Other Causes of the Errors in Learning

⁸ Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment.

For the 2 ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients:

The one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and even.

So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

⁹ Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of knowledge, which is mostly magistral and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful.

This makes it believed the soonest, and not easiest examined.

It is true, that in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be disallowed.

But in the true handling of knowledge, men should not fall either on the one side:

• into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean, Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de revideretur: nor
• into Socrates, his ironical doubting of all things

We should propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s own judgment proved more or less.*

¹⁰ Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours.

The more constant and devoted kind of professors of any science should make some additions to their science to aspire to certain second prizes.

This is like how a profound interpreter or commentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger,

And so the patrimony of knowledge becomes improved, but seldom augmented.

¹¹ But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge.

Men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge:

• sometimes from a natural curiosity
• sometimes to entertain their minds
• sometimes for ornament and reputation
• sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction
• most times for lucre and profession
• seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men

This benefit for the mind is like:

• a couch for rest for a searching and restless spirit
• a terrace for a wandering mind to walk up and down safely
• a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon
• a fort for strife and contention
• a shop, for profit or sale

Knowledge will be dignified and exalted if contemplation and action are more nearly and straitly conjoined and united.

“Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.” [39]

Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to converse on the earth.

I do not mean to leave natural philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy.

Both heaven and earth conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man. Likewise, the end from both philosophies should be:

• to separate and reject vain speculations, and whatever is empty and void
• to preserve and augment whatever is solid and fruitful
• to make knowledge a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort

Philosophy should not make knowledge:

• a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only
• a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use;

¹² I described those peccant humours which impede and the proficience of learning and have even put learning in a bad light.

My purpose in learning is:

• to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things
• to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments, divine and human.