Natural Philosophy

⁹² Men’s despair and the idea of impossibility are by far:

• the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the sciences, and -the undertaking of any new attempt

Men of a prudent and exact turn of thought are diffident in matters of this nature because of:

• the obscurity of nature
• the shortness of life
• the deception of the senses, and
• weakness of the judgment.

They think that:

• in the revolutions of ages and of the world there are certain floods and ebbs of the sciences
• these grow and flourish at one time, and wither and fall off at another
• when they have attained a certain degree and condition they can proceed no further.

If anyone believes or promises greater things, they:

• impute it to an uncurbed and immature mind
• imagine that such efforts begin pleasantly, then become[74] laborious, and end in confusion.

That is how men of dignity and excellent judgment think.

We must:

• be careful lest we should be captivated by our affection for an excellent and most beautiful object, and relax or diminish the severity of our judgment.
• diligently examine what gleam of hope shines upon us, and in what direction it manifests itself, so that, banishing her lighter dreams, we may discuss and weigh whatever appears of more sound importance.
• consult the prudence of ordinary life, too, which is diffident upon principle, and in all human matters augurs the worst.

Our ideas are detailed in our Tables of Invention.

⁸³ Let us:

• begin from God
• show that our pursuit from its exceeding goodness clearly proceeds from him

In all divine works, the smallest beginnings lead assuredly to some result.

The remark in spiritual matters that “the kingdom of God cometh without observation,” is also found to be true in every great work of Divine Providence, so that everything glides quietly on without confusion or noise, and the matter is achieved before men either think or perceive that it is commenced.

Nor should we neglect to mention the prophecy of Daniel, of the last days of the world, “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased,”[56] thus plainly hinting and suggesting that fate (which is Providence) would cause the complete circuit of the globe (now accomplished, or at least going forward by means of so many distant voyages), and the increase of learning to happen at the same epoch.

⁹⁵ Those who have treated of the sciences have been either:

• empirics or
  • These are like ants which only heap up and use their store
• dogmatical.[57]
  • These are like spiders which spin out their own webs.

The bee is a mean between both. It extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts.

The true labor of philosophy resembles hers, for it neither relies entirely or principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history and mechanics in its raw state, but changes and works it in the understanding. We have good reason,[77] therefore, to derive hope from a closer and purer alliance of these faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted.

⁹⁶ Natural philosophy is not yet to be found unadulterated, but is impure and corrupted—by logic in the school of Aristotle, by natural theology in that of Plato,[58] by mathematics in the second school of Plato (that of Proclus and others)[59] which ought rather to terminate natural philosophy than to generate or create it. We may, therefore, hope for better results from pure and unmixed natural philosophy.

⁹⁷ No one has yet had the firmness and severity to:

• entirely abolish common theories and notions, and
• applying the mind afresh to particular research.

Hence, our human reasoning is a mere farrago and crude mass made up of a lot of credulity and accident.

But if a man of mature age, unprejudiced senses, and clear mind, would betake himself anew to experience and particulars, we might hope much more from such a one. In this respect, we promise ourselves the fortune of Alexander the Great.

Aeschines spoke thus of Alexander and his exploits:

He considered Alexander’s exploits to be miraculous.

But in succeeding ages[60], Livy took a better view and observed that Alexander did no more than dare to despise insignificance.

So in our opinion, posterity will judge of us, that we have achieved no great matters, but only set less account upon what is considered important.

For the meantime, our only hope is in the regeneration of the sciences, by regularly raising them on the foundation of experience and building them anew, which I think none can venture to affirm to have been already done or even thought of.

⁹⁸ The foundations of experience (our sole resource) have hitherto failed completely or have been very weak. nor has a store and collection of particular facts, capable of informing the mind or in any way satisfactory, been either sought after or amassed.

On the contrary, learned, but idle and indolent, men have received some[79] mere reports of experience, traditions as it were of dreams, as establishing or confirming their philosophy, and have not hesitated to allow them the weight of legitimate evidence.

So that a system has been pursued in philosophy with regard to experience resembling that of a kingdom or state which would direct its councils and affairs according to the gossip of city and street politicians, instead of the letters and reports of ambassadors and messengers worthy of credit.

Nothing is rightly inquired into, or verified, noted, weighed, or measured, in natural history; indefinite and vague observation produces fallacious and uncertain information. If this appear strange, or our complaint somewhat too unjust (because Aristotle himself, so distinguished a man and supported by the wealth of so great a king, has completed an accurate history of animals, to which others with greater diligence but less noise have made considerable additions, and others again have composed copious histories and notices of plants, metals, and fossils), it will arise from a want of sufficiently attending to and comprehending our present observations; for a natural history compiled on its own account, and one collected for the mind’s information as a foundation for philosophy, are two different things.

They differ principally in thiat the former contains only the varieties of natural species without the experiments of mechanical arts.

for as in ordinary life every person’s disposition, and the concealed feelings of the mind and passions are most drawn out when they are disturbed—so the secrets of nature betray themselves more readily when tormented by art than when left to their own course.

We must begin, therefore, to entertain hopes of natural philosophy then only, when we have a better compilation of natural history, its real basis and support.

⁹⁹ Even in the abundance of mechanical experiments, there is a very great scarcity of those which best inform and assist the understanding.

For the mechanic, little solicitous about the investigation of truth, neither directs his attention, nor applies his hand to anything that is not of service to his business. But our hope of further progress in the sciences will then only be well founded, when numerous experiments shall be received and collected into natural history, which, though of no use in themselves, assist materially in the discovery of causes and axioms; which experiments we have termed enlightening, to distinguish them from those which are profitable.

They never deceive or fail you.

• They are used only to discover the natural cause of some object.
• They equally satisfy your aim by deciding the question.

¹⁰⁰ We must:

• procure many experiments.
• introduce a completely different method, order, and progress of continuing and promoting experience.

Vague and arbitrary experience is mere groping in the dark. It rather astonishes than instructs.

But when experience shall proceed regularly and uninterruptedly by a determined rule, we may entertain better hopes of the sciences.

¹⁰¹ But after having collected and prepared an abundance and store of natural history, and of the experience required for the operations of the understanding or philosophy, still the understanding is as incapable of acting on such materials of itself, with the aid of memory alone, as any person would be of retaining and achieving, by memory, the computation of an almanac.

Yet meditation has hitherto done more for discovery than writing, and no[81] experiments have been committed to paper. We cannot, however, approve of any mode of discovery without writing, and when that comes into more general use, we may have further hopes.