Good and Bad Friendships

It is your fault, Yen-yu.

The Chief of Chuen-yu in the past was appointed lord of the East Mung (mountain).

• He lives in your own State.
• He is an official of the State-worship.

How can you think of attacking him?

Chu Jin says that their leaders were found to be incompetent and resigned.

If they cannot be firm when danger threatens the government, nor lend support when it is reeling, what use will they be as Assistants?'

You said that when a rhinoceros or tiger breaks out of its cage, when a jewel or tortoise-shell ornament is damaged in its casket�whose fault is it? But you are wrong.

Yen! It is a painful thing to a superior man to have to desist from saying, ‘My wish is so-and-so,’ and to be obliged to make apologies.

I have learnt that the rulers of States and heads of Houses are not greatly concerned about their small following, but about the lack of equilibrium in it.

They do not concern themselves with their becoming poor, but with the best means of living quietly and contentedly. This is because:

• where equilibrium is preserved, there will be no poverty
• where there is harmony their following will not be small
• where there is quiet contentment there will be no decline nor fall.

It follows that if men in outlying districts are not submissive, then a reform in education and morals is needed.

• When they have been so won, then will you render them quiet and contented.

At the present, the people in the outlying districts are not submissive and cannot be brought round.

• Your dominion is divided, prostrate, dispersed, and cleft in pieces.
• You as its guardian is powerless.

Plans are being made for taking up arms against those who dwell within your own State.

I am apprehensive that the sorrow of the Ki family is not to lie in Chuen-yu, but in those within their own screen.

When the empire is well-ordered, it is from the emperor that edicts regarding ceremonial, music, and expeditions to quell rebellion go forth.

When it is being ill-governed, such edicts emanate from the feudal lords. In this case, it will be strange if there is not a collapse in 10 generations.

If they emanate merely from the high officials, it will be strange if the collapse does not come in 5 generations.

When the State-edicts are in the hands of the subsidiary ministers, it will be strange if there is no collapse in 3 generations.

When the empire is well-ordered:

• government is not left in the hands of high officials, and
• the common people will cease to discuss public matters.

For 5 generations, the revenue has departed from the ducal household.

Four generations ago, the government fell into the hands of the high officials.

Hence, the straitened means of the descendants of the 3 Hwan families.