by defending U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on adversaries that might seek to attack them.

The U.S. Space Force (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and theater combat support from space, to deter attacks against U.S. space assets, and to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF posture was conceived as a balance of offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for maximum effectiveness.

1. Reestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a favorable balance of forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously complicate enemy calculations of a successful first strike against U.S. space assets.

2. Restore architectural balance in U.S. space forces, both offensive and defensive, to restore deterrence dominance efficiently and quickly.

3. Rapidly expand space control capability, to include cis-lunar space (the region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the moon), to provide early warning of an enemy attack.

Reduce overclassification. The USSF must move beyond the Cold War– era culture of secrecy and overclassification that surrounded military space to facilitate greater coordination and synchronization of efforts across the government and commercial sectors.

Seek arms control and “rules of the road” understandings only when they are unambiguously in the interests of the U.S. and its allies, and prohibit their unilateral implementation. Declassify appropriate information about terrestrial and on-orbit space capabilities that threaten the U.S. space constellation, as well as those being pursued by our competitors, to secure the principled right to counter them offensively.

Implement policies suited to a mature USSF. No longer a “newborn,” the USSF has entered its fourth year of existence, and the lessons learned can be incorporated across all facets of the force to increase its effectiveness.

1. Restructure from the current “unity of effort” structure to “unity of command.”

2. Lead the U.S. government’s development of a clear and unambiguous declaratory policy that the United States will operate at will in space and enforce these operations with capabilities that ensure effective deterrence and the ability to impose our will if necessary.

3. End the current study phase of concept development and issue necessary guidance for the development and fielding of offensive capabilities.

4. Alter the Space Development Agency’s current “fail-early” approach and transition to a methodology that maintains aggressive timelines but with significantly greater engineering rigor, with special attention to sustainment, support, and fully integrated space operations.

5. Increase the number of general officer positions to ensure the Space Force’s ability to compete for resources on a common basis with the other services.

6. Explore creation of a Space Force Academy to attract top aero–astro students, engineers, and scientists and develop astronauts. The academy could be attached initially to a large existing research university like the California Institute of Technology or MIT, share faculty and funding, and eventually be built separately to be on par with the other service academies.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Needed Reforms

Ensure that USCYBERCOM is properly focused. Mission creep is leading to wasteful overlap with the Department of Homeland Security, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.

Separate USCYBERCOM from the National Security Agency per congressional direction. 2. Conduct effective offensive cyber-effects operations at the tactical and strategic levels.

USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 by the Department of Defense to unify the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthen DOD cyberspace capabilities, and integrate and enhance U.S. cyber expertise. Cyber capabilities and threats are evolving rapidly. Accordingly, a conservative Administration should be especially sensitive to and prepared to meet the challenges presented by bureaucratic silos, inappropriately rigid tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking’s historic tendency to lag behind technological capability.

The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or mis- placed. The following recommendations therefore presuppose that there will be a rigorous “lessons learned” analysis and review of existing U.S. doctrine in light of the battlefield evidence.

3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump’s classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36

4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics.

Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness.

Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare.

2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level.

3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level.

4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS).

5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies.

6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37

Rationalize strategy and doctrine.

1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes.

2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against U.S. infrastructure and citizens.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an1 extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations.

There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe.

Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran).

Needed Reforms

Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels.

1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.”

2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.

3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document.

4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.

Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe.

1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base.

2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt.

3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region.

Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland.

1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy.

2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.

3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner.

4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors.

5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland.