Emerging Force Postures

Pakistani anxiety did not dissolve even after demonstrating its nuclear weapon capability in 1998.

India’s conventional forces and its advancing nuclear capability continue to make Pakistan vulnerable to Indian coercion.

Pakistan’s nuclear force posture evolved under military doctrines, military force mobilisations in crises and a calculus of conventional force imbalance.

The most important factor is the correlation of Pakistan’s strategic force posture with India’s conventional force postures and military crises.

The twin military crises in 1999 (Kargil) and 2001-2002 (Parakaram) were catalysts for conceptualising Pakistan’s national security thinking and integration of nuclear force planning and conventional force planning at the Strategic Plans Division.

There was seemingly little realisation in India that coercing a conventionally weaker adversary that had newly demonstrated its nuclear weapon capability would only speed up the process of making nuclear weapons operational.

India should have known that the central premise of Pakistani going nuclear was to redress the strategic imbalance and to seek a way to deter hostile India from attacking its weaker neighbour.

The 2001-2002 crisis might well have been another Indian effort to display superior military might in a bid to force Pakistan into submission.

The timing of this coercive deployment were seen as exploiting the post-9/11 environment, especially when Pakistan was engaged along its western frontier due to US operations in Afghanistan.

India clearly posed a two-front dilemma for Pakistan. More importantly what remains an enigma for Pakistani security planners was the fundamental assumption that Indian military planners could start, control and win a limited war without escalating into nuclear tripwires.

The 2001-2002 military standoff was another grim reminder of the perpetuity of the existential threat from India, reinforcing the significance of nuclear weapons in deterring India from 1971-like adventures.

There appeared a lack of sober recognition in India’s security thinking that the advent of nuclear weapons means that war should not even be contemplated.

Pakistan therefore has to prepare to counter the threat of Indian mobilisation each time it occurs in response to terror attacks in India.

As Pakistan lacks comparable resources, nuclear deterrence would be the only recourse to rely on. The more innovation in conventional military doctrine against Pakistan is contemplated and the more new technologies (subsurface cruise missiles, space based surveillance, and ballistic missiles defence for example) are acquired by India, the greater the challenge to strategic stability in the region.

As new challenges to internal stability emerge for Pakistan, and its security forces are drawn into multiple contingencies, there would be even more reason to depend on nuclear deterrence to deal with the threat from India.

Nuclear deterrence does not come about automatically, especially against an adversary that seeks opportunity and space to threaten war.

Strategic forces must be structured to create deterrent forces. Pakistan had no clear models to emulate. Its force-structuring model was sui generis.

This meant weighing its vulnerabilities and strengths to determine force-planning parameters. Its geo-physical vulnerability, especially the lack of depth and proximity of communication centres to Indian military thrusts were all key considerations. Conversely, this weakness from short distances enabled Pakistan to draw up plans for rapid mobilisation for defence and implied that Indian offensive forces would stand to lose surprise and travel a greater distance. Next, denying escalation control would force India to calculate the risk of any misadventure.

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) announced four explicit thresholds, which alone or in combination would constitute redlines: space, destruction, economic strangulation and abetting domestic violence. Under President Musharraf, a unified command system existed in the country, which provided the Pakistan National Command Authority (NCA) a semblance of coherence in planning and decision-making—thus clearly articulating objectives and force goals. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) established at the Joint Services Headquarters in 1999 was tasked to act as a secretariat for the NCA.

Beginning in spring 1999, strategic planning commenced with a net threat assessment and appraisal of conventional capabilities. Simultaneous studies of several models for force planning provided a base for organisational and operational planning. The crucial determining factor was the financial and technical resources that would impact the minimum deterrence requirement but also the force structuring goals. It was therefore important to develop such organisational models for strategic force commands and operational procedures that Pakistanis were familiar with. Within a short span SPD was tackling a complex set of issues of nuclear management, which included developing procedures for preparing nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, survivability, security, safety and other mechanism for command and control. Even as these processes were growing it was ultimately the 2001-2002 military standoff 293that brought about the final shaping of nuclear forces when dispersal and mating plans were actually tested under extremely trying conditions of a physical threat from an enemy. India inadvertently provided Pakistan a chance to refine its procedures with an environment of real-time threats.

By the end of the crisis in October 2002, Pakistan had a well-exercised and functioning Strategic Force Command (SFC) under the Pakistan Army with ballistic missile units and Strategic Air Commands operating with The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) all operating under a centralised command, control, communication and intelligence (C3 I) system at the Joint Services Headquarters. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) comprised the highest-level of civilian and military decision-makers.

While nuclear force planning and development was done under the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff’s Committee, the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and four service chiefs formed the Employment committee of the NCA, which is the apex body that invites the heads of the scientific organisations to facilitate NCA decisions. The institutional response to manage the ultimate weapons and threats helps to keep an eye on developments and advances in India. But it does not mitigate the stark reality of resource constraints, which determines the force posture. Matching all Indian advances is not necessary to maintain the strategic parity with India. Periodic review by the NCA for qualitative match and force goal ceilings as well as oversight of safety, security and survivability of arsenals will remain a regular feature in Pakistan’s nuclear future.

Pakistani arsenals are maintained in non-deployed form. The NCA maintains centralised control of the assets. An elaborate system of security and safety has been employed though the Security Division, which ensures physical security of storage and transport.

Security is tight with strict access control within each organisation and a personnel reliability program has been instituted much on the lines of Western countries. It is extremely important for Pakistan to keep the safety coefficient high in normal peacetime. But the system must respond to the rapid changing strategic environment, which takes little time to change. As has been witnessed, a Mumbai type attack can lead to a speedy deterioration of the situation. The NCA is charged with assuring readiness in the event of a sudden strike or conventional war breakout.

Future Trajectories

Land-based forces will rely on a mix of solid- and liquid-fuelled ballistic and cruise missiles (Babur).

The air-based deterrent will improve as Pakistan develops its air defences for both conventional and strategic delivery.

Research and development continues on a sea-based deterrent. In the long run a submarine based cruise missile deterrent will ensure a second strike stability. Meanwhile improvement in command and control with information, surveillance and reconnaissance capability (C21SR) will continuously be enhanced.

A rejuvenated Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) will have new tasks in this regard.

Launching a Pakistan satellite in the next decade will give dedicated data; guidance and space based accuracy as well as enhance C2ISR. Early warning can win nearly half the battle.

The likely role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s regional policies and international engagements will primarily depend on the trajectories of regional security dynamics.

4 developments would affect Pakistan’s security policy.

1. The outcome of the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan

2. The shaping of the regional power balance between India and Pakistan.

Would strategic balance lead to peaceful resolution of conflict or would continued arms build up and modernisations increase tensions bringing in more crises and wars?

3. The policy course that United States might follow in Asia and the Muslim world.

US security policy with respect to China, Iran, and the Islamic world, will necessitate a role for Pakistan.

4. How Pakistan tackles its internal stability situation and emerges out of the current domestic crises.

This is the most important

Depending on these developments, Pakistan’s nuclear policy is likely to evolve into one of two futures.

1. Moderate and pragmatic

This will occur if Pakistan has a stable government with a balanced civil-military relation.

2. Radical

This will happen if a radical right-wing government assumes power.