Dod Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and assigned broad responsibility for “all defense research and engineering, technology develop- ment, technology transition, prototyping, experimentation, and developmental testing activities and programs, including the allocation of resources for defense research and engineering, and unifying defense research and engineering efforts across the Department,” to the new Under Secretary, who also was tasked with “serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary on all research, engineering, and technology development activities and programs in the Department.” 6 This led to the single largest DOD structural change since the Goldwater–Nichols act of 19867 and was organized effectively during President Donald Trump’s Administration.

Needed Reforms

Champion, engage, and focus the American innovation ecosystem. To maintain leadership in the era of great-power competition and succeed against our adversaries, a key DOD effort must be the creation of mechanisms and processes to embrace America’s most significant competitive advantage: innovation.

Engage and leverage all of America’s scientific, engineering, and high- tech production communities to research, develop, prototype, and rapidly deploy advanced technology capabilities on a continuing basis to preserve our warfighting advantage. 2. Increase integration and collaboration among the DOD, government labs, and private companies to solve the department’s most difficult problems. 3. Reduce the number of critical technology areas from 14 to a more manageable number to concentrate effort and resources on those that bear directly on great-power competition. 5. Move toward a much more comprehensive independent risk-reduction approach to increase understanding of the technical risks by drawing on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition programs succeed. l Improve the rapid deployment of technology to the battlefield. America’s military advantage has derived from the professionalism of our servicemembers and our ability to manifest our technological advantage in battlefield capability. The current era of great-power competition will continue for the foreseeable future, and technology will be the currency of competition. Our ability to prevail will rest on our ability to develop new technologies and move them onto the battlefield more rapidly than our adversaries can. 1. Accelerate the prototyping cycle to meet immediate battlefield needs. 2. Require tighter integration with user communities to provide value. — 99 —  4. Rebuild RDT&E infrastructure that resides in Cold War–era facilities and is not well-suited to the current era of rapid development and testing of advanced technology and concepts to the maturity level necessary for acquisition and operational fielding. 3. Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology that is aimed at great-power competition (China) and can be matured, prototyped, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost overruns from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies. l Develop a framework to protect the RDT&E enterprise from foreign exploitation. Strategic competition and adaptive adversaries require new thinking about how to protect technology. China has been relentless in stealing U.S. technology, using the full range of measures from influence operations to outright theft. This has been a major factor in its ability to close the gap and in some cases to exceed U.S. capabilities. 1. Implement a comprehensive approach to preserving U.S. technological leadership that is based on outpacing our adversaries; clear about what we need to protect; tailored to various specific sectors (for example, academia, the defense industrial base, and laboratories); and underpinned with a full range of consequences for attempted or actual theft.

DOD FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

The United States must regain its role as the “Arsenal of Democracy.” In fiscal year (FY) 2021, U.S. government foreign military sales (FMS) nosedived to a low of $34.8 billion from a record high of $55.7 billion in FY 2018.8

This decrease hinders interoperability with partners and allies, decreases defense industrial base capac- ity, and increases the taxpayer burden on the U.S. military’s own procurements. Under previous Administrations, the United States built its reputation as a reliable partner with a strong defense industrial base that could supply military articles and goods in a timely manner. Today’s FMS process is encumbered by byzantine bureaucracy, long contracting times, high costs, and mundane technology. The United States can change this downward trajectory by improving inter- nal processes that incentivize partners and allies to procure U.S. defense systems, thereby expanding our “defense ecosystem.”

We must reverse the recent dip in FMS to ensure both that our partners remain interoperable with the United States and that our defense industrial base regains much-needed capacity in preparation for future challenges.

Needed Reforms

Emphasize exportability with U.S. procurements. The record-low FMS sales in 2021 were driven partly by the high costs of converting weapon systems on the back end of production rather than emphasizing exportability in initial capability planning.

Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification.  l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10

Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases.