U.S. ARMY

The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term.

All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission.

Needed Reforms

Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs.

1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power.

2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance.

3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness.

4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously.

5. Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers.

Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water; munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the other services.

1. Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical munitions and repair parts.

2. Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war.

3. Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and coordination focused on logistics.

4. Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces.

Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next Administration’s highest defense priority.

1. Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the draft was eliminated.

2. Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public support for military service.

3. Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently, there are no general or field-grade officers who served as planners or commanders against a near-peer adversary in combat.

4. Examine the logic of emerging Army concepts about employing massed long-range fires and effects without considering how to gain advantage by closing with and dominating an adversary on land.

5. Recognize that high-intensity land combat operations cannot be sustained through short-term individual or unit rotations in the style of the sustained low-intensity campaigns conducted over the past 20 years.

6. Transform how the National Guard is employed during extended operations short of declared war to preclude back-to-back federal and state deployments of National Guard soldiers in order to stabilize and preserve military volunteerism in our communities.

7. Revamp Army school curricula to concentrate on preparation for large-scale land operations that focus on defeating a peer threat.

8. Address the underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide rates, which have surpassed pre–World War II rates and are now eclipsing the rate among civilians.

U.S. NAVY

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a recognition that there is a vital national interest in the maritime environment and that this national interest requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true today as it was almost 250 years ago and will remain true into the future.

The U.S. Navy (USN) exists for two primary reasons: to project prompt, sus- tained, and effective combat power globally, both at sea and ashore, and to deter aggression by potential adversaries by maintaining a forward operating presence in conjunction with allies and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China Peo- ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In the production, employment, and control of maritime forces, the USN must consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where appropriate, adapt its processes and workforce development. In balancing the necessary long-term industrial model of naval platforms against emerging short-term opportunities, the USN must take account of advances that may present vulnerabilities and risks as well as what is assured and secure.

Needed Reforms

Invest in and expand force structure. The USN’s organizing principle remains platform-centered: vessels manned by sailors. The manned surface and subsurface forces act in concert with land-based, air-based, and space- based forces to project power outside sovereign territory, principally by operating in international waters. Investments must be closely coordinated with these other elements of military power.

1. Build a fleet of more than 355 ships.26

2. Develop and field unmanned systems to augment the manned forces.

3. Require that range and lethality be the key factors in all procurement and sustainment decisions for ships, aircraft, and munitions.

Establish a Rapid Capabilities Office. The USN must transition technology into warfighting capability more rapidly. It must foster a culture of innovation that includes connecting theoretical and intangible ideas with real production environments that produce tangible and practical outcomes and adapting proven processes to advance material solutions.

1. Harness innovation and willingness to tolerate risk so that “good enough” systems can be fielded rapidly.

2. Use the Space Development Agency as a model.

3. Establish an oversight Board of Directors made up of the service chief, service secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

Reestablish the General Board. In contrast with the Navy General Board that served ship development so well during the interwar period, the current joint process27 for defining the requirements for major defense acquisitions is not well-suited to long-term planning of the sort that is needed for USN fleet architecture and shipbuilding. The interwar General Board should serve as a model, empowered with final decision authority over all requirements documents concerning ships and the major defense systems fielded on ships. The individual board members would ensure a broad base of knowledge as well as independent thinking.28

Accelerate the purchase of key munitions. It takes years to build and maintain navies but only hours to expend their ordnance in combat. The USN must be prepared to expend large quantities of air-launched and sea-launched stealthy, precision, cruise missiles against targets both at sea and ashore. Additionally, modern air defense requires the use of high- performance surface-to-air missiles.

1. Produce key munitions at the maximum rate with significant capacity.

2. Working with the Congress, employ the widest possible range of techniques to enhance the munitions supply chains and workforce.

Enhance warfighter development. The USN requires a variety of documented qualifications for personnel to advance in their careers and assume leadership positions. It also requires individual professional qualifications that are focused on warfighting.

Mandate qualifications that demonstrate an understanding of core competence in collective, integrated warfighting, especially based on current plans and technologies.

2. Elevate the Headquarters Staff focused on Warfighter Development (N7) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and empower it to develop such requirements.

3. Require that war games be utilized as experiential learning environments for the participants as a prerequisite for achieving career milestones (department heads, commanding officers, and major commanders).

4. Highlight in training and leader development that USN forces can and must maintain the ability to operate from and/or defend sovereign territory to include our allies and partners.

5. Train to balance effects from kinetic to nonkinetic and from lethal to nonlethal through effective command and control.