Our Aims

¹¹⁶ We are not trying to founding a philosophical sect, like the ancient Greeks, or some moderns, as Telesius, Patricius, and Severinus.

We do not believe that peculiar principles of things are of much importance to men’s fortunes. This is because it is easy to:

• revive many ancient theories and
• introduce many new ones

We do not waste effort on theoretical and useless topics.

On the contrary, our determination is that of trying, whether we can lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity.

And although here and there, upon some particular points, we hold (in our own opinion) more true and certain, and I might even say, more advantageous tenets than those in general repute (which we have collected in the fifth part of our Instauration), yet we offer[92] no universal or complete theory.

The time does not yet appear to us to be arrived, and we entertain no hope of our life being prolonged to the completion of the sixth part of the Instauration (which is destined for philosophy discovered by the interpretation of nature), but are content if we proceed quietly and usefully in our intermediate pursuit, scattering, in the meantime, the seeds of less adulterated truth for posterity, and, at least, commence the great work.

¹¹⁷ We also do not offer nor promise specific effects. Some people object to us, that since we so often speak of effects, and consider everything in its relation to that end, we ought also to give some earnest of producing them.

Our course and method does not deduce effects from effects, nor experiments from experiments (as the empirics do). Instead, we deduce:

• causes and axioms from effects and experiments, and
• new effects and experiments from those causes and axioms.

Anyone with intelligence will observe the indications and sketches of many noble effects in:

• our tables of inventions (which form the fourth part of the Instauration),
• the examples of particular instances cited in the second part
• in our observations on history (which is the subject of the third part);

Yet our present natural history is not sufficiently copious and well ascertained to satisfy a proper interpretation.

If, therefore, there be any one who is more disposed and prepared for mechanics art, and ingenious in discovering effects, than in the mere management of experiment, we[93] allow him to employ his industry in gathering many of the fruits of our history and tables in this way, and applying them to effects, receiving them as interest till he can obtain the principal.

For us, having a greater object in view, we condemn all hasty and premature rest in such pursuits as we would Atalanta’s apple (to use a common allusion of ours);

For we are not childishly ambitious of golden fruit, but use all our efforts to make the course of art outstrip nature, and we hasten not to reap moss or the green blade, but wait for a ripe harvest.

¹¹⁸ There will be some, without doubt, who, on a perusal of our history and tables of invention, will meet with some uncertainty, or perhaps fallacy, in the experiments themselves, and will thence perhaps imagine that our discoveries are built on false foundations and principles.

There is, however, really nothing in this, since it must needs happen in beginnings.[64] For it is the same as if in writing or printing one or two letters were wrongly turned or misplaced, which is no great inconvenience to the reader, who can easily by his own eye correct the error; let men in the same way conclude, that many experiments in natural history may be erroneously believed and admitted, which are easily expunged and rejected afterward, by the discovery of causes and axioms.

If these errors in natural history and experiments become great, frequent, and continued, they cannot be corrected and amended by[94] any dexterity of wit or art.

If then, even in our natural history, well examined and compiled with such diligence, strictness, and (I might say) reverential scruples, there be now and then something false and erroneous in the details, what must we say of the common natural history, which is so negligent and careless when compared with ours? or of systems of philosophy and the sciences, based on such loose soil (or rather quicksand)? Let none then be alarmed by such observations.

¹¹⁹

With regard to what is common; let men reflect, that they have hitherto been used to do nothing but refer and adapt the causes of things of rare occurrence to those of things which more frequently happen, without any investigation of the causes of the latter, taking them for granted and admitted.

This is why they do not inquire into:

• the causes of gravity
• the rotation of the heavenly bodies
• heat, cold, light, hardness, softness, rarity, density, liquidity, solidity, animation, inanimation, similitude, difference, organic formation.

Instead, they:

• take them to be self-evident, manifest, and admitted.
• dispute and decide on other matters of less frequent and familiar occurrence.

But we know that:

• no judgment can be formed of that which is rare or remarkable.
• things can only be brought to light after a regular examination and discovery of the common causes, and the causes of those causes.

We are necessarily compelled[95] to admit the most common objects into our history.

Besides, we have observed that nothing has been so injurious to philosophy as this circumstance, namely, that familiar and frequent objects do not arrest and detain men’s contemplation, but are carelessly admitted, and their causes never inquired after; so that information on unknown subjects is not more often wanted than attention to those which are known.

¹²⁰ Pliny says that an apology is needed for meanness, or even the filthiness of particulars.

Such subjects are just as worthy of admission into natural history just as the most magnificent and costly. They do not at all pollute natural history, for the sun enters alike the palace and the privy, and is not thereby polluted.

We neither dedicate nor raise a capitol or pyramid to the pride of man, but rear a holy temple in his mind, on the model of the universe, which model therefore we imitate.

For that which is deserving of existence is deserving of knowledge, the image of existence. Now the mean and splendid alike exist. Nay, as the finest odors are sometimes produced from putrid matter (such as musk and civet), so does valuable light and information emanate from mean and sordid instances. But we have already said too much, for such fastidious feelings are childish and effeminate.

¹²¹ Many parts of our history will appear to the vulgar.

Any mind accustomed to the present state of things will appear fantastically and uselessly refined.

Hence, we look for experiments that shall afford light rather than profit, imitating the divine creation, which only produced light on the first day, and assigned that whole day to its creation, without adding any material work.

If anyone imagines such matters to be of no use, he might equally suppose light to be of no use, because it is neither solid nor material.

For, in fact, the knowledge of simple natures, when sufficiently investigated and defined, resembles light, which, though of no great use in itself, affords access to the general mysteries of effects, and with a peculiar power comprehends and draws with it whole bands and troops of effects, and the sources of the most valuable axioms.

So also the elements of letters have of themselves separately no meaning, and are of no use, yet are they, as it were, the original matter in the composition and preparation of speech. The seeds of substances, whose effect is powerful, are of no use except in their growth, and the scattered rays of light itself avail not unless collected.

But if speculative subtilties give offence, what must we say of the scholastic philosophers who indulged in them to such excess?

Those subtilties were wasted on words, or, at least, common notions (which is the same thing), not on things or nature, and alike unproductive of benefit in their origin and their consequences: in no way resembling ours, which are at present useless, but in their consequences of infinite benefit.

• When they are introduced subsequently to the discovery of axioms, all subtile disputes of the mind are late and preposterous.
• Their true or chief opportunity is when experiment is to be weighed and axioms to be derived from it.

They otherwise catch and grasp at nature, but never seize or detain her: and we may well apply to nature that which has been said of opportunity[97] or fortune, that she wears a lock in front, but is bald behind.

Some people despise natural history as being vulgar, mean, subtile, and useless in its origin.

A haughty prince[65] once rejected the petition of a poor woman as unworthy of his majesty. The woman said to him: “Then stop to reign.”

The empire of nature can neither be obtained nor administered by one who refuses to pay attention to such matters as being poor and too minute.