The Conventional Military Balance

Pakistan has an effective conventional defence capability against India, due to:

• better strategic planning and acquisitions, mainly from China
• lethargy and mistakes in India’s defence acquisition and development programmes.

However, India has embarked on a major arms build-up which includes plans to acquire 120 plus advanced strike aircraft, nuclear submarines, AWACs (Airborne Warning and Control systems), antiballistic missiles, satellite and space capabilities.

These plans were outlined by India’s military chief in December 2009 when presenting India’s new military doctrine. He identified five ’thrust areas’ for the Indian military build-up:

1. the ability to fight a two-front war against Pakistan and China;
2. optimise the capability to counter ‘asymmetric and subconventional threats’;
3. enhanced capabilities for ‘strategic reach’ and ‘out of area’ operations ‘from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits’
4. acquisition of strategic and space-based capabilities, including missile defence; and
5. maintenance of a ’technical edge’ over adversaries (Pakistan and China).

The Indian Army Chief also propounded the “Cold Start” strategy to mobilise and strike, within hours, at Pakistan ‘under a WMD overhang’.

India foresees that it can soon be able to overwhelm Pakistan in a conventional conflict. This is through its:

• growing financial capacity
• access to the most advanced technologies from Russia, the US, Israel and other Western countries

If it can simultaneously neutralise Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability, through political or military means, it would be able, finally, to dictate terms to Pakistan and establish its regional hegemony over South Asia.

There are some defeatists among Pakistan’s political and economic elite who believe that India’s regional domination, and rise to global power status, is inevitable and Pakistan would do well to accept this emerging reality.

Perversely, some of them argue that this would help end the military’s preeminent role in Pakistan. But, acceptance of Indian domination would virtually extinguish the raison d’etre for the creation of Pakistan as a separate and independent homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, free of Hindu domination. Such surrender clearly would not be acceptable to the vast majority of the people of Pakistan.

It would mock the enormous sacrifices of preceding Pakistani generations for freedom. In any event, Indian hegemony is not inevitable and can continue to be resisted by a determined and resilient Pakistani nation so long as it has the conventional and nuclear capability to deter Indian aggression.

It is vital for Pakistan to retain the capacity to resist and repel India by conventional means. In the absence of credible conventional defence, Pakistan will be obliged to rely almost exclusively, and immediately, on its nuclear and strategic weapons, significantly lowering the threshold for nuclear escalation in any future conflict.

Obviously, Pakistan cannot afford to match India’s military build-up.

Its response will have to be defensive and asymmetrical. The development and acquisition of such defensive capabilities must remain a high priority for Pakistan. It can be achieved only through closer strategic cooperation with China.

Such a defensive military response should be accompanied by vigorous diplomatic efforts to prevent a destabilising and expensive arms race in South Asia. India’s defence suppliers should be confronted with the prospect that their quest of quick profits from major arms sales to India will entrench New Delhi’s refusal to negotiate a fair solution for Kashmir 311and other outstanding disputes with Pakistan. It would increase the danger of a conventional conflict and its possible escalation to the nuclear level. It is thus in the best interest of the global community to prevent, not fuel, an Indian arms build-up. In particula1; the US, if it wishes to see peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia, must exercise self-restraint in its arms sales to India and persuade other Indian suppliers—Israel, France and Russia—to do so as well. Such a diplomatic campaign is desirable even if its chances of success are not bright. It will, at least, justify Pakistan’s response.

Credible Nuclear Deterrence

It is self-evident that, given India’s larger conventional forces, Pakistan will need to rely on its nuclear-strategic capability to credibly deter Indian aggression and military adventurism. This capability was acquired through the dedicated efforts of Pakistani leaders, scientists, soldiers and diplomats in the face of the concerted and discriminatory campaign waged by the major powers over the previous decades to prevent Pakistan from acquiring, demonstrating and deploying its nuclear and missile capabilities. Today, unquestionably, Pakistan is a credible nuclear weapon state, with capabilities that match and, in some areas, surpass those of India.

But Pakistan cannot afford to be complacent. The credibility of its nuclear deterrence could be eroded in several ways.

Unlike India, Pakistan continues to be subjected to discriminatory restraints on the transfer of advanced technologies and equipment and on civilian nuclear cooperation on the basis of assertions that it contributed to nuclear proliferation and that its nuclear materials, facilities and weapons are susceptible to capture or attack by ‘Islamic terrorists’. There is no legal or political basis for penalising Pakistan for the past. All the nuclear weapon states have been involved in outward or inward nuclear proliferation at some stage, otherwise nuclear weapons could not have been acquired by most of them.

Dr A.Q. Khan had many distinguished predecessors. In fact, Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which is under tight military control, is less susceptible to capture or attack by ’terrorists’ than the less vigorously (civilian) guarded weapons, materials and facilities in India, or the ’loose nukes’ and fissile material scattered in various parts of the former Soviet Union.

Pakistan’s recent demand for recognition of its nuclear weapon status, while understandable, is irrelevant and unlikely. Not even India has been accorded formal recognition. Informal recognition already exists.

The real challenges are different and will arise in the future. The current restrictions against Pakistan on the transfer of advanced technologies which are now available to India, will enable India, over time, to acquire offensive and defensive capabilities that are more sophisticated than Pakistan’s, both in the nuclear and conventional fields, such as space-related weapons, satellites, nuclear powered submarines, anti-ballistic missiles, and information technology.

These capabilities could significantly neutralise Pakistan’s capacity for conventional and nuclear deterrence.

In the context of nuclear deterrence, there are three aspects that require attention: size and quality of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons arsenals, and the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear offensive capabilities and the effective protection of these capabilities.

With the access to nuclear fuel imports, opened up by the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement and the NSG waiver, India can significantly enlarge its nuclear weapons arsenal by folly diverting its indigenous uranium to its weapons programme. While absolute parity is not essential for nuclear deterrence, India’s larger arsenal—combined with its future qualitative edge—could erode the credibility of deterrence. Thus, Pakistan will need to acquire sufficient stocks of fissile material, especially plutonium, to build a larger number of warheads required to respond to India’s offensive and defensive capabilities.

It cannot, therefore, accept the proposal to ban fissile material production, at least for the next several years. Pakistan must also assess whether India has developed thermo-nuclear weapons, e.g. with designs provided by another nuclear weapons state or Israel. India may conduct further nuclear weapons tests to validate its new weapons designs. Obviously, Pakistan will need to respond in kind.

Second, India’s acquisition of anti-ballistic missile capabilities, early warning systems and satellite and space systems, can significantly compromise the ability of Pakistan’s missiles and strike aircraft to penetrate Indian defences, substantially eroding the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear 313deterrence. Without the financial and technological ability to match India qualitatively, Pakistan will have to respond by deploying a larger number of nuclear-armed missiles. For this too, continued fissile material production is vital.

Third, advanced Indian capabilities could also enable it to undertake pre-emptive counter force strikes to eliminate Pakistan’s offensive systems at the outset of a conflict. Even more ominously, in the event of an Inda- Pakistan conflict, the major Western powers, and Russia, are likely to make all possible efforts to prevent Pakistan from threatening a resort to the nuclear option. If political pressure does not work, they could launch operations to capture or take-out Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities, or resort to military actions or threats thereof, to prevent Pakistan, even when facing defeat, to threaten the use of its nuclear capability. To deter an Indian pre-emptive strike or major power intervention, Pakistan will need to put its nuclear weapons delivery systems on higher alert, place some missiles in hardened and dispersed silos, and acquire one or more nuclear submarines as a survivable platform for a retaliatory second-strike.

Strategic Marginalisation

An even more complex challenge is to reverse Pakistan’s progressive and significant political, economic and diplomatic marginalisation in regional and global power relations.

Being de-hyphenated from India and equated with Afghanistan are the most visible signs of this decline in global status. This is the result of several years of strategic confusion, internal discord, economic weakness, external dependency as well as the reversals imposed on Pakistan by the War on Terrorism and India’s active diplomacy.

The vital ingredients to reverse strategic marginalisation will be:

• economic revival
• political stability
• national confidence and self-respect and hard diplomacy.

In this context, the most urgent objectives should be to revive and build relations with several key countries: China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia.

China has been Pakistan’s principal geo-political partner. While defence cooperation with China remains on track, trade and economic cooperation is constrained by incoherent efforts, corruption, bureaucratic inertia and failure to provide adequate security to Chinese workers in Pakistan.

Periodic problems have occurred because of the presence of Uighur rebels among the Islamic militants in the border areas. Meanwhile, despite its strategic alignment with Pakistan, China’s trade and economic relationship with India has expanded exponentially. China is being drawn into partnerships with India in several emerging groups to promote specific convergent interests—the G-3 (Russia, China, India), BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the G-20 (major economies). All of these exclude Pakistan.

It is largely up to Pakistan to leverage its strategic relationship with China to advance its national interests and objectives. China has a strategic nterest in supporting Pakistan’s resistance to Indian domination. China is now in an even better position than in the past to assist Pakistan, economically and strategically.

Instead of preoccupation with the whims of Washington, Islamabad should focus on the opportunities offered by Beijing. A new and comprehensive plan is needed to revive and invigorate the Pakistan-China strategic relationship.

Saudi Arabia

The nature of Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has also changed. It is now less equal and reciprocal.

On the one hand, Pakistan’s dependence on Saudi Arabia has grown for financial support, oil supplies and even domestic political accommodations. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has broadened its strategic horizons—seeking to diversify and strengthen its regional and global support base, mainly against Iran’s expanding influence and power in the region. Saudi Arabia has been wooed assiduously by India.

The value for Riyadh of Pakistan’s informal nuclear umbrella appears to have decreased. An erosion of Saudi support on Kashmir and the economy is visible. Pakistan needs to build a more balanced relationship with the Kingdom based on mutual interest and reciprocal support.

Iran

The relationship with Iran is critical. Its cooperation is vital for peace in a post-American Afghanistan. Its present strategic alignment with India is hugely negative for Pakistan. There are areas of convergent interests which should be strengthened—pacifying Afghanistan and both sides of Balochistan, gas supplies to Pakistan, preventing an Israeli (and/or US) military strike against Iran, ending nuclear discrimination against Muslim countries. Existing problems—suspicion in Tehran that Pakistan serves as a US proxy; past power rivalries in Afghanistan; Iran’s role with Shi’a groups in Pakistan—need to be openly addressed on the basis of reciprocity and mutual accommodation.

Russia

At the end of the Cold War, Pakistan failed to exploit possibilities to build a new and friendlier relationship with Russia, which continues to play an important role in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.

The major problems with Moscow are: Russian memories of Pakistan’s contribution to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan; opposition to the perceived sympathy within Pakistan for the Afghan Taliban and other Islamic groups, including those active in Central Asia and the Caucusus; and Moscow’s close military relationship with India. Each of these problems can be addressed.

Pakistan’s commitment to combating Islamic militants can now be more readily established, even if pragmatic accommodations may be required with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s policy independence from the US global and regional agenda is also likely to become more visible once it asserts its national interests.

Moscow’s military ties with India should not pose an insuperable obstacle to economic and even some limited military cooperation with Russia once a measure of mutual trust is built.

A New Strategic Paradigm

Pakistan’s endeavour to reverse its political marginalisation would become much easier if it can change the strategic paradigm regarding South Asia that emerged over the last decade. This change can emanate mainly from a shift in the security parameters and perceptions of the United States and its allies.

Increasingly, the Obama Administration, in its declarations at least, has displayed refreshing honesty and realism in analysing the major security threats and challenges to the US in the ‘broader Middle East’.

It has rightly concluded that Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian issues threatens US policies towards the entire Muslim world, generates the widespread hostility against it and contributes to Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

President Obama has also placed emphasis on developing a relationship of cooperation rather than containment towards China and ‘resetting the button’ on relations with Russia. More pertinently for Pakistan, he has determined that military solutions are unlikely in Iraq and Afghanistan and that most, if not all, US forces should be withdrawn as soon as possible from these two theatres of war.

This new realism in Washington offers Pakistan an opportunity to reshape the strategic environment in South Asia. To this end, Islamabad should make a concerted effort to convince Washington to endorse the following strategic premises regarding South Asia:

1. The US should no longer be pre-occupied with building India as a counterweight to ‘balance’ or contain China.

This is unnecessary and also likely to generate the competitive Chinese reaction which Washington wishes to avoid.

In the future, India could itself emerge to challenge US interests in the region.

2. India is not the best partner for the US in combating Islamic extremism or terrorism. This fight has to be fought and won within the Islamic countries and, critically, by Pakistan.

India’s support may be functionally useful; but with its own continuing record of suppressing the Kashmiris and discriminating against its own Muslims, its credentials to contribute to reversing the rise of extremism in the Muslim world are questionable.

What America needs is a ’new deal’ with the Muslim world; it is Pakistan, not India, which can help to promote this.

3. India is not a factor for regional stability, as advertised. On the contrary, it is the principal cause of political turmoil in South Asia. It is not a 317’status quo’ power seeking stability.

India seeks a new role as the regional hegemon. It is India’s ambitions and interference which have destabilised all its neighbours—Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and parts of Pakistan.

It is India which refuses to accept fair solutions to disputes with every one of its neighbours. It is India’s suppression of the Kashmiris that keeps alive the threat of terrorism. It is India’s quest for dominance which is likely to fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race with Pakistan and retard prospects of rapid development and regional economic cooperation in the region.

The United States—working together with China, Europe and Russia—can create a security and political paradigm in South Asia that can promote sustainable peace and improve the prospects for prosperity.

Pakistan and India are unlikely to discard mutual hostility. But their competitive relationship can be ‘managed’ in directions which are constructive and stabilising.

Such a new paradigm could be built within the following parameters: one, a balance in conventional forces between Pakistan and India maintained at the lowest possible levels.

This would involve:

1. Acceptance by India and Pakistan of restraints on the development and acquisition of certain destabilising weapons systems, e.g. anti-ballistic missiles, and a progressively less threatening deployment of forces
2. formal global acknowledgement of the nuclear weapons status of both India and Pakistan and application of a non-discriminatory nuclear regime to both, accompanied by agreements by them to restrain the expansion of their nuclear and strategic capabilities, build mutual transparency and confidence to ensure against deliberate or accidental nuclear use, and commitments by both to respect and contribute to the nuclear non-proliferation regime
3. Genuine dialogue on Kashmir and other outstanding issues, such as the water dispute between India and Pakistan—and similar disputes with India’s other South Asian neighbours—expressly supported and encouraged by the international community through the UN or another collective forum;
4. The creation of a South Asia free trade zone, with adequate measures to protect the economies of the smaller countries and ensure a ’level playing field’; five, following progress on the preceding, the establishment of transit agreements, allowing India access to Central and West Asia, and Pakistan access to Nepal and Bangladesh, with international financial and technical support to build the required infrastructure.

Such a new South Asian paradigm would serve the interests of the peoples of Pakistan, India and other regional states as well as the international community. It could transform South Asia from an area of instability and danger into the latest Asian economic miracle.

Much depends on how well Pakistan and its leaders confront the present and emerging strategic challenges to the country and build clear and bold responses to overcome these challenges.