PRAETORIANS AND THE PEOPLE

Saeed Shafqat

In Pakistan’s post-February 2008 election era two contradictory trends are evident. The first is political continuity in that the third and fourth generations of the traditional feudal, tribal, religious and business families are entering the political arena. Second, the social class origins of the dominant institutions, namely, the military and civil bureaucracy are undergoing change—the recruitment pattern is shifting from the upper middle class to the lower middle class.

This means that the social composition of Pakistani elites is undergoing change. The emerging elite have humbler origins, hold conservative social and political views and reflect authoritarian tendencies in society rather than democratic values. Some elite circulation appears to be taking place but the implications for strengthening democracy and a party system remain uncertain.

For making a transition from a military-hegemonic system to a party-based representative system, elections are an important procedural element to measure democratic aspirations in a society. In Pakistan’s case this is severely conscribed by the military-hegemonic system. While holding elections and transitioning to democracy are important, attention also needs to be paid to strengthening the substantive components of democracy: the rule of law, respect and tolerance of dissent and minority rights, religious freedom, Cultural pluralism, and freedom of association.

At 63 Pakistan is deeply troubled. Its people are despondent as they watch a ruling class concerned more with its own privileges than with serving the public, which has driven the debate in the media chat demands a reordering of the state and society. This discourse has also projected competing visions of transforming Pakistan and also urges the restoration of the dignity and self respect of ordinary citizens. This should be putting pressure on the Pakistani elites to mend their behaviour but are they listening?

Three sets of arguments are presented in this chapter. First, the argument that the transformations in elite structures are changing the dynamics of elite interactions, which in turn are shaping the direction of civil-military relations. Second, it makes the case that despite serious limitations the political leadership is striving to sustain a multi-party system and redefining government-opposition relations. Third, that the War on Terror is affecting the prospects of democratic development and contributing to reordering civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Elites and Democracy

The theoretical literature concerning why democracy flourishes in a society can be summarised into four basic approaches. One, that democracy is a function of the level of economic development; the higher the level of economic development, the better the prospects for democracy. Economic development leads to a vibrant middle class whose interest is in sustaining a free market economy, protecting rights and freedoms and building democracy. Two, that democracy is a function of the level of education; the higher the education levels of a society, the greater the chances of a successful democracy. Third, that democracy is a function of cultural pluralism and work ethics; that a correlation exists between the culture of a society and its chances to create a representative government. This represents the Weberian hypothesis arguing that the rise of democracy in Western Europe was directly linked to the Protestant ethic. Four, that democracy is a function of the elites’ ability to bargain, compromise and build consensus on the normative aspects of democracy- rule of law, respect for dissent, protection of minority and women’s rights. It is this author’s contention that in the Pakistani case a focus on elites and elite interactions is more instructive in explaining the functioning or absence of democracy as compared to the other three approaches. It is pertinent to ask: do the elites have faith in democracy and representative government? How are decisions made and policies adopted that subvert constitutional norms and resurrect the hegemonic position of the military?

To answer these questions, the chapter begins with the premise that the people and the general public might help in sustaining democracy but constructing democracy is a function of the elites. It is thus important to 108study the evolution and transformation of Pakistani elites to review the prospects of political stability and change in Pakistan.

In the last thirty-nine years the structure of the Pakistani elites has undergone social and political transformation. At least five complex and contradictory trends are evident. The Pakistani elites consist of the military and civil bureaucracy, leaders of political parties, the religious clergy and members of the emerging electronic media. Among these elite structures, the role of the military is distinctive because it has been involved in the ‘construction’ of other elites. As Pakistan’s history attests, each military regime has patronised a new set of individuals to construct political elites who would adopt the political system that the military favoured. The following section provides an analytic framework and dynamics of emerging trends in each elite category.

The Military Elite

During the 1970s and particularly since 1979, the social origins of the military elite have undergone change. Generals Jehangir Karamat and Pervez Musharraf and their cohorts were the last of the pre-independence generation.

The year 2007 marked the ascendancy of an indigenous post-independence generation at the helm of military decision-making. Until 1971 the base of military elites (Brigadiers to General) was relatively small, totalling approximately 120 officers.

Today there is a five-fold increase—the base of military elites has considerably expanded to over 600 officers. However, strategic decision-making is confined to the 10 Corps Commanders and another thirty to forty top staff officers. Their ethnic, social class and educational composition have also become noticeably diffuse.

There is considerable debate about the ideological orientation of military elites. During the 1960s and until the mid 1970s, the generals from rural background and the Potohar—the so-called ‘martial races’—were dominant.

But the new breed is more urban and comes from more modest social backgrounds. There is a noticeable shift from the ‘Huntingtonian model of military professionalism’ to the ‘Janowitzian model’—moving beyond a soldierly profession and assuming constabulary functions.

In the post-1979 period, with the exception of the Kargil conflict (1999), the military has increasingly been involved in combating internal disorder, fighting insurgency, designing counterinsurgency plans and, 109since 2002, increasingly fighting global terrorism; extensively performing UN peacekeeping and policing functions.

During this decade more military officers have interacted and been trained at American military institutions compared to the previous three decades. It would be worth watching how these interactions and trainings impact the ideological orientation and professional skills of the emerging elites.

What is significant, though, is that the military has already entrenched itself in managing industrial, business, commercial and real estate ventures. To understand the dynamics of this change it is important to recognise the transformation in officers’ professional skills, levels of competence and ideological orientation at the rank of Brigadier and not just at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The first noticeable trend is that the military has become a corporate entity, its role and relationship in Pakistani society has undergone transformation—it has acquired a new sense of confidence and is tentative and cautious in showing ‘deference’ to the political leadership. Second, the military elites have been vigorous and aggressive in consolidating control on security, defence and the foreign policy arena.

Is there any noticeable shift in this trend in the post-February 2008 period? The indications are that the military has made a tactical withdrawal because under General Musharraf (1999-2007), particularly after 2001, its policies had become too closely identified with the US led global War on Terror.

The operations that the military launched in 2005-06 in the tribal areas and the North West Frontier Province did not secure adequate political or public support, which had a demoralising effect on the troops.

As political and professional costs mounted the military leadership sought to regain the trust and confidence of the people. In the post-Musharraf era the military elites re-assessed and re-strategised their role and relationship with the civilian leadership. They have shown ‘deference’ to the political leadership, galvanised public support for the military operations against the Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas and refurbished its professional image.

Occasionally the military high command has also shown measured resistance to American policy. Examples include the opposition to the Kerry-Lugar Bill (which sets out conditions for US assistance) and pursuing nuclear cooperation with China. Has the Army been able to restore its public image and rebuild trust? Indications are that the return to normalcy in Swat where the military 110operation in 2009 drove out the Pakistani Taliban has considerably restored public trust. The July-August 2010 floods-which claimed 1600 lives, displaced millions of people in the country and caused extensive infrastructure and crop damage-saw the military take a lead role in relief and rescue operations and in reconstruction. This contrasted with the weak response from political leaders and political parties in managing the catastrophe. All of this means that it is too soon to tell whether the ‘deference’ the military has shown for the political leadership is a tactical shift or more deeply-rooted.

The Bureaucratic Elite

The second visible trend is the changing composition, orientation and educational background of the bureaucracy. The Pakistan civil service-the pivotal pillar of governance and until the 1980s the backbone of administration-is now plagued by institutional decline and a crisis of moral authority. Unlike the first three decades after Pakistan’s independence it no longer attracts the best and the brightest that instead prefer to go in to business and other private sector professions.

Since the mid 1990s recruitment has shifted from the upper middle class to the lower middle class who, for status enhancement and limited choices of personal advancement, still find the competitive examination for the civil service as the only vehicle for social mobility.

At the same time, in public perception and in reality, the integrity of the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC) has been considerably eroded. Since 2001 the Police is the most preferred occupation group for new entrants. The yearly reports of the FPSC show that the choice of service suggests that the change in composition is not conducive to promoting representative government but appears more supportive of authoritarian and clientelist type of political system.

At the mid-career level the retention of civil servants remains a major policy challenge. The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a new breed of civil servants, ’the Laptop Wallas’, who are well-versed in information technology and governance issues, have acquired a foreign degree, and are professionally competent and increasingly attuned to the language of the international donor community.

Their number is small but growing. This is a genre that has put in ten to fifteen years of service and is under 40 years of age. These are the new ‘project managers’ who are either part of the federal or provincial government or working on a project run by the government but funded by a donor agency.

These ‘Laptop Wallas’ get an enhanced salary package and invariably demonstrate professional competence and effective managerial skills. While this is a phenomenon that exhibits individual competence it doesn’t necessarily translate in to better delivery of services and implementation of policies for a host of other reasons.

The transition to party-led government has not only accelerated the politicisation of bureaucracy but also widened the gap between the small number of professionally competent and the larger number of inadequately trained bureaucrats. Civil bureaucracy remains the life­ line of governance in the country. But its growing ineffectiveness raises concerns about capacity-building and the prospects for reform.

The Political Elite

The third trend is that the elites leading the political parties are becoming more dynastic and their leaders unabashed in giving key party positions to family members. The landowners, tribal leaders, business families, religious leaders, a few professionals and a sprinkling of the middle classes continue to comprise the dominant political elite.

But political parties are in decay, organisationally weak, lacking vision and programme and with no leadership succession plan. The current ruling coalition led by the PPP has banded together not on the basis of any principle but on the basis of expediency and desire for power.

Thus the outcome has been progress only in the procedural dimension of democracy because they have acquired power through election. But the normative dimension of democracy-respect for rule of law and core values of tolerance, accommodation and consensus remains weak. Analysts remain sceptical that the political parties, who have done little to promote a democratic culture internally, who pursue power with little regard to the public good, whose leaders are unable to communicate with each other without an ‘international broker’, can provide an alternative to the military.

Yet, despite political uncertainty, the restoration of party-based representative government is a positive development as it aids nation-building and helps in consensus building on issues of national significance.

After the 2008 elections, the leaders of the PPP, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Awami National Party (ANP) have conducted politics by consultation and consensus building which has created an expectation that they will be able to sustain a coalition government and stable government-opposition relations. This transition towards a multi-party system is still heavily dependent on the role and behaviour of the two larger parties, namely the PPP and PML-N.

But Asif Zardari, Nawaz Sharif and Asfandyar Wali are neither visionary nor transformational leaders but pragmatic and deft politicians. Yet this fragile consensus could rupture if the ‘international brokers’ (mainly the United States) withdraw support, change direction or lose interest in ‘managing’ Pakistan’s internal politics.

The Religious Elite

A significant change has been underway among religious institutions and the religious leadership, which represents the fourth trend. The past 30 years have seen the rise of Madrasahs as a source of social status and political power.

It is significant that these madrasahs have produced a new breed of religious leaders that claim legitimacy on the basis of scholarship as well as by assuming political roles. These religious leaders are relatively young, mostly in their late thirties or early forties. This religious elite is not necessarily well-versed in religious scholarship but is enthusiastic in instrumentalising Islam; they have increasingly become assertive and uncompromising in projecting their own form of Shari’a. In the late 1970s and 1980s state patronage, the Afghan jihad (supported by the US and Saudi Arabia) and trading communities were instrumental in supporting these new religious elites.

This has greatly influenced the Pakistani political discourse as religiosity rather than religious principles and ethics has acquired primacy leading to constraints on social, cultural, political and economic activities.

For example, if one were to tabulate the religious congregations that took place during the decade (between mid October and November each year) in Lahore and its surroundings-the Tablighi Jamaat, Ahle-Hadith Conference, Dawat-e-Islami (Maulana Ilyas Qadri) and Jamaat-e-Islami etc., the number would be a significant trend indicator. These congregations perform symbolic, substantive and ideological messaging 113functions. The critical question is: to what extent has this religiosity fanned a jihadi culture? There is considerable evidence to support the view that without state connivance and support from the religious elites a jihadi culture could not have flourished in the country. Nor would militancy have become the monster it bas. In any case, the main casualty has been the liberal political space which has shrunk as a consequence. The emerging religious elites are self-confident and have emerged as a potent political force.

The US Factor

The fifth transformation, which has greatest significance, is the structural presence of the US in Pakistan’s policy and strategic decision-making. Because of the close collaboration of the Pakistani ruling elites—military, bureaucratic, political—it has become hard to differentiate between the interests of US policy-makers and these domestic elites.

In recent years the US presence has become more pervasive and reveals a strategic shift in US thinking on Pakistan. According to media reports, of the 240 plus members of the 2002 national assembly, thirty five members had US nationality.

During the 1950s the military elites set the ball rolling with the provision of air space. This later extended to logistical support and then intelligence gathering after 2001. Now almost all aspects of internal law and order, regional relations, counter-terrorism, anti-money laundering and nuclear non-proliferation policies are influenced one way or another by the relationship with Washington. Most ministries (including Interior, Defence, Commerce and Finance) have bilateral arrangements with the US.

The commander of CENTCOM (US Central Command) makes regular trips to Pakistan. Invariably, the new CENTCOM chief’s first destination is Pakistan. What all of this means is that the Pakistani state is hard put to make a case for sovereignty so deeply penetrated that its ally is in its affairs. Pakistan’s governance issues are no longer internal, as outside help— especially economic support—has become essential to governing the country. Here is the paradox: while power elites collaborate, connive and compromise to consolidate this structural presence it leads to occasional official outbursts against outside interference which deepens the existing resentment against the US on the street. There is in fact a growing 114disconnect between the elites and civil society which opposes the US role and presence. If this disconnect deepens and spins out of control it could rupture the carefully crafted Western encouraged transition to democracy in Pakistan. State Under Siege As a consequence of these transformations the very structure or institutional landscape of the Pakistani state has undergone change. While one of the key functions of the state is to have a legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion there are various parts of Pakistan where the writ of the state is either weak or being challenged. The Pakistani state is under pressure and struggling with the question of how to accommodate competing interests while expanding its room to manoeuvre and restoring its writ. The critical challenge is whether it will be able to acquire a more legitimate basis of authority through institutions or a credible political leader. The answer to this question lies in understanding the dynamics of changing relationships among the elites and particularly the shifting dynamics of civil and military relations. This complex but contradictory change among Pakistani elite structures is transforming civil-military relations and a new pattern is emerging. The following section will focus on these transformations.

From Military Hegemony to Coalition Politics

For over 60 years, Pakistan has oscillated between military- hegemonic and dominant party political systems. Persistent and prolonged military rule has entrenched the military in politics, business and even the social sphere in the militarisation of Pakistani society. Despite this, military rule has never gained legitimacy among citizens. In a military­hegemonic system, the military has a monopoly over strategic policy issues and decision-making institutions. It can manipulate and direct the behaviour of political leaders and interest groups in a chosen direction.

The military-hegemonic system functions via three identifiable processes: first, political control through executive orders/ordinances; second, political exclusion through restrictions on parties and other political groups or urban professional groups; and third, the building of a strategic partnership with the United States. Pakistan’s history shows that 115military-hegemony evokes resistance. The longer the period of military rule the stronger resistance movements become in their push for free and fair elections. Upsurges of opposition and demands for the restoration of democracy by civil society groups and political parties have accompanied each period of military rule (General Ayub Khan, 1958-69; General Yahya Khan, 1969-71; General Zia-ul-Haq, 1977-88; and General Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2008). The recurring pattern has been that the collapse or more often a weakening of the military regime paves the way for elections which then facilitate a transition to civilian-led party governments.

It is distressing, however, that with each election opportunities for consolidating civilian-led party governments have mostly been squandered by Pakistan’s parties. Political leaders have not been successful in constructing a party system nor promoting democratic values. Construction of democratic values and ingraining a democratic culture in society is a time-consuming and long term project. A culture of respect for dissent, necessary for a representative form of government, has yet to be developed. The tendency has been for parties, when in power, to establish their dominance. In particular, the Pakistan Peoples Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 1971 to 1977; the Pakistan Muslim League led by Muhammad Khan Junejo from 1985 to 1988; and both the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP and Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League (PML-N) from 1988 to 1999, all attempted to establish political dominance by weakening the opposition.

In the post-2008 period there is a significant change. The issue is no longer projecting ‘dominance of a political party’ but maintaining a balance among multiple political parties. This is the consequence of coalition politics as no party got an overall majority in the 2008 polls. While this balance is evolving the dynamics of governance remain the same-who gets what and how much. The lack of development of civilian-led party rule does not inspire confidence that the rule of law, good governance and the values of constitutional liberalism will be strengthened. Since the first general elections of 1970, the winning political party has adopted a post­election policy of establishing dominance rather than creating the political space necessary for opposition parties. Each time the military withdrew, political leaders neither paid any attention to reform nor democratising their 116political parties. Personalities drove the parties instead of organisation or programmes. Both the party in power and opposition parties pursued confrontational politics and failed to build consensus on how to restrict the role of the military in politics. The military, in turn, took advantage of the discord among parties and implicitly encouraged confrontation rather than cooperation. The party in power focused on establishing dominance and excluding political opponents instead of devising ways to restrain the military. The party system and representative government could not be institutionalised. Thus both the military and the political parties have failed in creating pluralist norms and values necessary for a democratic society. Given this history, why should one expect political parties to behave differently now? Before addressing this question, Pakistan’s history in the past decade must be examined. General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in October 1999, over­ throwing the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. From 2002-2007, Musharraf enhanced presidential power via constitutional amendments and ordinances and ruled by decree, confining the role of the legislature to that of a decree-stamping institution. Until 2006 he maintained a political order that created a semblance of stability, but 2007 was perhaps the worst year in Pakistan’s legal and political history. In that year the president misused his powers through a series of unlawful acts: on 9 March 2007 he dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and on 9 November 2007 he issued a decree firing over sixty judges of the superior judiciary. Musharraf then managed to get re-elected as President in his capacity as both the Chief of the Army and serving general. Lawyers’ protests were ruthlessly suppressed. Under domestic and international pressure, Musharraf announced that elections would be held on 7 January 2008. Political parties responded by demanding the return of exiled leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. They also initiated a consultative process which led to the signing of the Charter of Democracy. Through this charter, they agreed to work together to restore democracy, seek independence of the judiciary and curb the political role of the military. On 5 October 2007, Musharraf issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which exonerated political leaders from charges in cases of corruption. This paved the way for the return of these leaders especially Bhutto, which came to be known as the 117Musharraf-Bhutto deal. As the election campaign progressed, key electoral issues included restoration of judges, the curtailment of presidential powers, disengagement of the military from politics, recognition of terrorism as a national issue, the use of political engagement rather than force to deal with religious extremists, the transfer of power to elected representatives and the supremacy of the legislature. On 18 October 2007, Bhutto returned to Karachi to a rousing reception. Although she narrowly survived a suicide bomb at her welcome procession, the bomb killed over 100 participants. Bhutto continued to campaign despite threats to her life. On 27 December 2007, Bhutto met a tragic death in a bombing of her election rally in Rawalpindi. This became a defining moment in Pakistan’s history. It sparked anger and a wave of sympathy not only for her party, the PPP, but also other political leaders. Bhutto’s death intensified the revolt of urban professionals, which had been simmering since the removal of the Chief Justice in March 2007. The lawyers’ protests gave new meaning to the electoral process. Bhutto’s death jolted Pakistan and precipitated an expectation among the people that political party leaders would seize this opportunity to construct a civilian-led democratic order. For almost two decades, Bhutto was centre stage, regardless of whether she was in or out of power, within or outside the country. She showed courage and imagination in confronting military rule and in the process facilitated a democratic transition. By winning two elections in 1988 and in 1993 she assumed the office of Prime Minister, a distinction in Pakistani politics. In the eyes of many, she was poised to win the 2008 elections. Despite her disappointing performance as Prime Minister, the promise and mystique of her leadership persisted. Her ten weeks of electoral campaigning from 18 October 2007 to 27 December 2007 demonstrated how, despite threats to her life, she galvanised the PPP base across the country. In her speeches and interviews, she courageously attacked religious extremists and terrorists. She forcefully argued that democracy was the only alternative to an authoritarian military dictatorship. At the time of her death, she had re-emerged as the most popular political leader in recent history. Her death was followed by massive protests and violence, creating 118much uncertainty. Elections were delayed by a full month, yet that did not diminish the PPP support base. The party secured victory even if it did not gain an overall parliamentary majority. Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari emerged as the strongman of the party. Despite a past tainted by corruption allegations he showed considerable political acumen in the period following Bhutto’s death. He has also been adept in consolidating control over the party and has sought reconciliation with the other major parties, particularly the Awami National Party (ANP), the PML-N, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and even the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). In June 2008, the MQM joined the provincial government in Sindh. The outcome of the 2008 elections raised expectations that Pakistan would move away from a dominant-party system to a multi-party system where the PPP, PML-N, ANP, JUI and MQM would work as coalition partners. Each has a different agenda and support base yet they seem to agree on the idea of a minimal consensus. The politics of coalition building are not new to Pakistan and alliance-forming coalitions have emerged as effective oppositional groups. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, politicians built alliances that became formidable opposition movements. This gave rise to both military-hegemonic and party-dominant regimes. The 1990s saw Pakistan’s political parties and their leaders pursue the politics of regime confrontation, elite manipulation and even street agitation, but not reconciliation and consensus. Thus sustaining coalitions that would lead to politics of accommodation, consensus building and national reconciliation remained weak. Today, the multi-party coalition led by the PPP remains tenuous bur holds the promise of setting a new direction for coalition politics. Leaders of the PPP, PML-N, MQM and ANP seem to be learning that politics is about compromise, bargain and consensus. But increasingly coalition parties have begun to reveal three disturbing trends. First, leadership is increasingly dynastic. Second, these parties are a coalition of landed elites, business groups, tribal elders and religious groups. Third, these leaders are driven by considerations of personal gain and power rather than public good and institution building. The leaders are reluctant to change the status quo despite their apparent recognition that their supporters expect them to work together to improve security and governance, provide justice and reduce poverty. In spite of these worrying trends, there are at least six reasons why coalition politics may lead to the 119development of a multi-party system. First, even though the three major political parties, the PPP, PML-N and ANP, were quick to build a consensus against President Musharraf, the parties differed in their approach to his removal from office. The PML-N was vocal in demanding Musharraf’s removal (and are currently demanding his trial) and the reinstatement of the judges, while the PPP was less confrontational and searched for ways to define a basis for a workable relationship with Musharraf. The PPP also wished to dilute the issue of the restoration of the judges, which strained the coalition, as the PML- N’s expectation was that the judges would be promptly restored. When that did not happen, the PML-N’s ministers resigned from the coalition and the party withdrew from the government. This jolted the coalition, and the PML-N chose to become the opposition party in the National Assembly. The transition has been bumpy and is likely to remain so. Second, there are indications of an emerging consensus on the political role of the military. The political parties remained focused on ensuring the removal of Musharraf, who resigned in August 2008. His departure helped define power-sharing with the military rather than establish the supremacy of the civilian leaders. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, took a number of steps, such as withdrawing serving military officer from civilian positions. Third, there appears to be a realisation among the leaders of the political parties that they must refrain from repeating the mistakes of the 1990s when confrontation between the PPP and PML-N paved the way for military intervention. Therefore, despite the confrontational politics and brinksmanship at the height of the lawyers’ protest in 2008, the PPP and PML-N leaders kept the channel of communication open. The leadership of the parliamentary parties seemed eager to sustain the dialogue in order to dispel any mistrust. This spirit was best reflected in the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment which swept away Musharraf’s constitutional changes. Fourth, there is a strong desire among leaders who were either jailed (for example, Asif Ali Zardari) or compelled to go abroad (such as Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif) to ensure that no one will be forced into exile or put in prison. This has helped improve the levels of trust among political leaders, with the bonds of prison and past exile giving new meaning to the politics of coalition building. Nawaz Sharif conveys the image of a 120confident but confrontational and somewhat defiant leader who remained focused on the restoration of judges and Musharraf’s removal. Zardari appears calm, calculating and somewhat tentative but tenacious and leaning toward reconciliation. Both seem to understand that the politics of mass mobilisation could unleash social forces that can quickly become uncontrollable. For public posturing time and again Nawaz Sharif has engaged in a war of words but shown restraint in taking to the streets in protest. Fifth, party leaders, despite the serious differences in their approaches, have evolved a consensus in recognising terrorism as Pakistan’s own problem, and the need to curb militants, particularly the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and others who provide sanctuary to al Qaeda. This implies that the various leaders are, through consultation, repositioning themselves on how to handle extremism. While still evolving, the retention of a balance between engagement with the militants and the application of force is of critical importance. It is this balance between engagement and force that has improved levels of trust or necessitated teamwork between the civilian and military leadership. Finally, since the middle of 2006, the US and Pakistan have been reviewing and reassessing their anti-terrorism policies in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In addition to pressing Pakistan to intensify military operations in these areas Washington also initiated dialogue with ANP leader Asfandyar Wali, who was invited to meet with the State Department and CENTCOM. During 2007, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Pakistan three times; these visits were supplemented by those of congressional leaders. Besides conducting regular meetings with Pakistani government officials, the Deputy Secretary and congressional leaders also met the heads of almost all the major political parties. In 2008, the United States embarked on a three pronged approach to reset its policy toward Pakistan. The Pentagon, Department of State and House and Senate leadership acted in concert to engage the Pakistani civil and military leadership on wide-ranging domestic and bilateral concerns. This has deepened and expanded the scale and interactions of Pakistani and US officials. In July 2008, President Bush invited Prime Minister Gilani to Washington, and in November President Zardari attended a UN forum on the ‘Culture of Peace’. Gilani and Zardari both made efforts to assure US 121policy-makers and the global community that the civilian leadership of Pakistan was determined to combat terrorism and needed sympathy along with financial support. Relations have continued to grow in 2009 with an official visit to the US by President Zardari to negotiate issues ranging from supporting democracy to socio-economic reform to combating terrorism, a promising sign for the transition to democracy and evolution of a multi-party system. The PPP-led coalition government is now in the third year of its rule. But corruption, violence and sectarian strife continue to deepen the crisis of governance. Despite significant political achievements including the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, the seventh National Finance Commission Award (which governs the distribution of resources between the four provinces) and a Balochistan package (economic and other measures to address provincial sentiment after Musharraf’s use of force there) the regime’s public stock has been low on account of its weak governance and its inability to solve the deepening energy crisis, rising inflation and unemployment levels. All of this has eroded public confidence in party government and democracy. Furthermore its poor and insensitive handling of the worst floods in Pakistan’s history in the summer of 2010 could turn out to be a watershed for the resurgence of the military and even the demise of party rule. Given these changing dynamics of civil-military relations, what are the prospects of democratic consolidation? There are many indications that despite serious crises civil-military relations are undergoing an important transformation. This is borne out by several developments. In July 2010 Prime Minister Gilani ended rising speculation about General Kayani by granting him a three-year extension. This suggests an improved level of trust between the civil and military leadership that is helping to define the parameters of their evolving relationship. In theory and constitutionally this establishes the norm of the supremacy of civilian leadership. The past had seen a tussle between the president and the prime minister over who has the right to appoint the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Although the constitutional position on the issue has always been clear both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif as prime ministers found limits to their authority in this regard. The prime minister and the president should through mutual consultation develop a consensus on the selection of service chiefs. In 122reality, they have quarrelled over this matter. This reflects the weakness of the civilian leaders and the power of the military. However, once the Chief of Army Staff is selected he assumes the role of an arbiter, sometimes broker, and of course a potential intervener in the country’s political process. What role the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) chooses to play depends on three factors: his personal orientation, political circumstances and the corporate interests of the military. Seen from this perspective General Kayani has been