U.s. Air Force

The U.S. Air Force today lacks a force structure with the lethality, survivabil- ity, and capacity to fight a major conflict with a great power like China, deter nuclear threats, and meet its other operational requirements under the National Defense Strategy.29 For 30 years, the Air Force has received less annual funding

Needed Reforms

Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force.

1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives.

2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades.

(if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform.

The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning.

3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force.

Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats.

1. Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year.

2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems.

3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific.

4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints.

5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout.

6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum.

Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries.

1. Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise.

2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).

3. Achieve moving target engagement capability and capacity against sea, surface, and ground mobile targets at the scale necessary to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy.

4. Build resilient basing, sustainment, and communications for survivability in a contested environment.

5. Establish a vigorous and sufficiently funded electromagnetic spectrum operations recovery plan to make up for more than 20 years of neglect of this mission area.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

Needed Reforms

Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation.32 Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available for modernization.

The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is the maritime land force of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy. It serves a critical role as an expedition- ary amphibious force that can project power from sea to shore and beyond while performing other specialized missions like securing America’s diplomatic out- posts abroad.

Between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the conclusion of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in August 2022, the Marine Corps engaged in extended operations ashore as directed by the Secretary of Defense, leaving it with little opportunity or ability to train for and execute the naval and amphibious operations for which it is uniquely suited and directed by law. This lengthy diver- gence from its primary mission led to deep concern that the Corps had become a “second land army,” prompting senior Marine Corps leaders to push for the service to return to the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting coun- terinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed capabilities that were specifically geared to those fights but have limited utility in scenarios involving evenly matched and advanced enemies or amphibious operations that are neces- sary for the projection of naval power.

As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement Force Design 2030,31 a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The suc- cessful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.

Transform USMC force structure. a. Eliminate all USMC law enforcement battalions. b. Transform at least one Marine Infantry Regiment into a Marine Littoral Regiment. c. Reduce the size of remaining infantry battalions. 2. Divest systems or equipment that are better suited to heavier U.S. Army units. a. Maintain divestment of M1 Abrams tanks. b. Eliminate the majority of tube artillery (M777) batteries. c. Reduce the number of Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles and the number of their replacements. 3. Use funds made available by divestment of systems to support new systems that are geared to the likely needs of future conflicts.  a. Increase the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS). b. Increase the number of upgraded Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) companies. c. Increase the number of Unmanned Aerial Systems and anti-air systems (including counter-UAS systems). d. Develop long-range strike missiles and anti-ship missiles for the Corps. e. Modernize USMC infantry equipment.

Transform the USMC personnel paradigm. More than other services, the USMC relies heavily on junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to staff key positions across the force but especially in combat arms. For example, E-4s routinely hold squad leader billets when the Army normally has E-6s in those billets. The nature of more distributed operations and the increasingly complex responsibilities of a Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon under Force Design 2030 will only put more responsibility on the backs of squad leaders and platoon sergeants, increasing the need for more senior Marines in those critical positions. Additionally, the Corps needs to improve its retention of junior NCOs after their first enlistments (the Marines have much lower rates of reenlistment than other branches).33

1. Align the USMC’s combat arms rank structure with the U.S. Army’s (squad leader billets are for E-6s, and platoon sergeant billets are for E-7s).
2. Create better incentives to retain talented junior NCOs, especially in infantry and other critical military occupational specialties.
3. Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to enable more robust primary military education.

Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with Force Design 2030. The U.S. Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious fleet that could support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete against other priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity.

1. Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LAWs) to support more distributed amphibious operations, especially in the Pacific.34

2. Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified before 2020.35