Nuclearisation and Impact of 9/11

On May 11 and 13 1998, India conducted 5 nuclear tests codenamed ‘Shakti’ and proclaimed it to be a nuclear weapon state. They created a great sense of alarm in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan described them as a ‘death blow to the global efforts at nuclear non-proliferation’.

Reacting to international appeals that Islamabad should exercise restraint in the face of India’s provocative action, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that ‘as being a sovereign state Pakistan has every right to undertake measures for national defence and security.’

Belligerent statements by

Indian leaders warned Islamabad to roll back its anti-India policy and vacate Azad Kashmir.

• Islamabad was convinced that the Shakti tests threatened to tilt the strategic balance in India’s favour.

Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, joined strident calls for an immediate tit-for-tat response by the small but powerful pro-bomb lobby in Pakistan. She called on the government to ‘immediately respond to the Indian test.’

Two weeks later, on 28 and 30 May, Pakistan conducted 5 nuclear tests in the Chagai Hill range in Balochistan.

E. Sridharan writes that this created a military balance that discourages any direct military confrontation

In response to Pakistani nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed sanctions that cut off all American economic assistance to Pakistan. This hit the economy.

The US called on New Delhi and Islamabad to comply with the benchmarks set out by the Security Council in its resolution 1172 passed on 6 June, 1998.

These included such steps as:

• signing and ratifying the CTBT
• halting all further production of weapon-usable fissile material
• joining the negotiations on a fissile material treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
• limiting development and deployment of delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction and resuming bilateral dialogue on resolving long-standing tensions and disputes.

India-Pakistan ties suffered a marked decline in the wake of their nuclear tests.

The press reported that Indian warplanes had violated Pakistani airspace on August 1, 1998.

Kashmir Affairs Minister, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Abdul Majeed Malik told a news conference that Pakistan was ready to ‘give a befitting reply to any armed conflict imposed on it by India.’

A day later, Prime Minister Sharif accused India of ’taking South Asia to the brink of war’ and called upon the international community to take notice of Indian aggression.

Responding to these statements, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee warned Islamabad ‘India would use a firm hand to respond to any attack on its border.’

He expressed the resolve of his government to ‘fully back’ the efforts of the Indian Army to ‘repulse the nefarious designs of Pakistan.’

The escalation in verbal hostility was coupled with intensive firing by both sides along the volatile Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. This generated considerable international concern.

On 3 August 1998 Washington reportedly sent ‘urgent messages’ to Islamabad and New Delhi asking them to ‘refrain from proactive actions and rhetoric’, to ‘resume the senior level dialogue.’

Motivated partly by their shared interest to avoid the risks of inadvertent escalation and partly by the need to respond to international pressure, both New Delhi and Islamabad expressed their willingness to resume the stalled talks.

In October 1998, Foreign Secretary level talks were resumed. These paved the way for a summit meeting between the Prime Ministers which was held in Lahore on 20-21 February 1999.

The Vajpayee-Sharif summit resulted in 3 agreements:

1. a joint statement
2. the Lahore Declaration
3. the Memorandum of Understanding.

The MoU dealt with nuclear issues and committed both sides to adopt a wide-range of confidence-building measures aimed at avoidance and prevention of conflict.

But hopes of better India-Pakistan relations generated by the Lahore Summit were dashed by the May July 1999 Kargil crisis which brought both to the brink of war.

Pakistan’s military incursion endangered India’s vital supply routes to Leh and the Siachin.

• New Delhi threatened to go to war with Pakistan to restore the status quo.

Caving in to international pressure, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made a dash to Washington on 4 July and signed a joint statement with President Clinton, which called for the restoration of the ‘sanctity’ of Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement.

Riding the wave of world sympathy unleashed by the Kargil episode, India adopted an uncompromising attitude toward Pakistan.

In August 1999 India shot-down a Pakistan navy aircraft ‘Atlantique’, killing all 19 people on board after the ill-fated plane went astray during a training flight in Balochistan.

New Delhi shunned calls for the resumption of India-Pakistan ‘dialogue’.

• It declared that it will not talk to Islamabad unless the Pakistan severed links with Kashmiri militants

Pakistan’s retreat from democracy after the 12 October 1999 military coup in Pakistan intensified Islamabad’s regional and international isolation, as strong world disapproval followed this development.

In America the return of the Republicans led by George W. Bush to power in 2001 intensified Clinton’s opening to India.

Taking a ’less absolutist’ view of New Delhi’s nuclear aspirations, the Republican Party platform described India as ‘one of the great democracies of the twenty-first century’ and raised expectations that the Bush Administration would be ‘more sensitive to Indian security concerns, and more willing to accommodate India’s own aspirations to be a great power.’ The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 offered New Delhi a golden opportunity to further deepen its security links with Washington.

New Delhi promptly endorsed Bush’s declaration of a ‘War on Terrorism’ and pledged full cooperation. In doing so ‘New Delhi hoped to turn the war on terrorism to its advantage as a lever to end Pakistan’s decade-long covert support for the anti-India insurgency in disputed Kashmir.’

Relations between India and Pakistan reached their lowest ebb after the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on India’s parliament, in which over a dozen people including five security guards, were killed.

Despite Islamabad’s swift and strong condemnation of the attack, Prime Minister Vajpayee accused Islamabad of supporting Kashmir militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), whom he blamed for carrying out the attack.

Islamabad denied the allegations and accused New Delhi of ‘stage-managing’ the attack to discredit the Kashmiri struggle for freedom, and also to give a bad name to Pakistan as a state supporting terrorism.

341New Delhi initiated a full-scale military mobilisation, and in May 2002, war between India and Pakistan seemed a distinct possibility. Faced with the nightmare scenario of an India-Pakistan shooting war turning into a nuclear conflagration—with devastating consequences for the region and the American anti-terror campaign against al Qaeda—Washington exerted intense diplomatic pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad, asking them to pull back from the precipice.

Amid warlike noises from New Delhi President Musharraf announced a sweeping reform agenda in his address to the nation on 12 January 2002. Condemning radical Islamists who had unequivocally set up a ‘state within a state’, he declared his determination to rid Pakistani society of their pernicious influence. He announced a ban on all sectarian activity, and set up speedy trial courts to punish terrorists.

Most significantly, he banned six extremist Islamic groups involved in sectarian campaigns in the country, including LeT and JeM, both of which had already been designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department.

Signaling a qualitative shift in Pakistan’s involvement in militancy in Kashmir, President Musharraf said, ‘No organisation will be able to carry out terrorism [under] the pretext of Kashmir.’

Two days before President Musharraf’s landmark speech, Islamabad announced the setting up of National Kashmir Committee, under the presidency of moderate Sardar Muhammed Abdul Qayyum Khan, a former President of Azad Kashmir.

The purpose of this committee was to continue the struggle for the rights of the Kashmiri people by new means. Islamabad’ sweeping measures to curb Islamic militancy in Pakistan and to end armed support to the insurgents in Kashmir, however, failed to dissipate the clouds of war.

Fearing that war with India was imminent, Pakistan withdrew more than 50,000 troops it had deployed along its border with Afghanistan to prevent al Qaeda and Taliban forces from entering its territory. Islamabad also informed Washington that in the event of an India-Pakistan war, it would have to reclaim some of the airfields that it had allowed the United States to use for its operations in Afghanistan.

To prevent a looming India-Pakistan war from playing havoc with its anti-terror campaign Washington launched a frantic diplomatic campaign to defuse the India-Pakistan crisis. Following the visit of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to New Delhi and Islamabad 342in June 2002, both countries agreed to step back.

In response to President Musharraf’s pledge that he would ‘permanently’ end his country’s support for armed militancy in Indian-held Kashmir, New Delhi lifted some of the diplomatic and economic curbs imposed on Islamabad in the wake of the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. Musharraf’s decision to limit Islamabad’s strategic support for the militancy in Kashmir, although greeted with howls of ‘sell out’ by Islamic hard-liners in the country, evoked a positive response from India in May 2003. Prime Minister Vajpayee told the Indian parliament on 2 May 2003 that he was willing to make his ’third and final’ effort at peace by agreeing to hold ‘decisive talks’ with Pakistan.

Two weeks earlier, during a visit to Kashmir, he had said that he wanted to extend a ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan. Taking advantage of this offer, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali called Mr Vajpayee on 28 April 2003. This broke the ice. Following their telephonic conversation both sides announced the return of diplomats to each other’s capitals, and agreed to re-establish communication and sporting links. Under constant prodding from the world community the feuding neighbours slowly but steadily began to move towards rapprochement.

In a remarkable reversal of Islamabad’s verbal strategy on Kashmir, President Musharraf publicly stated on 17 December 2003 that even though ‘we are for United Nations Security resolutions… now we have left that aside.’ He pledged in a joint statement issued in Islamabad following his meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee, on 6 January 2004 that he would ’not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.’ This statement was meant to mollify New Delhi’s concerns relating to the issue of alleged ‘cross-border’ infiltration from Pakistan.

By dropping its longstanding demand for a UN-mandated plebiscite over divided Kashmir, and by assuring New Delhi that Islamabad would not encourage violent activity in Indian-held Kashmir, President Musharraf created much-needed political space for New Delhi to substantively engage with Islamabad to find a workable solution to the festering Kashmir dispute. Following the 6 January meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee, the first round of official talks between the two countries was held in Islamabad from 16-18 February.

The joint statement issued in Islamabad on 18 February announced that both sides had agreed to resume their stalled composite dialogue. It also mentioned that the foreign ministers of both countries would meet in August 2004 to review the overall progress of the composite dialogue. Meanwhile the surprise victory of the Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi, in the May 2004 Indian national elections further raised hopes of a permanent peace between India and Pakistan.

Composite Dialogue

India and Pakistan resumed their stalled peace process in February 2004. This has yielded tangible but varying degrees of progress on all eight issues that have been on the agenda. This progress is summarised in Table 2. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put forth the Five Working Groups proposal at the Second Jammu and Kashmir Round Table in Srinagar on 25 May 2006. The proposal sought to involve local Kashmiris in the following areas:

1. Confidence-building measures across segments of society in the State
2. Strengthening relations across the Line of Control.
3. Economic Development
4. Ensuring Good Governance
5. Strengthening relations between the State and the Centre The positive steps jointly taken by India and Pakistan to improve their relations through the mechanism of the composite dialogue include the following: 344• The November 2003 ceasefire along the LoC, which terminated armed hostilities after thirteen years, continues to hold. Despite occasional outbreaks of violence along LoC, the ceasefire continues to hold. • The conclusion of several nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs), including an agreement to establish a permanent hotline between their foreign secretaries and the decision to conclude an agreement with technical parameters on pre-notification of missile flight tests. • The initiation of discussions and conclusion of agreements on reducing the risks of nuclear accidents and the unauthorised use of nuclear weapons as well as on preventing incidents at sea. • Resumption of a bus line between Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) in April 2005. • Opening of LoC at five points after the October 2005 earthquake in AJK to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance as well as meetings between divided families. • Launching a truck service on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route in May 2006. • Launching of the second cross-Kashmir bus service, linking Poonch in J&K with Rawalakot in AJK in May 2006. • Reopening of additional rail and road links across the international border between the two countries. These include: a bus service linking Sikhism’s holiest city, Amritsar in India, with Nankana Sahib, the birthplace in Pakistan of Sikhism’s founder. A railway link between Munnabao in Rajasthan and Khokhrapar in Sindh from January 2006. • Resumption of bilateral trade through Wahgah at the international border. • Agreement to restart shipping routes. • Reactivation of the Joint Economic Commission and Joint Business Councils to promote commercial activity between the two sides. 345• Setting up of the Joint Working Group to explore prospects for Iran­Pakistan-India gas pipeline. • Creation of an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations. 346Table 2: India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue (June 2004-2008) Agenda TypeStatus of Progress Achieved NegotiationsSticking PointsProspectsIndian Views Pakistani Views
6. Peace and Security including CBMSFour round held but stalled after Mumbai attacksPermanent relocation of strike formations in forward positions. No nuclear first use versus non use of forceGoodCurrent moves must the pave the way for a Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship between the two countriesWithout resolving the core issue of Kashmir, peace between India and Pakistan would remain elusive. Adherence to Stated Indian and Pakistani positions. ‘No redrawing of borders.’ Territorial status quo unacceptable to Pakistan’Good if talks continue and their ambit is expanded to include Kashmiris fromTermination of cross- border infiltration from Pakistan as a pre- requisite for progress on KashmirIndian unwillingness to embrace Pak proposals regarding demilitarisation zones, self- governance and Agreements on secure hotline, missile test notification; Consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines; Agreement to implement the 1991 Agreement on Air Space Violations; hold monthly Flag meetings between local commanders; speedy return of inadvertent Line crossers; periodic review of existing CBMS April 2006 Agreement on pre- notification of flight testing of Ballistic Missiles and the operationalisation of the hotline between the two foreign secretaries to prevent misunderstanding and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues; February 2007 Agreement on reducing the risks from nuclear accidents
7. Jammu and Kashmir Four rounds held including active back channels links. Stalled after Mumbai attacks Observance of ceasefire along LoC since November 2003. No visible progress towards resolution of Kashmir problem. Floating of new ideas and proposals— self- governance, demilitarisation and joint management. New Delhi- Srinagar roundtable discussions. 347Five Working groups proposal to seek Kashmiri support for Indian policies in Kashmir. Back channel discussions yielded a blueprint for the resolution of Kashmir conflict. It had five key elements: no changes in territorial layout of Kashmir; creation of soft-borders across LoC; greater autonomy and self-governance within both Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the state; across LoC consultative mechanism; the demilitarisation of Kashmir at a pace determined by the decline in cross-border terrorism both sides of the divide joint management of Kashmir. This betrays lack of seriousness on the part of New Delhi to make substantive progress on the resolution of the Kashmir issue
8. SiachinSeveral rounds of talks held but stalled after Mumbai attacksCeasefire since November 2005Delineation of LoC beyond NJ9842. Authentication of present positions of occupation versus evolving a framework for troop withdrawal to create complete zone of disengagementStalematePak must agree to authentication of existing Indian position before troop withdrawal to an agreed location can take placeBoth sides must work for troop withdrawal and agree not to violate the de-limited zone
9. Sir CreekTechnical level talks held but stalled after Mumbai attacksMay 2006 agreement to conduct a joint survey of Sir Creek and the adjoining region; Joint survey completed in March 2007Differences relating to the termination points of the land boundary in the SirPromisingNegotiate a fixed boundary around the middle of the Creek along theSeek arbitration if bilateral efforts do not lead to delimitation of maritime boundary 348Creek area have yet to be ironed out 1914 resolution map

Tulbul/Wullar, Bagihar and KishengangaSeveral rounds of talks held but stalled after Mumbai attacksAgreement on design modificationConflicting interpretation of Indus-Water TreatyProgress hinges Of the overall state of Indo- Pak relationsIndia not violating Indus-Basin treaty as Tulbul is a navigational projectIndus- Water treaty forbids a water storage yielding barrage on the river Jhelum. India international mediation sought to determine if Indus-Basin Treaty is being violated 6. Terrorism and Drug TraffickingSeveral rounds of talks held but stalled after Mumbai attacksReiteration of commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms and work toward its elimination; 2006 Agreement on Joint anti- terrorism mechanism MoU on counter-narcotics emphasising closer cooperation between drug enforcement agencies. Agreement to create India-Pakistan anti- terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter- terrorism initiative and investigationsPakistan must discontinue its support for cross- border terrorism activity of the banned jihadi outfits such as LeTFor terrorism not very promising. For anti-drug trafficking, the prospects seem promisingWithout addressing the issue of cross- border terrorism no meaningful bilateral cooperation against terrorism is possiblePakistan is doing all that it can to bring cross-border terrorism under control. India must share its intelligence with Pakistan. India is using cross-border terrorism to deflect attention from its state-sanctioned violence in Indian- held Kashmir. India-Pakistan must evolve an institutional mechanism to jointly investigate 349acts and incidents of terrorism 7. Economic and Commercial Cooperation 8. Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various Fields Several rounds of talks held but stalled after Mumbai attacks Several rounds of talks held but stalled following Mumbai attacks Revival of Indo-Pak Joint Commission; India-Pakistan Joint Working Group to study the feasibility of Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline Project; Draft proposal for a Shipping protocol. Agreement on steps to boost bilateral trade from $2 billion to $10 billion by 2010India’s demand for most favoured nation; Resumption of bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad; Operationalisation of Bus service between Amritsar-Lahore and Amritsar Nankana Sahib; Operationalisation of Poonch- Rawalakot Bus service and a truck service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar; Munabao Khokarapar train service; Proposal for a Karachi-Mumbai ferry service; MoU between PMSA (The Pakistan Maritime Security Agency) and ICG (Indian Coast Guard) to enhance communication linksLack of liberal visa regime Promising Implementation of SAFIA Pakistan must immediately grant MFN status to India; Economic cooperation should not be held hostage to resolution of the Kashmir dispute 350 Promising Friendly exchanges are a vital tool for peace building between the two countries Without achieving progress towards resolution of Kashmir dispute, prospects for economic cooperation will remain limited Friendly exchanges per se have limited value. Resolution of Kashmir dispute must be accorded the highest priorityThe Mumbai Setback On 26 November 2008 a band of ten well-armed terrorists launched an onslaught on India’s commercial capital, Mumbai, which led to the slaughter of 166 people including twenty-five foreign nationals from eight different countries. The attacks occurred at a time when Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi was visiting India to discuss issues relating to the ongoing dialogue process including Kashmir, the Chenab River water and trade ties between the two countries. The instantaneous effect was a sharp downturn in India-Pakistan relations. The peace process launched in 2004 was suspended amid mutual recriminations as India blamed Pakistan for the outrage and Pakistan denied responsibility. Relations between India and Pakistan had begun to lose their positive momentum in the months preceding the Mumbai attacks. Musharraf was beset by two major crises in the summer of 2007. The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) episode involved a military assault on a mosque in Islamabad that had become a centre of violent radicalism in the heart of the country. The operation caused a large number of deaths (including those of civilian hostages held in the mosque) and sharply reduced the President’s credibility. It was, moreover, followed by a rapid rise in terrorist attacks, including a spate of suicide bombings. Musharraf’s difficulties were compounded by the campaign of angry protests launched by the lawyer’s community against his decision to dismiss the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry. Serious doubts arose about his ability to remain in power. As Musharraf’s internal legitimacy began to erode in the wake of country-wide political protests spearheaded by the lawyers, New Delhi became extremely sceptical of his ability to forge a national consensus to implement his ‘out of the box’ thinking on Kashmir. As a consequence, the planning for a landmark visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Islamabad in March 2007 during which both leaders were to announce a comprehensive peace settlement aimed at burying the hatchet over Kashmir had to be shelved. According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, ‘I and General Musharraf had reached an agreement, a non-territorial solution to all problems but then General Musharraf got into difficulties with the chief 351justice… and therefore the whole process came to a halt.’ The assassination on 28 December 2007 of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto with whom President Musharraf had cut a power-sharing deal in July 2007 to pave the way for her return to the country, raised more questions about political stability. The PPP’s advent to power following the February 2008 elections and the abysmal showing of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q)—known as the ‘King’s party’—against its principal political rival, Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), forced Musharraf into a tight political corner. Meanwhile, the tension between India and Pakistan kept growing. Pakistan increasingly viewed India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan as antagonistic to its interests. A series of ceasefire violations across the Line of Control (LoC) led to accusations and counter-accusations of bad faith between the two sides. On 7 July 2008, the Indian embassy compound in Kabul was hit by a powerful blast in which fifty­ eight people including two senior Indian officials were killed. Afghan President Hamid Karzai was quick to blame Pakistan for the attack. India’s National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan asserted ‘we do not suspect but have a fair amount of intelligence’ on the involvement of the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In the shadow of this event, the fifth round of the composite dialogue got under way in New Delhi with foreign secretary-level talks on 21 July. However no schedule for meetings on the various subjects it covered was announced. Indian foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon observed, ‘India’s peace process with Pakistan is under stress.’ Pakistan’s foreign secretary Salman Bashir acknowledged India’s ‘misgivings’ but denied any culpability and rejected Indian accusations. In September 2008, India denied visas to a Pakistani hockey team. Thus, on the eve of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the peace process had already become stagnant under the twin pressure of Pakistan’s domestic turbulence and new sources of tensions between the neighbours. Initially, India did not blame the civilian government in Pakistan for being directly involved in the Mumbai attacks but accused the LeT of perpetrating the crime. But Pakistani responsibility was underlined by the Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, who held ‘some elements’ in Pakistan for being responsible and demanded that Islamabad not permit 352the use of its territory for terrorism against India. On 1 December, India handed over two demarches to Pakistan. In the first, India accused ’elements from Pakistan’ of carrying out the terrorist attack and said it expected Islamabad to take ‘stern action against the groups that could have been involved in the attack.’ The second demarche was more specific and sought the extradition of three people—Maulana Masood Azhar, Tiger Memon and Dawood Ibrahim. It also urged action against the Jamaat-ud- Dawa (JuD). India’s Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma told the Agence France­ Presse that the Mumbai attacks had dealt a ‘grave setback’ to relations. Sharma said the gunmen were ‘all from Pakistan’ and stressed that it was time Islamabad delivered on its promise to prevent its soil being used for attacks on India. On 9 December 2008, the Mumbai police released the coordinates of nine terrorists involved in the attacks—all belonging to Pakistan. While condemning the Mumbai attacks as ‘detestable’ and ‘heinous’, Islamabad asked India to avoid ‘knee-jerk’ reactions and provide proof. The Pakistani strategy was to deny culpability, insist that both countries were victims of terrorism and assert that the attacks could not have occurred without ’local’ assistance. It was also pointed out that India was raising ’the convenient Pakistan bogey’ to divert attention from its own security lapses and that ‘India has a massive problem of domestic terrorism.’ Immediately after the Mumbai outrage, India handed Pakistan a list of twenty persons allegedly involved in terror incidents in India and demanded their extradition to India for trial. Pakistan’s response was tactically legalistic. Islamabad pointed out that there was no extradition treaty between the two countries and asserted that if India insisted on anyone being handed over, Pakistan too would ask for the perpetrators of the Samjhauta Express blast to be extradited. India accused Pakistan of being uncooperative. In response, Pakistan arrested LeT leader Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and twelve other activists. On 10 December, a United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 banned three organisations operating in Pakistan: the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the al-Rashid Trust and the al-Akhtar Trust. The Committee also added four leaders of JuD to a list of people and groups facing sanctions for ties to al Qaeda or the Taliban including a freeze in their assets, travel ban and arms embargo. 353Pakistani resistance to pressure from India and the global community took different forms. Though the government did act against the JuD, the crackdown was not swift and comprehensive. It took the Punjab government more than two months after the Mumbai attacks to take over the JuD’s headquarters at Muridke, which it did on 25 January. This effectively gave the organisation time to create a different identity for itself under the name Falah-e-Insariiat Foundation. The military also applied pressure on the US to indicate that Pakistan could be distracted from its effort to fight the Taliban. Dissatisfied with the Pakistani response, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a speech in Parliament on 12 December called Pakistan ’the epicentre of terrorism’ and pointed out that the restraint exercised by New Delhi should not be ‘misconstrued’ as a sign of weakness while demanding that ’the infrastructure of terrorism’ in Pakistan be dismantled. India also put in a formal request to the UN Security Council seeking a ban on the JuD. On 19 December, Mukherjee, who had earlier ruled out military action, stated that New Delhi would ‘consider the entire range of options’. India’s new Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, warned that Pakistan would have to pay an ’enormous price’ if another attack took place. While raising this pressure the Indian government also began to engage with Islamabad. On 5 January it handed over a sixty-nine-page dossier of ’evidence’ on the Mumbai terror attacks. This included telephonic transcripts between the gunmen and their LeT commanders, decoded Skype calls over the Internet, a list of weapons recovered after the 26/11 carnage, and the interrogation report of Ajmal Kasab. India also used the dossier in its diplomatic offensive to convince the international community of its case. In the first week of January 2009, Home Minister Chidambaram made plain the view that the high degree of sophistication in training and equipment displayed by the terrorists reflected the involvement of the Pakistani state. Prime Minister Singh repeated the allegation. Fearing another escalation of tensions and the risk of war, the US tried simultaneously to defuse the tension and to put pressure on Pakistan to respond to Indian demands. The American ambassador to New Delhi described the evidence contained in the Indian dossier as ‘credible’. Calling for more evidence from India Islamabad forwarded a set of thirty-two questions to aid the investigation process. On 13 March, India provided information in reply to questions raised. But the process of cooperation remained uneven, with each side periodically calling on the other to do more. In June 2009, JuD leader Hafiz Saeed, who had been under house 354arrest for six months, was set free by the Lahore High Court for lack of sufficient evidence. Pakistani calls for more information were met by Indian accusations of stonewalling. But some cooperation nonetheless continued. In July, President Zardari distanced himself from the previous government by admitting publicly that Pakistan had, in the past, ‘deliberately created and nurtured’ extremist groups for ‘short-term tactical objectives’. Soon after, Prime Ministers Singh and Gilani met on the side-lines of the Non­Aligned Movement summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt. Their joint statement agreed that ’terrorism is the main threat to both countries’ and that ‘dialogue is the only way forward’. India also made a major concession: that ‘action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process’. Pakistan informed India that it had arrested, along with others, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a senior LeT leader identified by Kasab as the mastermind of the Mumbai attacks. On 17 July, Prime Minister Gilani said that the joint declaration signed by the two prime ministers ‘underlines our concerns over India’s interference in Balochistan and that Pakistan would give India proof about this. The Sharm el-Sheikh statement evoked a harsh negative reaction in India. Describing this as ‘surrender’, BJP deputy leader in the Lok Sabha, Sushma Swaraj said, ‘Once terrorism-related issues are delinked, there will be nothing composite about the dialogue.’ On 29 July Dr. Singh clarified during a Lok Sabha session that ’terrorism has not been de-linked from the composite dialogue with Pakistan’. He said, ‘As neighbours, it is our obligation to keep our channels open. Unless we want to go to war with Pakistan, dialogue is the only way out. But we should do it on the basis of trust, but verify’. He also refuted reports that Pakistan had handed over at Sharm el-Sheikh a dossier about India’s involvement in Balochistan. Faced with stiff domestic opposition, New Delhi decided to ignore repeated Pakistani pleas for a meeting at the level of the two foreign secretaries and went on a diplomatic offensive by claiming that Pakistan- based militant groups were planning fresh attacks against New Delhi. On 17 August, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh claimed that there was ‘credible information’ that Pakistan-based militant groups were planning fresh attacks on India. He said, ‘Coming to specific challenges, cross- border terrorism remains a most pervasive threat.’ Worried that the opening for resumption of the peace dialogue 355provided by Sharm el-Sheikh meeting might be lost, the US-led international community pressed both sides to resume talks as soon as possible. On 16 July, US Assistant Secretary Robert Blake said Washington wanted to see ‘greater understanding and progress particularly on the issue of Pakistan moving forward with prosecution of those responsible for the Mumbai attacks.’ On 18 July Hillary Clinton, in an interview, urged India to help Pakistan fight terrorism, saying that this would augment India’s standing as a global power. On 27 September Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that India had supplied sufficient evidence to Pakistan to bring to book those involved in the Mumbai attacks. Two days later China asked India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue amicably and offered to play a ‘constructive role’ in settling the ‘bilateral issue’. Hu Zherigyue, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, in charge of Asia, said, ‘As a friend China will be happy to see such progress (in the peace process] and we will be happy if we can play a constructive role in resolving the issue [Kashmir].’ Reacting strongly to the Indian pressure Islamabad accused New Delhi of stoking terrorism in Balochistan and Pakistani areas bordering Afghanistan. On 2 November at a press briefing top officials disclosed that Pakistan had tangible proof of India’s involvement in militancy in South Waziristan and had decided to take up the matter with New Delhi. During President Barack Obama’s visit to China in November, Washington underscored the need for progress in India—Pakistan ties to achieve the goals of ‘peace, stability and development’ in South Asia. The joint statement issued at the end of President Obama’s visit states: They (US and China) support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. On 21 November, prior to his first state visit to Washington under the Obama Administration, Dr Singh said in an interview that India was set to resolve all outstanding issues with the Pakistan on the condition that it would not permit its territory to be used against its neighbour. It was a ’tragedy’ he added that Pakistan has come to the point of using terror ‘as an instrument of state policy’. On 25 November he called on the international community to put ‘combined pressure’ on Pakistan to ensure 356that ‘ghastly attacks’ such as Mumbai would not take place again.’ On 28 November, Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor said that India cannot negotiate with Pakistan while having a gun pointed at its head. This indicated India’s no-talks posture ahead. On 22 December, India turned down Pakistan’s proposal for the resumption of the composite dialogue process till the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks were prosecuted. Tharoor said: ‘Our PM has said very clearly you [Pakistan] take the first step, we will reach you more than half-way. That first step has not been taken.’ On 6 February, the United States said it had been encouraging measures by both India and Pakistan to decrease tension and augment cooperation. Blake, who urged the two countries to resolve their differences through peaceful means, reiterated this call. Reacting to mounting international pressure to resume the stalled peace talks, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao invited her Pakistani counterpart to visit New Delhi on 25 February for talks. The dialogue failed to produce any tangible result. Both sides used the occasion to reiterate their stated positions. On 3 March, Foreign Minister Qureshi said that Pakistan went to the talks with an open mind but ’engaging in talks for the sake of talks will serve no purpose [ unless] India change(s) its approach towards Pakistan which continues to be anchored in the Cold War mindset. On 2 March, India’s Home Minister criticised Pakistan for allowing JuD chief Hafiz Saeed to make ‘provocative’ speeches against India instead of acting against him. Responding to Indian allegations of inaction, Islamabad declared that the new dossiers from India did not contain actionable intelligence and were not enough to arrest Hafiz Saeed. On 13 March Minister Malik claimed there was solid evidence of the Indian involvement in acts of terror in Balochistan and the government was taking up this matter diplomatically with lndia. On 13 April, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers met each other at the US-hosted Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. Their gesture of shaking hands was seen as a positive move but soon after Dr Singh declared at a news conference that there could be no talks with Pakistan until it cracked down on the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks. On 3 May 2010 an Indian court convicted Kasab on charges of murder and waging war against India. India’s Home Minister described the verdict as a 357’message to Pakistan that they should not export terror to India’. On 29 April deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the State Department, Paul Jones said that President Barack Obama believed that reducing tensions between India and Pakistan is a ‘high priority’ for the United States. But this ‘is best done in a quiet fashion’. Washington described the resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue as ’encouraging’. Commenting on the India-Pakistan thaw at the SAARC summit at Thimpu, a senior American official P. J. Crowley said: We have encouraged the leaders of Pakistan and India to restore direct dialogue that has been characteristic of the relation between those two countries within the last few years. We’re encouraged that they are taking steps to do that… . Looking Ahead After a hiatus of nearly eighteen months the peace engagement recommenced. Looking ahead beyond the day-to-day management of the relationship the list of issues competing for attention has grown longer. Apart from the eight elements of the composite dialogue, it now includes such divisive issues as water, intensifying Indian and Pakistani competition for influence in Afghanistan, Pakistani apprehensions about Indian involvement in Balochistan and the Indian belief that Pakistan has not irreversibly altered its policy of using jihadi militant organisations to wage what it describes as proxy war against India. Prioritising these different issue areas and converting them into shared core concerns around which negotiations can take place will be the biggest procedural hurdle for both sides. By jettisoning the composite dialogue framework, New Delhi and Islamabad have not only opened the door for engaging in debilitating ’talks for talks’ but have also run the enormous risk of losing all the gains made during four rounds of composite dialogue held since January 2004. Finding a way to preserve these gains and building on them through a sustained peace engagement will not be an easy task. Following the Mumbai terrorist attacks, New Delhi has made a conscious effort to ‘recast the dialogue around the issue of terrorism’ and this narrow focus works to Islamabad’s detriment as it denies Pakistan the negotiating space to discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries. Apart from according terrorism the highest priority and using engagement as a lever to ‘get Pakistan to up the level of its cooperation on terrorism’, the Indian approach toward the dialogue with Pakistan is also informed by the belief that given Pakistan’s serious domestic problems including a fragile economy, poor governance and rising terrorism, Islamabad is not in a position 358to extract any meaningful concessions from New Delhi especially on Kashmir. As argued by K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Given the military, economic and demographic equation between the two countries, there is no possibility of Pakistan succeeding in changing the status quo by force… Therefore, India does not need any incentive to engage Pakistan in a peace process.’ In the same vein, Bharat Karnad, has pointed out that: Accounting for 72 per cent of the population, 72 per cent of the region’s land space and, by late 1990s, 75 per cent of the wealth produced in South Asia, India in the new century is in a decisively better siruation… the widening economic and resource gap renders the prospect of Pakistan as a serious competitor, let alone rival, to India meaningless and militarily and economically unsustainable. Another factor influencing the Indian diplomatic calculus vis-a-vis Pakistan is the growing Western endorsement of New Delhi’s geo­political outlook as a rising major power. ‘The Quadrennial Defense Review’ released by the Pentagon in February 2010, after noting India’s rising ’economic power, cultural reach and political influence’, and its worldwide military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, described it as a ’net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond’. ‘The National Security Strategy’ unveiled by the White House in May 2010, while valuing ‘India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues’, pledged that Washington ‘will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world’. Since 2000, India has increased the number of countries with which it has defence-specific agreements from seven to twenty-six by the end of 2008. Bilateral and multilateral exercises are also an increasing feature of India’s expanding defence relations as it ‘seeks to find new technologies to transform its military from Cold War era weapons to 21st century capabilities through such opportunities.’ In July 2005 India and the United States entered into a civil-nuclear cooperation agreement which committed the United States to allow the export of nuclear material and technology to India for peaceful civilian purposes and made an exemption for India from the application of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The subsequent approval of the US-India deal by the Nuclear Supplier Group has opened the flood­gate of civil nuclear cooperation with India. Pakistan has viewed the Indo-US nuclear deal as an effort by Washington to rewrite the rules of international nuclear commerce favour 359India, which has the net effect of enabling ‘India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors’, and thereby ‘igniting an arms race and having implications on strategic stability in South Asia’. Delhi’s rising diplomatic stock and its expanding influence in the global arena have direct ramifications for the India-Pakistan peace process. Three are noteworthy: first, faced with the spectre of a rising India, Pakistan may turn inward to put its own house in order. This internal balancing act would require a long truce with India and would augur well for enduring peace between the two countries. Second, to play the prohibitively costly game of strategic competition with India, Islamabad might revive its atrophying links with jihadi groups to use against its arch-rival,-JCSC. This option would not only put the two countries on the path to military confrontation with nuclear overtones but would have devastating blowback consequences for Pakistan. Third, Islamabad might bandwagon with New Delhi to take advantage of India’s high economic growth and especially tap into a huge Indian market for its goods. The pursuit of this option would require Islamabad and New Delhi to bury their hatchet over Kashmir and become friendly neighbours. None of these options are a foregone conclusion. A lot would depend on how India and Pakistan negotiate their way out of current challenges. The resumption of the peace process, while reflecting their sensitivity to ‘reputational risks’, which do not allow them to keep their peace talks in a state of permanent freeze, underscores the fact that the long-term sustainability of their dialogue depends on achieving tangible progress towards narrowing down their differences on the core issue of Kashmir. Without achieving any tangible progress on this, the India-Pakistan dialogue will not only remain devoid of substance but also perennially vulnerable to attempts by various kinds of spoilers to derail it. 360CONCLUDING NOTE The contributors to this volume have offered a number of policy recommendations that address Pakistan’s systemic and fundamental challenges to assure the continuing viability and vitality of the state. These may, it is hoped, prove to be key elements of a reform agenda that will help Pakistan’s leaders to turn the country around and guarantee its long-term stability.

Today’s turmoil and turbulence are such that there is no concerted official effort to plan for Pakistan’s future. But both the urgent and the essential must be addressed if the country is to be transformed into a strong state responsive to the welfare of its people and not merely its privileged elites. Dysfunctional politics, unresolved structural economic problems, internal security threats and the governance deficit all have to be tackled simultaneously and not in isolation from one another as together they have contributed to the systemic crisis. But first urgent actions have to be taken to deal with the country’s security situation and the crisis in public finances to enable the pursuit of other critical goals. Prioritisation is necessary to push forward an enforceable reform agenda.

Effective governance is what makes the difference between successful states and struggling ones. Improving the quality of governance is therefore central to the effort to move Pakistan beyond the ‘crisis state’. This volume has identified both short- and longer-term reform measures needed to enhance the capabilities of public institutions, institute checks and balances and create a more competent civil service. Yet none of these policies can be undertaken without articulating a vision and the mechanism to implement it.

What this book has also emphasised is the need to bring the country’s politics in sync with the social, economic and technological changes that have been transforming the national landscape and creating a more ‘connected’ society. Electoral and political reforms that foster greater and more active participation by Pakistan’s growing educated middle class will open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional, patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people and meet their needs.

361In re-designing the polity the central principle that should be applied is that democracy cannot function without the rule of law. This means strengthening the judiciary to operationalise robust checks and balances. It also means ensuring the availability of justice to citizens by reforming the judicial system, especially at the lower levels.

Stable civil-military relations are essential for political stability to be maintained. The Armed Forces can contribute towards a viable national polity by subjecting themselves to civilian oversight and control. This will have to be matched by civilian leaders who should abide by the Constitution and refrain from dragging in the Army to settle political disputes. The goal of economic revival will have to be comprehensively targeted with emergency actions, short term measures and long term reforms, all of which will have to be pursued simultaneously. Immediate steps to restore macroeconomic stability and the fiscal and financial balance need to be accompanied by efforts to mobilise resources to power Pakistan’s economic development. Broadening the revenue base by taxing the rich and the powerful and bringing exempted sectors such as agriculture into the tax net should be the crucial elements for setting up an equitable and efficient tax regime.

The state has to play a central and active role to create an enabling environment for economic growth and job creation. This means addressing the infrastructure deficits, especially in power, evolving a fair regulatory framework for economic activity and halting the haemorrhaging in the public sector enterprises that is fuelling the budget deficit and crowding out private investment. A coherent strategy to revive the agriculture sector should include new investment in the rural infrastructure, appropriate pricing and incentives, land reclamation, focused research and development, application of modern technology and utilisation of international market rules and opportunities. These measures should aim to turn the country into the region’s food reservoir.

Policies to promote industrial growth and expansion should entail greater support to small and medium enterprises, and identification and encouragement of manufacturing in sectors where Pakistan has or can acquire the greatest competitive advantage and where demand is rising rapidly. A key policy objective should be the country’s integration into global production 362chains and manpower training and skills development. The highest priority needs to be given to human development. A crash programme should be implemented to educate Pakistan and meet the target of achieving universal primary education in the next ten years through higher government spending and public-private partnerships. Meeting the education and health needs of citizens, alleviation of poverty and steps to end discrimination against women should be part of a comprehensive human development strategy.

It is also critical to address the challenge of a rapidly growing population and youth bulge by implementing a mix of policy measures that include a programme to reduce fertility and a far-reaching literacy campaign focused on the rural areas and women to achieve higher primary school enrolment. Skills training and increasing female labour participation will also be needed to reap a demographic dividend and turn the country’s human capital into an engine for economic growth.

Restoring internal security and order will require a holistic approach that deals with the multifaceted challenge of terrorism and violence. An overwhelming reliance on military means has distracted attention from the need to deal with the ideological and political aspects of the militant challenge and may even have dispersed rather than diminished the threat. Evolving a counter-narrative, forging a political consensus and mobilising public support against militancy must be part of the strategy to stop the flow of recruits to militant organisations in order to break the cycle of radicalisation. A multi- layered, multipronged strategy is needed that includes efforts to engage in the battle of ideas and address the factors—including issues of governance and injustice—that create the breeding ground for militancy. To promote its vital short and long term national objectives and regain lost strategic space, Pakistan needs to adjust its foreign policy and invigorate its diplomacy within the current and emerging political and economic environment.

Its priority goals should include promoting peace in Afghanistan through an inclusive political settlement based on that country’s realities while working to end terrorism and extremism within Pakistan and the region. A modus vivendi with India should be sought which maintains Pakistan’s policy independence including for Kashmir’s legitimate aspirations and preserves credible conventional and nuclear deterrence while exploiting the potential for mutually advantageous trade and economic relations. 363Vastly expanded strategic and economic relations should be pursued with China which offer Pakistan the best hope for the realisation of its security and economic objectives. A balanced and stable relationship with the US should be built on mutual accommodation of legitimate national interests, respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and expanded cooperation in areas of benefit to both sides.

Pakistan should also seek to revive historic and mutually supportive relationships with key Islamic nations especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Gulf states, as well as Malaysia, Iran and Indonesia. This is not an exhaustive list of all that is contained in the volume but an identification of the critical priorities on which a national consensus needs to be fashioned. None of this is possible without political will on the part of a political leadership that commits itself to the larger good rather than just its own interests. Political will can only be effectively asserted when leaders enjoy authority as well as power and pursue goals regarded as fair and legitimate by the wider public. Only such an assertion of political will can help to revive the vision and hope that accompanied Pakistan at its inception. Executing this game plan for success may seem a daunting task but Pakistan’s people deserve no less.