Department Of Defense

The Constitution gives Congress the authority to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and maintain a Navy”2 and specifies that the President is “commander in Chief” of America’s armed forces.3

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest part of our federal government.

It has almost 3 million people serving in uniform or a civilian capacity throughout the world and consumes approximately $850 billion annually—more than 50 percent of our government’s discretionary spending.

The DOD is also a deeply troubled institution. Historically, the military has been one of America’s most trusted institutions, but years of sustained misuse, a two-tiered culture of accountability that shields senior officers and officials while exposing junior officers and soldiers in the field, wasteful spending, wildly shifting security policies, exceedingly poor discipline in program execution, and (most recently) the Biden Administration’s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have taken a serious toll.

Our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, our impossibly muddled China strategy, the growing involvement of senior military officers in the political arena, and deep confusion about the purpose of our military are clear signals of a disturb- ing decay and markers of a dangerous decline in our nation’s capabilities and will. Additionally, more than 100,000 Americans die annually in large measure because of illicit narcotics flows—more than four times as many people in one year as we lost in our 20-year war against al-Qaeda.

We also are witnessing a transformation in the character of war. The democ- ratization of technology and the collapse of time and space require dramatic, thoughtful changes in how we defend, deter, and fight. As with any huge bureau- cracy—and the DOD is one of the world’s largest—breaking the status quo requires leadership and endurance.

Technology is critical to maintaining our warfighting primacy, but we must be leery of the siren song that technology alone can protect us. More important is how new technologies are developed, tested, procured, and used, and that relies on the true competitive advantages of our people: ingenuity, common sense, and thoughtfulness grounded in a free society. Because war will continue to be the most stressful and consequential human endeavor, the most powerful weapon systems will remain the six inches between the ears of our citi- zens and the strength of their hearts and content of their souls.

Military service is the most difficult task we ask of our citizens, and our nation is enormously blessed that so many young, patriotic Americans eagerly volunteer to carry such a heavy burden. We owe them everything, and we must do better. To do better, however, means recognizing and implementing four overriding priorities:

Priority No. 1: Reestablish a culture of command accountability, nonpoliticization, and warfighting focus. Priority No. 2: Transform our armed forces for maximum effectiveness in an era of great-power competition.

Priority No. 3: Provide necessary support to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) border protection operations. Border protection is a national security issue that requires sustained attention and effort by all elements of the executive branch.

Priority No. 4: Demand financial transparency and accountability. This chapter offers recommendations for improving our armed forces and the civilian organizations that support and oversee them.

DOD POLICY

By far the most significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and pros- perity is China. China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other than the United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and then, from that position, become globally preeminent. If Beijing could achieve this goal, it could dramatically undermine America’s core interests, including by restricting

Needed Reforms

Prioritize a denial defense against China. U.S. defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan.

U.S. access to the world’s most important market. Preventing this from happening must be the top priority for American foreign and defense policy. Beijing presents a challenge to American interests across the domains of national power, but the military threat that it poses is especially acute and signif- icant. China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.

The most severe immediate threat that Beijing’s military poses, however, is to Taiwan and other U.S. allies along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. If China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Bei- jing’s hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China does not succeed. This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordi- nation of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. Critically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S. The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.

This is a grim landscape. The United States needs to deal with these threats forthrightly and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot wish away these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a clear-eyed recognition of the need for choice, discipline, and adequate resources for defense. In this light, U.S. defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for U.S. defense planning while modernizing and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. U.S. allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. The reality is that achieving these goals will require more spending on defense, both by the United States and by its allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization and more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can scale our free- world efforts together.

This focus and priority for U.S. defense activities will deny China the first island chain.

1. Require that all U.S. defense efforts, from force planning to employment and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan.
2. Prioritize the U.S. conventional force planning construct to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before allocating resources to other missions, such as simultaneously fighting another conflict.

Increase allied conventional defense burden-sharing. U.S. allies must take far greater responsibility for their conventional defense. U.S. allies must play their part not only in dealing with China, but also in dealing with threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. 1 Make burden-sharing a central part of U.S. defense strategy with the United States not just helping allies to step up, but strongly encouraging them to do so.

2. Support greater spending and collaboration by Taiwan and allies in the Asia–Pacific like Japan and Australia to create a collective defense model.

3. Transform NATO so that U.S. allies are capable of fielding the great majority of the conventional forces required to deter Russia while relying on the United States primarily for our nuclear deterrent, and select other capabilities while reducing the U.S. force posture in Europe.

Sustain support for Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to take responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses both individually and working collectively.

5. Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea.

Implement nuclear modernization and expansion. The United States manifestly needs to modernize, adapt, and expand its nuclear arsenal. Russia maintains and is actively brandishing a very large nuclear arsenal, but China is also undertaking a historic nuclear breakout.

Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously.

2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion.

Increase alzled counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia.

Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts.

2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions.