Justice and Injustice

The violator of Law is Unjust. The keeper of the Law is Just.

All Lawful things are Just because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the legislative power and each of these we say is Just.

The Laws too give directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard real goodness or adopting some other estimate).

In one way we mean by Just, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and its ingredients for the social community.

Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man (as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one’s arms), but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from adultery and wantonness;

Those of the meek man, as refraining from striking others or using abusive language.

Similarly, in respect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat inferior if it is one extemporised.

This Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as exercised towards one’s neighbour.

This is why Justice is thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and

“neither Hesper nor the Morning-star So worthy of our admiration:”

and in a proverbial saying we express the same;

“All virtue is in Justice comprehended.”

And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice of perfect Virtue.

It is perfect because he that has it is able to practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself.

There are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is thought to be a good one,

“Rule will show what a man is;”

for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a community.

For this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous to another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject.

He is the basest of men who practises vice not only in his own person,[5] but towards his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in his own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some difficulty.

However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice.

Now wherein Justice in this sense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the same really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has respect to one’s neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and such a moral state it is simply Virtue.