Army vs. Civil Hierarchy

Even two-time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif shook his head when asked by me if he knew about the application of the Warrant of Precedence during his terms in office.

Yet this list that Pakistan inherited from the British and that established the relative ranking of civil and military officials for protocol purposes has been a major path to the rise of the 97military in Pakistani society and polity.

Beyond simple protocol, this list symbolises the relative roles of officials from the civil and the military in the nation’s polity and provided a map of their relationships.

The Warrant of Precedence was issued by the Ministry of Interior from Karachi in February 1950.

It ranked the top officials of the then Dominion of Pakistan.

1. Governor General
2. Prime Minister .. deputy ministers of the Dominion .. the Judges of the Federal Court .. the chief justices of the high courts of the provinces .. federal secretaries .. the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan
3. Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army
4. Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army
5. Lieutenant Generals
6. General Officers Commanding divisions

Pakistan changed this warrant when General Ayub Khan, the C-in-C of the Army, was made Defence Minister and afterwards when he took over as Chief Martial Law Administrator and then President.

Today:

• the Chairman, JCSC, and Chiefs of Army, Air, and Naval Staff are #6
• Lieutenant Generals remain at par with federal secretaries at #16.

Protecting its Own

A frequent complaint about the Pakistan Army stems from its:

• overwhelming power and ubiquity in all spheres of civil endeavour
• ability to operate outside the bounds of normal legal systems.

The ISI is a highly effective counter-intelligence entity.

It came in to its own during the Afghan Jihad. Recently, it has often been called a ‘rogue’ agency or a ‘state within a state’.

In fact, it often operates at the behest of the government, civil and military, aligning with whatever centre of power is deemed more powerful or supportive.

The civilian Intelligence Bureau used to be tasked with internal security matters. It is now an appendage of the military agencies.

Under the Musharraf regime, it was headed by a retired Brigadier, a personal friend of the Chief of Army Staff and President.

Under the previous civilian regime of Prime Minister Sharif, the IB was used for political purposes and even then was headed by a former military officer.

Even the Army’s own Military Intelligence Directorate was brought in to the political sphere by Musharraf and a number of his predecessors. To make these agencies effective and to remove from them the opprobrium associated with their extra-legal actions, they need to be subjected to public scrutiny and controls not only within the Army’s structure but also by parliament.

Today and Tomorrow

Over the years the Pakistan Army has been regarded, with some merit, as a highly disciplined and trained force, relying on volunteer recruitment. The Pakistani population traditionally has shown great respect, even adulation, for its soldiers and officers.

Many youth sign up voluntarily for service in the Army as officers or soldiers following family or tribal traditions and recently as a means of upward social and economic mobility. Its soldiers and junior officers have time and again shown their abilities on the battlefield. But the leadership of the Army has let down the forces and the country repeatedly. Gradually, instead of respect, feelings of fear and loathing have pervaded the political discourse on the Army and its role in the country’s polity.

The Pakistan Army of today, though large and ubiquitous, is ill equipped for low-intensity conflict and has suffered heavily at the hands of well-trained guerrillas that melt into the population.

Increasingly, its association with the American superpower that is driving the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan pits the Army against its own tribes. Even the United States is now putting pressure on Pakistan to do more to plug the gaps in the porous and rugged l,350-mile border with Afghanistan, something that the relatively small US and coalition forces have failed to do from their side of the divide.

The terror network has struck back not just in FATA but also against the Army inside Pakistan proper, with a new weapon: suicide bombers. The Army faces a long war on this front.

Undergoing Change

The conditions that led to the weaknesses of the military system are not just societal but also arise from the recruitment patterns of the Pakistan Army that define the nature of its officer class and other ranks (soldiers). Traditionally, the Army was a predominantly Punjabi force.

In British India, three districts: Campbellpur (now Attock), Rawalpindi, and Jhelum dominated the recruitment flows that helped India send some 2.5 million soldiers to fight in World War II on behalf of the British Empire. The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) gradually began supplying troops and officers, as settled areas Pushtun tribesmen joined the military.

Over time, with the provision of waivers for both physical and educational qualifications, recruitment has been increased from the formerly less well-represented areas. Based on separate GHQ data for soldiers and officers, Punjab shows an overall decline in recruitment of soldiers from 63.86 per cent in 1991 to 43.33 in 2005, with Central Punjab outpacing Northern Punjab, the traditional recruitment ground, by 7,500 to 5,000 recruits in 2005. Southern Punjab had 1,800 recruits. The NWFP and FATA increased from 20.91 per cent to 22.43 per cent, Sindh rose from 8.85 per cent to 23.02 per cent, with rural Sindh accounting for the majority of the recruits (5,095 to 2,500 in 2005), Balochistan rose from 0.49 per cent to 1.52 per cent in 2005 with 200 Urban to 300 rural recruits in 2005, and Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas rising from 5.86 per cent to 9.70 per cent. The induction of 4,000 Baluch soldiers into the Army on October 28, 2010 with the goal of increasing this number to 10,000 is a good sign of national integration.

Comparing the officers commissioned into service during the period 1970-89 to those commissioned between 1990-2006 reveals a change in the relative share of different parts of the country. The Punjab rose marginally from 66.46 per cent to 66.93 per cent, but within the Punjab there are notable changes in the home districts of the officers shifting to the more 100populous and emerging urban centres of Central and even Southern Punjab. This is in line with rapid urbanisation trends nationwide. These bigger cities and towns are also the traditional strongholds of Islamist parties and growing conservatism associated with the petit bourgeoisie. The Zia period (reflected in the statistics for 1980-89) shows a sharp bulge in all cases, as the Army became a visibly more lucrative and attractive profession for urban youth and a means for upward social mobility.

The importance of the bulge in the Zia period is also underscored by the fact that the officers who joined in that decade are now poised to rise into the General Officer category. When the current group of senior Lieutenant Generals retires, most of whom were commissioned in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Zia Bharti (recruits) will take over the running of the Pakistan Army. Apart from being inducted into the Army during the middle of Zia’s Islamist ethos and official fostering of religious ideology and dogma, this group suffered at the hands of the US and Western European embargo of aid to Pakistan and was largely deprived of training opportunities in the West. Not only was it deprived of advanced overseas training during its formative years, but this officer cohort was also denied exposure to the world outside till late in their careers, by which time their worldview had formed and in many cases become entrenched.

The current cohort of senior Army leaders in Pakistan, including the Army Chief, General Kayani, represent the last group of officers who were able to take advantage of overseas training in their early years and were exposed to wider external influences. The effects of such training and exposure are reflected in some of its thinking on national issues.