careful and discreet so as to reveal little about his political or ideological beliefs except on national security issues. He went public in stating that the Pakistan military is ‘India- centric’ in its orientation and approach. Nationally and internationally he is recognised as a ‘professional soldier’. In 2009 Time magazine declared General Kayani as the ‘most influential General in the world’. Officials who have worked with General Kayani convey that he is calm, calculating, and prudent and keeps his cards close to his chest. General Kayani earned Musharraf’s trust and confidence after he successfully investigated the assassination attempts on the former President in 2003 with professional competence and utmost discretion. Consequently, he was appointed as the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 2004 and held that position till 2007. Earlier in his career he had briefly served in the office of the military secretary to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. This position provided him an opportunity to witness first hand political elite interactions and decision-making. Given his association with Musharraf and Bhutto he was ideally positioned to play a pivotal role in their ‘reconciliation’ in 2007. He also demonstrated the courage of his conviction on 9 March 2007 when Musharraf and his close aides read out a charge sheet to Chief Justice (CJ) Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, asking him to step down. Kayani was part of that team but remained silent throughout the meeting and refused to present an affidavit to the Supreme Court in the reference Musharraf had filed against the CJ and others. Kayani has shown vigour and determination in conducting effective counter-terrorist operations in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the post-Musharraf phase General Kayani had also carefully rebuilt the image of the military and strived to win the trust of his troops and the people. For example, as COAS, one of his first acts was to raise the salaries of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). Furthermore he announced that the Army 123will not interfere in politics and political decisions. He has cultivated an image of staying aloof from politics but on issues of security and foreign policy-particularly the strategic dialogue with the US-he has taken charge. In this regard he took the unprecedented step of calling and presiding over a meeting of the federal secretaries at General Headquarters (GHQ). This earned him the distinction of being the first and the only COAS who summoned a meeting of the country’s top civil servants in the presence of a civilian democratic government. Simultaneously, Kayani has played a key role in moving the US- Pakistan strategic dialogue forward, while gradually gaining American trust and confidence. He has become the person who most important officials in the Pentagon, the White House and NATO want to communicate with when deciding matters relating to Afghanistan and other regional security issues. A different kind of example of his power is provided in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack on Mumbai. President Zardari wanted to send the ISI head to India to calm down New Delhi but Kayani swiftly vetoed that. The person calling the shots on policy towards India is Kayani. It is evident from this that on defence and foreign policy the military retains hegemony. But this is also a reflection of the lack of competence and ability on the part of the civilian leaders in this sphere. A different kind of interpretation would argue that by allowing this space on external policy to the COAS the civilian leadership is delineating policy arenas where it accepts a legitimate military voice.

Conclusion

Against this backdrop the future of civil-military relations holds both the promise of change and the peril of business-as-usual. Continuity is indicated on strategic policy issues on which military hegemony will likely persist. This means that the military can be expected to play the decisive role in navigating defence and foreign policy and determining strategic decisions, while the civilian government will handle the economy and issues of ’low’ politics at home. An optimistic interpretation could be that civil-military relations are improving because an improvement in the trust level between the civilian and military elites reduces the possibility of a military coup. So while the military’s primacy in decision-making on strategic issues is conceded by the civilian regime, 124in return it would expect the military to support the political government and enable it to complete its parliamentary term.

In the short term a system of power sharing seems to be evolving rather than military s ubordination to civilian supremacy. At this stage the political leaders may concede that power sharing is a short term but unavoidable goal. The hope is that as the electoral process becomes a regular one and political parties pursue internal reform to democratise their internal structures, they may over time be able to provide a viable alternative to military hegemony. This would happen, if the political elites and political parties demonstrate the will to strengthen the party system; improve governance and rule of law; prioritise citizen welfare policies and the media and judiciary band together in promoting accountability and dispensing social justice. However until then civil-military relations in terms of power and authority will remain skewed even if there is greater mutual trust between them.