Question 2: Prophetic Mission

There are 2 points regarding the Prophetic Mission.

1. The proof of the coming of the prophets
2. An explanation of the fact that the man claiming to be a prophet is really so and does not lie.

Many people are desirous of proving the existence of the prophets by analogy—and such are the Mutakallimun.

They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends, and is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a being in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people.

Hence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world.

They have thought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by absurd and[235] far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use.

They say that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the observed world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a king and says, “O ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you” and produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge him to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the credentials are the miracles which they perform.

For certain reasons this method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people, but when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle.

Our acknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is not true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the royal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects that whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man, which are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger.[236]

When this is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance of miracles is the special sign of the prophets?

This can be proved neither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more impossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they are the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they were found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other.

So in this case a proof of anyone’s prophecy is based upon two premises. First, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and secondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet.

Now as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed miracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have admitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither be made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are beyond our conception.

The second[237] premise can only be true when we admit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only performed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission. We would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe the existence of the prophets and the miracles.

For instance if it has become clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly knows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man can object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved?

Even after we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it may seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the premise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other. One cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by reason, because of its possibility.

For the possibility to which they refer is in fact really ignorance,[238] and is not found in the nature of things.

For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain or not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that is, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as in the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility of a thing by its nature.

The necessary (wajib) is quite contrary to it; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found. In this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its nature cannot be changed or transformed.

So when one party admits the existence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic mission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says that it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in its case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because we have known the prophets.

We say that a knowledge of the messengers from man, leads us to a belief in the existence of[239] messengers from God, as the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion of there being a messenger from Zaid also.

This requires a similarity in the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the difficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the future, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our knowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has come into existence.

For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the fact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives, that is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing in this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent any messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from our doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do not know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any messenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose[240] anybody to be his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him.

We can admit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So when we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles, then how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for this faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved.

At the same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience and habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be seen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to have been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a convincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is not, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one whose claim is wrong.

By these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the whole[241] purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put possibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in reality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every one who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except when the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of messengers.

It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous things, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive proof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do such things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie.

But it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit that the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be performed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a a prophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person, because there is no connection between them and reason, except that we admit that the miracles are[242] one of the works of the prophets, just as curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is certainly a physician.

This is one of the fallacies of the argument. Moreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by putting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place of certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims to be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a person, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets, as the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed by the magicians and saints.

The condition which they attach with them is that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time claims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to the false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be understood either by hearing or reason.

That is, it is said that one whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as we have already[243] said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then they can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this purpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence cannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who think miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly are not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies. Hence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that they cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only imagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who deny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints.

It is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him, that he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy, and that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the performance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing one element into another.

Whatever miracles[244] did appear from him were only performed in the natural course of things, without on his part any intention of contention or competition. The following words of the Quran will make this clear; “And they say: We will by no means believe in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth for us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and vines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst thereof in abundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as thou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch for thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to heaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until thou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we may read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as an apostle?”[104]

Then again, “Nothing hindered us from sending thee with miracles, except that the former nations have[245] charged them with imposture.”[105] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in him, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, “Say, verily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto it, although the one of them assigned the other.”[106]

Then further he says, “will they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore ten chapters like unto it forged by yourself.”[107] This being the case the miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which he advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic mission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but how does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his prophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of prophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of any[246] prophet.

Besides the people have differed in taking the Quran to be a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a miracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may have become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only word, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by its superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing anything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent.

This being the case it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details only, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some people say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority.

They do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should be quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be such a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would reply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not as they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy, is based, we believe,[247] upon two principles, which are found in the Book itself.

The first being that the existence of the class of men called prophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down laws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education. Their existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated action, as the existence of all things which we have not seen—the lives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and other men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words, (and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been revealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good actions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them give up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions.

This is the business of divine apostles.

The second principle is, that everyone who does this work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This principle is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it is[248] known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one who can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of the prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and one who does so is a prophet.

The Book mentions the first principle in the following:—“Verily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and We have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and Solomon; and we have given thee the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto David; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee, and God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,”[108] and again: “Say, I am not alone among the apostles.”[109] The second principle is that Mohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is, has given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be known from the[249] Quran, where God mentions it.

He says, “O men, now is an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down unto you manifest light.”[110] By manifest light is meant the Quran. Again He says, “O men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord; believe, therefore, it will be better for you,”[111] and again, “But those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who believe in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;”[112] and again “God is the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He sent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness thereof; but God is a sufficient witness.”[113]

If it be said, how can the first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men who give the Law to the people by divine revelation; and so also, how to know the second principle, that is, that which the[250] Quran contains, about beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that the first principle can be known by the information which these men give about the existence of things, which were not found before, but come into existence after they have informed the people about them, and in a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and teaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and actions, which can be taught by human agency.

This is so because if the miracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot be laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation, then it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of laws, as the dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily prove the prophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the former, if they fall very near to it.

But standing alone they cannot prove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance of the prophets, if the other[251] kind of miracles, which are its conclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle must be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs while others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses.

So now it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and how can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearance; as is the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked: How can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a miracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is the business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in many ways:—First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and deeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation; secondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can be achieved[252] by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is known that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic speaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is the case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the Arabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one.

How can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge and precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they deserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also can be known in many ways.

First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be acquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and misery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as charity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness and produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the knowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the soul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not.[253]

If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery; and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does not give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a knowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the common people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this, or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education, learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting learning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and giving information[254] about the conditions of the Day of Judgment.

When all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about it, “Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like it.” This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit, who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, “Thou couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the divine origin thereof.”[114] Hence God[255] has repeatedly told the people this quality of His prophet. “It is He who hath raised up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,”[115] and, “Those who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet.”[116] This matter can also be known by another method—that of comparison of this Law with the others.

For, if the business of the prophets be the giving of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an unlimited degree.

On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it[256] is clear that the Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you could know the past books—the Old and New Testaments. But that is not possible because they have been changed to a great extent.

Were we to describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day of Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would require many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has been called the last of the divine dispensations.

The Prophet has said:

“Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped following me,”

The Prophet was right, on account of the universal nature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the human race. So God has said, “say,[257] O men, Verily I am the messenger of God unto you all.”[117] The Prophet has said, “I have been sent both to the white and the black nations.”

The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some foods which agree with all, or most of the people. Such is the case with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation, which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said informing us of his superiority over other prophets, “There is no prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment.” All that we have said must have made it[258] clear to you that the proof of the prophecy of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,—they not being acts which make a prophet.

Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it would be outward satisfaction alone. The first is far better.[259] The only reason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God distinguished him with his revelations.

On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist, and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted with regard to the common people. For the doubts and[260] objections which we have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the sake of truth.