Commonplace

S. An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing.

I. Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word idea, viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs135 with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.

M. On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies136.

I. &c. Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last137.

I. They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.

[pg 039] Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive138, he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another’s. Introduction.

S. The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind139, mischievous and useless.

Mo. To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

Mo. Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.

P. S. Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow’d by all to be onely in the mind140, and others as generally taken to be without the mind141, if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.

I. If men would lay aside words in thinking, ’tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

Mo. From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.

M. Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility of Matter’s thinking142.

[pg 040] I. Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin’d significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. Wtever I see myself ’tis impossible I can paint it out in words.

Mo. N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.

Mo. Homo is not proved to be vivens by means of any intermediate idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.

S. There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition143.

M. S. We have assuredly an idea of substance. ‘Twas absurd of Locke144 to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

M. S. The substance of Body we know145. The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a purus actus.

I. Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

I. Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.

[pg 041] S. Locke’s out146—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought.

Mo. God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought.

S. No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.

S. I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho’ at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.

S. The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings.

S. Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv’d, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv’d.

Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt.

S. The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things.

S. The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it.

S. You ask, do these volitions make one Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more147.

N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen.

[pg 042] I. Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.

Locke’s great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don’t agree wth wt he says in ye 3d148.

M. If Matter149 is once allow’d to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho’ he seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.

I. When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will.

M. I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created150.

[pg 043] M. There is a philosopher151 who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen’s sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.

E. N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.

Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.

I. ‘Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho’ unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.

Mo. “Homo est homo,” &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. ‘Tis all about sounds and terms.

Mo. Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing152.

Mo. We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.

Mo. It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. ‘Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions [pg 044]form’d answering to these words, & in simple perception ’tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty153.

Mo. The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.

Mo. The obscure ambiguous term relation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.

Mo. Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is ye effect of God’s will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.

I. Qu. What becomes of the æternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish154.

I. But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.

I. To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.

E. “Cogito ergo sum.” Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.

N. Mo. Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found155.

P. We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses156.

‘Tis a man’s duty, ’tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do.

I. A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—’twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.

[pg 045] S. Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of judicium intellectus preceding the volition: I think judicium includes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium, intellectus, indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.

S. Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive157, &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.

S. Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by homo and agens in this place?

E. Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, ’tis strange they should want them158.

I. It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum’d in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.159

I. These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. (‘Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.

It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.’s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wn duly us’d or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, [pg 046]or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.

Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense160.

S. We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and such sensations161.

S. Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.

Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.

Mo. Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.

S. Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.

Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.

2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.

Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss’d.

I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you’d have me make wn you tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.

Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.

[pg 047] Numbers are nothing but names—never words.

Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.

Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.

In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.

Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wt remains?

These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them162.

Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon’d amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points163?

Mo. Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.

E. Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.

Mo. Sensual pleasure is the summum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.

Mo. Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man164. But if it be contemptible, ’tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.

I. Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.

I. By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing165.

M. S. To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive166 (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether [pg 048]passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.

What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name167.

I. M. I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”168 I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.

S. G. “Nihil dat quod non habet,” or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.

E. Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.

G. Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. ‘Tis impossible169.

M. E. Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality170.

I. Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.

M. S. Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.

S. ‘Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.

[pg 049] Mo. Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.

S. We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. ‘Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.

M. Locke in his 4th Book171, and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.

S. While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.

E. The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception172. Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) … First Book.

Mo. There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;” “Gold is yellow;” “Gold is fixt;” “Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.

M. Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God173.

M. S. Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs.

S. Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.

S. Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of [pg 050]the scholastiques—“the will wills,” &c. So does Locke. I am of another mind174.

S. Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.

E. S. Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs’s doctrine, &c.

M. P. E. Malbranch in his illustration175 differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.

P. I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind176. All ye carefully and lucidly to be set forth.

M. P. Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wn not actually perceived; but still with relation to perception177.

The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves178.

M. N. Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.

G. Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.

S. The not distinguishing ’twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas179.

M. Say you, At this rate all’s nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned [pg 051]the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book180.

I. S. Idea is the object of thought. Yt I think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. ‘Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.

I. Mo. Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the “horse is white” I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say “fortitude is a virtue” I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.

S. Pure intellect I understand not181.

Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.

G. S. The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction182.

G. I am certain there is a God, tho’ I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant by certainty.

S. It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.

S. Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?

S. Mo. Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.

Mo. N. Mem. To take notice of Locke’s woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.

M. Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that [pg 052]bodies do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt183.

M. S. Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.

S. Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?

S. Understanding is in some sort an action.

S. Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.

M. Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.

M. My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.

G. Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same184.

I. E. Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.

G. Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be “omnium rerum causa immanens,” and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul, “in Him we live,” &c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa’s, or Locke’s, or Hobbs’s, or Raphson’s185, &c.

S. The Will is purus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable, [pg 053]not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.

S. Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble yt may be made of the word “it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.

G. Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.

E. N. “Ex nihilo nihil fit.” This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are called veritates æternæ, because “nullam fidem habent extra mentem.” To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will186.

P. The philosophers talk much of a distinction ’twixt absolute & relative things, or ’twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wt they mean by “things considered in themselves.” This is nonsense, jargon.

S. It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wt are preferable to annihilation.

Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.

‘Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point187.

Mem. Wn I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy ’twixt Hobbes and Wallis.

[pg 054] G. Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.

M. I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we see solids. I reject his “solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch188.

S. It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.

E. S. Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential189.

M. The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.

P. Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2a ad Oldenburgium.

G. My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. “Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,” or “Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum190.”

‘Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.

S. But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by “we,” or “selves,” or “mind,” &c. ‘Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit191.

S. I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or [pg 055]part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.

S. The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.

N. S. I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; ’tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you’ll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.

Mo. In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.

Mo. There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.

Mo. N. Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality192.

S. Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.

N. We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.

N. The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes yt do nothing.

S. According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness [pg 056]so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.

I. I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.

I. If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.

I. Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.

M. What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.

M. Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen?

M. S. Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom193.

P. Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.

P. Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.

I. Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.

S. The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.

Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.

Tho’ it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.

S. I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name “pure act,” but rather pure spirit, or active being.

[pg 057] S. I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even ratione different from the Spirit, quâ faculties, or active.

S. Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible194. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

Mo. Qu. whether veritas stands not for an abstract idea?

M. ‘Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.

S. G. Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?

P. If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.

M. Extension, tho’ it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho’ it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.

S. ‘Tis an absurd question wch Locke puts, whether man be free to will?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.

M. P. I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.

Mo. N. Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names195.

[pg 058] N. I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; ’tis all the result of freedom, i.e. ’tis all voluntary196.

M. S. If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not say he or his mind is the sun, or is extended, tho’ neither sun or firmament be without mind.

S. ‘Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely ’tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries197, De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.

S. De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.

One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.

G. T. Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?

T. Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.

Duration not distinguish’d from existence.

Succession explain’d by before, between, after, & numbering.

Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

[pg 059] T. The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.

Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.

Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.

T. Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv’d, or rather the immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar’d with yt of motions shews the wisdom of God.

Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower?

M. Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.

Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.

M. In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov’d not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov’d not to exist therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd.

M. World wthout thought is nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, &c.

M. ‘Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty’d of all intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons198.

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?

Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight?

Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are [pg 060]different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name.

Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?

N. Qu. how to reconcile Newton’s 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?

Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable per se.

Molyneux’s blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight199.

Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt ’tis impossible it should exist without thought.

M. S. Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.

No extension but surface perceivable by sight.

M. Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, ’tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.

M. Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?

T. In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.

M. If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.

Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.

The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of ye story of the German Count.

Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?

Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?

N. Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely [pg 061]at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest?

M. Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?

T. The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a man200.

Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—

1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?

2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

3dly. From Molyneux’s problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv’d by Locke and him201.

M. Nothing but ideas perceivable202.

A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived—they being powers in the active being203.

Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says204.

Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish’d by parts. Hence taken for the same.

[pg 062] If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?

Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.

Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany’d wth pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv’d common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of ’em].

Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye205. Qu. Would he not think the later?

Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing how minimum tangibile would look in vision.

M. Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God’s creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.

In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.

M. Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.

Extension if in matter changes its relation wth minimum visibile, wch seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix’d?

M. Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.

M. If the world be granted to consist of Matter, ’tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.

Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.

Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz. punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.

[pg 063] M. N. By immateriality is solv’d the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.

Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.

N. Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, ’tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions206.

Unity in abstracto not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all; in concreto not divisible ad infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrable ad infinitum.

M. Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?

M. Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?

M. Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, Fardella207, &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they doubt of.

M. I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge208, whereas I think I have demonstrative [pg 064]knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum209.

M. Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.

‘Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.

S. Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?

Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?

The idea of an inch length not one determin’d idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose ’tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.

No stated ideas of length without a minimum.

M. Material substance banter’d by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.

M. In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease210.

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?

T. Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?

But one only colour & its degrees.

[pg 065] Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing seen was without his mind211?

S. Space without any bodies existing in rerum natura would not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wth respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.

M. The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.

By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try’d.

Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible212.

A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho’ the visible idea it yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.

Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.

[pg 066] Depth or solidity now perceived by sight213.

Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all214.

Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.

G. Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot subsist.

Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases215.

Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. ‘Tis an abstract term of the Schools.

P. Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.

Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.

M. “Of” and “thing” causes of mistake.

The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.

Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?

T. Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.

Lines & points conceiv’d as terminations different ideas from those conceiv’d absolutely.

Every position alters a line.

S. Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind.

[pg 067] All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.

Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv’d by Locke216.

Qu. how ’tis possible we should see flats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?

Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?

T. Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.

M. Matter tho’ allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin’s head.

Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.

Velocity not proportionable to space describ’d in given time.

M. No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.

Magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin’d, are resoluble into those points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.

M. Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wt the body has past may be conceiv’d annihilated.

[pg 068] M. Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

All potentiæ alike indifferent.

A. B. Wt does he mean by his potentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t’other?

No agent can be conceiv’d indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

We do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.

Mo. S. A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.

S. Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.

Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.

[pg 069] S. By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.

S. In moral matters men think (’tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will’d them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the potentia of A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills in infinitum.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.

M. The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter’d; they not having yet thought on such matters. ‘Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho’ never so exact, will not go down with most.

[pg 070] Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.

S. Mo. Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin’d by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin’d by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence ’tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.

Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.

The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius’s of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t’other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater?

Why objects seen erect?

N. To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other perceptions?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can’t perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.

Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the punctum visibile below 30 minutes?

I. S. Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow’d from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.

S. The grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the [pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.

G. The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.

M. The substance wood a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be no necessary connexion between those thoughts?

Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.

Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish’d by convexes, or enlarg’d by concaves?

P.N. Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.

M. P. Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. ‘Tis prudent to correct men’s mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.

M. P. Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.

How the retina is fill’d by a looking-glass?

Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses.

[pg 072] Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses?

The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign’d by any writer I know.

Qu. Why not objects seen confus’d when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?

Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?